ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD) as an appeal of a decision
rendered by a Hearing Officer of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Ms.
DeHart appealed a determination by the Disability Determination Division of the South Carolina
Department of Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) that she was not "disabled" and therefore not entitled
to Medicaid benefits. The denial of eligibility was based on the conclusion by VR that Ms. DeHart
has the residual functional capacity to perform unskilled, non-complex, sedentary work that is
available in the national economy.
A fair hearing was held by DHHS on December 3, 1997. Ms. DeHart was not represented
by counsel at this hearing, but did appear with her mother. On January 15, 1998, the DHHS Hearing
Officer (Kimberly B. Burrell) issued an Administrative Decision affirming the denial of eligibility.
Ms. DeHart appealed that decision to the ALJD and subsequently retained counsel. A hearing was
held before the Administrative Law Judge Division May 20, 1998.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
This case is before the ALJD as an appeal of an agency action. As such, the ALJD sits in an
appellate capacity under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), rather than as an independent
finder of fact. In South Carolina, the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act -- specifically
S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(6) -- govern the reasons an appellate body may reverse or modify an
agency decision. Section 1-23-380(A)(6) sets forth that:
The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant
have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or
decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory authority;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion
or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(Supp. 1998).
A decision is supported by "substantial evidence" when the record as a whole allows
reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton v. Best Western Royal
Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 321 S.E.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1984). The well-settled case law in this state
has also interpreted the rule to mean that a decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable
minds may differ on the judgment. Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981). The fact
that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency's finding from being supported by
substantial evidence. Waters v. South Carolina Land Resources Conservation Comm'n, 321 S.C.
219, 467 S.E.2d 913 (1996); Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388
(1995); Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. South Carolina Public Service Comm'n, 282 S.C. 430, 319 S.E.2d
695 (1984).
In applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the administrative agency
are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Co., 320 S.C. 515, 466 S.E.2d 357 (1996),
citing Kearse v. State Health and Human Services Finance Comm'n, 318 S.C. 198, 456 S.E.2d 892
(1995). Furthermore, the reviewing court is prohibited from substituting its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995), citing Gibson v. Florence Country Club, 282 S.C.
384, 318 S.E.2d 365 (1984). Finally, the party challenging an agency action has the burden of
proving convincingly that the agency's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters v.
South Carolina Land Resources Conservation Comm'n, 321 S.C. 219, 467 S.E.2d 913 (1996), citing
Hamm v. AT&T, 302 S.C. 210, 394 S.E.2d 842 (1994).
Disability Evaluation Process
Federal criteria contained in regulations issued by the Social Security Administration are used
to determine whether an applicant is "disabled." These criteria are the same as those used by the
Social Security Administration in determining whether an individual qualifies for certain Social
Security benefit programs (e.g., cash assistance payments of the Supplemental Security Income [SSI]
Program).
The federal regulations governing the disability determination process establish a "sequential
step evaluation" to determine whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 416.920. VR first
determines whether the applicant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity" at the time of the
application. In other words, "is the applicant currently working?" If the applicant is not currently
working, the process proceeds to the second step, in which the Department decides whether the
applicant suffers from a medically determinable "severe impairment" that may reasonably be
expected to last for more than one year or to result in death. If the applicant does suffer from a
"severe impairment," that impairment (or combination of impairments) is compared to the regulatory
listing of impairments that are considered to result in disability. If the applicant's impairment meets
or equals one of these listings, the applicant is considered to be disabled. If the applicant's
impairment does not meet or equal one of those "listings," then the applicant's age, education and
work experience are considered to determine whether there is any "substantial gainful activity" (i.e.,
work) existing in the national economy in which the applicant could engage. This step is known as
the evaluation of an individual's "residual functional capacity" -- which essentially means
evaluating what the individual can still do in light of his/her impairment, age, education, and work
experience. In conducting this evaluation, the previous work history of the individual is considered.
If the individual is deemed unable to engage in his/her previous work, then a determination is made,
taking into account his/her impairment, age, education, and work experience, as to whether any other
work opportunities exist in the national economy that would be suitable for the applicant.
Disability Determination in this Case
Ms. DeHart applied for Medicaid benefits on January 24, 1997, under the "Aged, Blind, and
Disabled" ("ABD") eligibility category. Her application was referred to the Disability Determination
Division of the South Carolina Department of Vocational Rehabilitation ("VR") for an independent
disability determination. Ms. DeHart's application for Medicaid was denied September 23, 1997
because she was determined not to be "disabled."
In Ms. DeHart's case, she was not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" (i.e., was not
working) at the time of her application. Therefore, VR evaluated her medical condition to determine
whether she suffered from a "severe impairment." In conducting this evaluation, VR considered not
only the conditions identified by Ms. DeHart in her application, (1) but also considered other medical
conditions identified during a review of Ms. DeHart's medical records.(2) In addition, VR arranged
for an independent medical consultant to examine Ms. DeHart.
Although some aspects of Ms. DeHart's condition were determined by VR to be less than
severe, her combination of impairments was determined to be severe enough for the determination
process to proceed to the next step. Furthermore, the DHHS Hearing Officer specifically found the
combination of Ms. DeHart's impairments to be severe. However, Ms. DeHart's impairments did
not meet or equal any of the "listings" that would have deemed her to be disabled based solely on
her medical condition. Therefore, an evaluation of her "residual functional capacity" was undertaken
as the next step of the sequential evaluation process in order to ascertain the impact her condition
could be expected to have upon her ability to work (i.e., "engage in substantial gainful activity").
In reviewing Ms. DeHart's "residual functional capacity," VR determined that she could not
return to her past work. Therefore, VR evaluated whether she is capable of performing any work that
is available in the national economy. Based on the available information, VR concluded that Ms.
DeHart was capable of performing work that does not involve detailed or complex instructions, and
that such work does exist in the national economy. The Hearing Officer also made a specific finding
that Ms. DeHart retains the capacity to perform unskilled, non-complex, sedentary work available
in the national economy. As a result of her residual functional capacity, the Hearing Officer
concluded that Ms. DeHart did not meet the definition of "disabled."
Deterioration of Ms. DeHart's Condition
More than two months elapsed between VR's denial and the fair hearing before the DHHS
Hearing Officer. At both hearings, Ms. DeHart asserted that her medical condition, which is
apparently degenerative in nature, had further deteriorated. Indeed, at the time of the fair hearing,
Ms. DeHart was reportedly scheduled for additional surgery. Although VR's representative at the
fair hearing did attempt to address the impact of Ms. DeHart's future deterioration, his ability to do
so without access to relevant medical records is quite constrained. To the contrary, both Ms. DeHart
and her mother testified about her worsening condition. With all due respect to Mr. Bost, he is
apparently not a medical doctor. Therefore, his qualifications to address the seriousness of Ms.
DeHart's medical condition are limited by his education and training. The difficulty faced by Mr.
Bost was further compounded by his lack of access, due to no fault of his own, to the appropriate
records at the time. Unfortunately, because this issue was not fully explored, the record before me
contains insufficient information to allow me to render a decision as to whether the alleged
deterioration in Ms. DeHart's condition would have been dispositive of the disability determination.
Additionally, I am also faced with the same quandary that confronted the DHHS Hearing Officer in
that Ms. DeHart's condition has reportedly worsened even more in the interim.
Within the federal system, reviewing courts have generally declined to remand disability
claims for reevaluation in light of medical evidence of a deteriorated condition. Sizemore v.
Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 865 F.2d 709, 712, (6th Cir. 1988), citing Oliver v. Secretary
of Health and Human Serv., 804 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1986). In doing so, the courts have often ruled
that the appropriate remedy for a seriously degenerated condition is to initiate a new claim for
benefits as of the date that the condition aggravated to the point of constituting a disabling
impairment. Id.; see also, Godsey v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1987) and Ward v. Schweiker,
659 F.2d 762 (9th Cir 1982).
However, this prohibition is not absolute. Courts have remanded cases on the basis of "new
evidence" -- often involving an alleged deterioration of the claimant's condition -- in circumstances
meeting the following criteria: (1) the evidence must be relevant to the determination of disability
at the time the application was first filed; (2) the evidence may not be merely cumulative; (3) the
evidence must be material to the extent that the disability decision might reasonably have been
different had the new evidence been considered in the original determination; and (4) there must be
good cause for the claimant's failure to submit the evidence during the initial determination. Borders
v. Heckler, 777 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1985). This four-part test was subsequently incorporated by
Congress into the federal statute governing judicial review of disability cases. Under that statute, a
reviewing court is allowed to remand a case for additional evidence "upon a showing that there is
new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such
evidence into the record in a prior proceeding." 42 U.S.C. §405(g). See also, Young v. Harris, 507
F. Supp. 907 (D.S.C. 1981) (applying an amended federal statute and holding that court may remand
a denial of disability benefits for additional administrative consideration; good cause for such a
remand may consist of new evidence obtained after the hearing which suggests a different result).
The decision as to when a deterioration of condition warrants a remand versus when the filing
of a fresh application is the appropriate remedy is a difficult one that must balance the competing
interests of the parties. In providing for remands, Congress' intent has been explained by one district
court as follows:
Congress has expressed a desire that disability claims should be disposed of quickly,
so that truly needy claimants may have their cases proceed without the backlogs
caused by needless remands for "new evidence."...In order to facilitate the speedy
disposition of meritorious claims, "new evidence" remands [under section 405(g)]
should be narrowly circumscribed.
Brown v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 190, 193-94 (M.D. Fla. 1983), as quoted in Wilkins at 774.
However, this understandable and laudable goal of a speedy disposition of meritorious claims should
not be achieved at the expense of creating a system that does not adequately address valid medical
conditions of applicants whose claims may ultimately prove to be meritorious.
Both the state and federal determinations of disability are made by VR, using the same
criteria. In fact, in most cases a determination made through the federal process is binding on the
state. Although the federal judicial review process is governed by different laws than those which
set forth this court's obligations in reviewing this matter, the state and federal disability
determination processes -- including appeals and judicial reviews -- should afford some measure
of consistency of results. A claimant proceeding through the federal avenue should not have an
easier time (nor a more difficult one) than a claimant pursuing an appeal through the state process.
Therefore, although I do not necessarily consider the federal court decisions cited herein to be
binding upon the ALJD operating under South Carolina's Administrative Procedures Act, I do find
the reasoning in these cases to be persuasive in many respects.
In Ms. DeHart's case, evidence of a worsening of her condition can hardly be described as
cumulative to the information previously available to VR, since a deterioration is by its very nature
a change in condition that would be new or different. Courts have tended to view such changing
circumstances as meeting the "good cause" requirement for ordering a remand. If a person's medical
condition is undergoing change, then evidence of that change is obviously not available until the
change occurs. Thus, the "new" information may not have been available at the time of the initial
hearing. See, Burkett v. Callahan, 978 F. Supp. 1428 (D. Kan. 1997). In this case, there is credible
evidence that some change allegedly occurred prior to the fair hearing, and also some change
occurred between the time of the fair hearing and the hearing before the ALJD. Obviously, at least
some of the information was not available at the time of the fair hearing. This situation, coupled with
the fact that Ms. DeHart has only an eighth grade education, satisfies the "good cause" component
of the decision to remand.
A serious medical condition that impacts an individual's ability to engage in physical activity
is certainly "material" to a disability determination. If true, the alleged change in Ms. DeHart's
condition would present a "reasonable possibility" (not "probability") of a different outcome.
Therefore, Ms. DeHart's alleged deterioration meets the "materiality" test. Finally, like the Burkett
court, I have difficulty concluding that the reported deterioration developed in a very short span of
time. I think it is quite possible that the change occurred over a broader period of time that could
extend back far enough to impact the onset of a disabling condition relative to Ms. DeHart's original
application.
Therefore, under the unique circumstances presented in this case, I find it appropriate to
remand this matter back to DHHS for additional findings concerning the "new evidence" of the
deterioration of Ms. DeHart's condition and the relevance (if any) of that evidence to the potential
onset of her disability in connection with her original application date. The impact (if any) of that
evidence upon whether her condition meets or equals a disability "listing" should also be evaluated.(3)
In addition, because VR found Ms. DeHart's severe impairment to exist in the form of her
depression, its residual functional capacity assessment focused primarily on the restrictions this
mental condition would place on her ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. VR's
assessment apparently did not focus on physical limitations, since VR did not consider her to have
a severe physical impairment. Upon remand, if Ms. DeHart's deterioration is found to be relevant
to the onset of a disability in connection with her original application date, then the effect of that
physical deterioration upon the assessment of her residual functional capacity should be developed.
ORDER
For the reasons discussed above, this matter is remanded to the Division of Appeals and
Hearings of the Department of Health and Human Services for additional findings concerning the
"new evidence" of the deterioration of Ms. DeHart's condition, the relevance (if any) of that evidence
to the potential onset of her disability in connection with her original application date, the impact (if
any) of that evidence upon whether her condition meets or equals a disability "listing," and the
impact (if any) of that evidence upon her residual functional capacity.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
Ralph King Anderson, III.
Administrative Law Judge
September 14, 1998
Columbia, South Carolina
1. Ms. DeHart's application alleged disability as the result of a neurological tumor.
2. VR specifically evaluated Ms. DeHart's psychiatric condition as the result of information that was discovered
in the review of her records. Ms. DeHart's pain was also considered.
3. In ordering that this case be remanded, I am fully aware of the difficulty of the task facing the DHHS Hearing
Officer, both initially and upon remand, in evaluating the extent to which allegations of interim deterioration should
impact the final determination of disability. Unfortunately, this is an issue that has no simple solution. She (or he)
will simply have to make a concerted effort to develop all of the potentially material facts and then make an informed
decision based upon all available relevant information. |