ORDERS:
ORDER OF REMAND
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Court (“ALC”) pursuant to the appeal of
Carlos R. Durant, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections (“Department”). In
his appeal, Durant alleges that the Department failed to properly calculate his sentence.
The ALC’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). In Al-
Shabazz, the Supreme Court created a new avenue by which inmates could seek review of final
decisions of the Department in “non-collateral” matters, i.e., matters in which an inmate does not
challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence, by appealing those decisions to the ALC and
ultimately to the circuit court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. Id. at 373, 376, 527
S.E.2d at 752, 754. These matters typically arise in two ways: (1) when an inmate is disciplined and
punishment is imposed; and (2) when an inmate believes that his sentence, sentence-related credits,
or custody status have been calculated incorrectly. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750. Subsequently, in
Sullivan v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124 (2003), the
Court clarified the ALC’s jurisdiction over inmate cases, holding that for the ALC to have jurisdiction
over an inmate’s claim, it must implicate a state-created liberty interest.
In this case, Durant challenges the calculation of his sentence. As such, I find that this tribunal
has jurisdiction to hear Durant’s appeal.
However, upon review of the Record on Appeal, I find that the Department’s final decision
in this matter fails to set forth findings which are sufficiently detailed to enable this tribunal to conduct
a meaningful appellate review.
Additionally, the Record on Appeal itself is devoid of sufficient
documentation to permit the conduct of a proper review. Pursuant to the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s decision in Porter v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 333 S.C. 12, 507 S.E.2d 328 (1998), the
findings of an administrative body must be “sufficiently detailed to enable [the reviewing body] to
determine whether the findings are supported by the evidence and whether the law has been applied
properly to those findings.” Id., 507 S.E.2d at 332.
In this case, the Department’s final decision includes a finding that Durant “has been convicted
of six disciplinary infractions dating back to July 6, 1989 where [he] lost 150 days of Good Time
Credits.” The final decision contains no finding as to the date that Durant began serving his sentence.
However, in their briefs the parties seem to agree that Durant has only been incarcerated with the
Department since 1992.
The sparse Record on Appeal in this case consists only of copies of
Durant’s Step 1 and Step 2 Grievances; it does not include any documentation reflecting when
Durant’s sentence began, how long he was to serve, or how many disciplinary infractions he has had
since his sentence began. The Department attached a history of Durant’s Earned Work Credits as
an exhibit to its Respondent’s Brief, which includes jobs Durant supposedly has held between the
years of 1989 and 2002. This history is in conflict with the Department’s position in its Brief that
Durant has been incarcerated only since 1992. The Department also attached a Maxout Date
Calculation Worksheet as an Exhibit to its Brief; however, there is insufficient documentation in the
Record on Appeal to show what evidence was used to determine the number of Good Time Days,
the number of Earned Work Credits, and the Sentence Start Date that were used to calculate the max-out date. Consequently,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is remanded to the Department of Corrections
for the issuance of a final order containing detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding
the issues raised in Durant’s grievance; such order shall be issued within sixty (60) days of the date
of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this docket is closed; when the Department issues its new
final order, if Durant feels he is aggrieved by that order he needs to address it through a new
grievance.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
C. DUKES SCOTT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
June 25, 2004
Columbia, South Carolina |