Delores Manning (Manning) appeals a decision of the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) denying her claim for benefits provided by the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (ABD) Program.
Jurisdiction for this appeal is in the Administrative Law Judge Division. S.C. Code Ann. §
44-6-190 (Supp. 1997). The DHHS decision is vacated and the matter remanded for
reconsideration in light of the matters discussed herein.
II. Discussion
Medicaid "is intended to enable each state . . . to furnish medical assistance on behalf of . . .
permanently and totally disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet
the cost of necessary medical services." 79 Am. Jur.2d Welfare Law § 38. Manning argues she is
totally disabled and entitled to Medicaid benefits. Having not received benefits, this appeal arose.
An appellate body may reverse or modify the decision of a hearing officer if substantial rights of
the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or
decisions of the hearing officer are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(e) (Supp. 1997). Since
Manning challenges the factual basis supporting the hearing officer's conclusion, the ALJ must
determine whether the hearing officer's findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, under normal circumstances two matters would be decided. First, what did the hearing
officer find as the basis for her decision? Second, are the hearing officer's findings supported by
substantial evidence? In this case, the first question cannot be answered to the degree needed for
proper appellate review. Thus, the second question is not reached, but instead a remand is ordered.
A. Implicit Findings
In this case the findings of fact are implicit findings not sufficiently detailed to allow for a
meaningful review of the conclusion that Manning is not totally disabled. A meaningful review
cannot be made where the findings of fact are implicit findings that merely outline the conclusions
and rational used by the parties. "[A] recital of conflicting testimony followed by a general
conclusion is patently insufficient to enable a reviewing court to address the issues." Able
Communications, Inc. v. South Carolina Public Serv. Comm'n, 290 S.C. 409, 411, 351 S.E.2d
151, 152 (1986), quoted in Brayboy v. Clark Heating Co., Inc., 306 S.C. 56, 59, 409 S.E.2d 767,
768 (1991). Three examples establish the difficulty in this case
1. Examples
First, the hearing officer found "the reviewer indicated that [Manning] could return to this past
relevant work, as performed in the national economy." (emphasis added; Order, p. 3, paragraph 15).
Given such language, the reviewer found Manning could return to prior work, but the hearing
officer made no specific determination on the issue. Consequently, not having reached the issue,
the hearing officer could not and did not state what facts she would have relied upon to reach such
a conclusion.
Second, and quite similar to the first, the hearing officer found "[t]he Department determined
[Manning] could perform light work." (emphasis added; Order, p. 3, paragraph 16). Again, the
Department made a determination on the light work issue, but the hearing officer did not.
Obviously, Manning opposed such a view and presented evidence challenging such a position. The
hearing officer must decide such factual disputes and give sufficient rational for her decision so as
to allow the reviewing body to decide if substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached.
Brayboy v. Clark Heating Co., Inc., 306 S.C. 56, 59, 409 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1991). The rational for
a finding is important. Lack of a clear explanation of the agency's reasoning prevents the reviewing
court from determining if the decision is arbitrary or capricious. See Hatcher v. South Carolina
Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, Inc., 267 S.C. 107, 226 S.E.2d 253 (1976) ("A decision is
arbitrary if it is without a rational basis, is based alone on one's will and not upon any course of
reasoning and exercise of judgment, is made at pleasure, without adequate determining principles,
or is governed by no fixed rules or standards").
Finally, the hearing officer found that "if [Manning] is limited to sedentary work . . . [she] would
fall under 20 CFR Rule 201.29 which warrants a finding of not disabled." (emphasis added; Order
p. 3, paragraph 16). In other words if someone were to make a factual finding that Manning could
perform sedentary work, she would not be totally disabled. No explicit finding is made that
Manning can perform sedentary work, no factual finding is made of how long she can sit, and no
factual finding expresses a rational as to how such a conclusion on the ability to perform sedentary
work was reached.
2. Fundamental Problem
The above three examples are merely indicators of a more fundamental problem. The fundamental
problem is that an appellate review cannot be intelligently made in this case since the decision lacks
findings on the ultimate facts in dispute, i.e., a finding of fact clearly indicating the hearing officer's
decision on Manning's ability to lift, walk, sit and stand and a resulting finding on her ability to
work. Those facts are critical in determining whether Manning is totally disabled; those facts must
be specifically decided; and, those facts must not be so vaguely decided as to force the appellate
body to guess at the hearing officer's basis for concluding Manning's work capacity. At best the
order recites what the physician for Vocational Rehabilitation found, i.e., "The Department
determined [Manning] could perform light work." At best, the order recites what the DHHS
reviewer found, i.e., "[t]he reviewer indicated that [Manning] could return to . . . past relevant
work." What is needed is explicit fact finding. Without it the appellate body must guess at the
basis for the decision.
In this case, the difficulty of a meaningful appellate review can be seen by a casual examination of
the record. The only direct evidence in the record of Manning's ability to sit, walk, stand or lift is
from Manning, Manning's husband and from Manning's witness Phillipe Cote. All three testified
to Manning's inability to walk or sit for any appreciable period of time and to her inability to lift
a weight even on an occasional basis.
No observation testimony contradicts these witnesses statements. On the contrary, the only
evidence opposing the force of these three witnesses' personal observations is a document read into
the record. The document is a report by a physician. The physician, who never saw Manning, never
talked to her, never examined her, and never appeared at the hearing, concluded that Manning
should be able to stand or walk for six hours in an eight hour day. Obviously, the absent physician
was not cross examined, and no explanation is given by the physician on how he determined
Manning's work capacity. Equally as obvious, Manning disagrees with the findings and produced
witnesses who specifically contradicted the physician's conclusions.
Further, the record supports Manning's conclusion that she was struck by an automobile. It is
admitted that the hospital records for that accident were not reviewed by the physician who made
the assessment of Manning's ability to walk, stand and lift. The hearing officer does not address
what extent such records may be relevant in assessing Manning's disability.
The above matters are not listed here in an attempt to suggest the conclusion the hearing officer
should reach. Rather, these matters are listed to show how seriously contested is the issue of
whether Manning can sit, walk or stand to the degree necessary to accomplish sedentary or light
work. Without explicit findings of fact on this critically disputed issue by the very agency with
expertise, a meaningful appellate review is not possible. See Hamm v. South Carolina Public
Service Comm'n, 298 S.C. 309, 380 S.E.2d 428 (1989) ("We recognize, of course, that the
PSC--and not this Court--has been designated the 'expert' to regulate the rates and services of
public utilities operating in South Carolina. 'Expert' status, however, does not somehow diminish
the PSC's duty to support its conclusions with factual findings; indeed, that status heightens the
duty to make the explicit findings of fact which allow meaningful appellate review of these complex
issues. The insufficient Order here precludes a decision by this Court on whether substantial
evidence on the whole record supports the PSC's ultimate conclusions." (internal citations omitted)).
B. Conclusion
Under appropriate circumstances, a remand for further proceedings is proper. S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 1997). See Medikal Works, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., 95-ALJ-08-0563-AP (April 2, 1996); Mansion Homes, Inc. v. South Carolina
Dep't of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, S.C. Manufactured Housing Bd., 96-ALJ-11-0300-AP
(January 7, 1997). Because the Administrative Determination lacks detailed, definitive findings of
fact concerning Manning's ability to sit, lift, stand or walk, the case must be remanded. See Hamm
v. South Carolina Public Service Comm'n, 291 S.C. 119, 352 S.E.2d 476, (1987) (case remanded
where agency's finding that utility made reasonable effort to minimize additional fuel costs caused
by shutdown was unsupported by record); Bridges v. Wyandotte Worsted Co., 239 S.C. 37, 121
S.E.2d 300 (1961) (abuse of discretion occurs when factual conclusions of lower court are without
reasonable evidentiary support), cited in Rampey v. Rampey, 332 S.E.2d 213, 286 S.C. 153 (Ct.
App. 1985).
III. Order
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the hearing officer's order be vacated and this matter be
REMANDED for reconsideration in light of the matters discussed in this decision. To the extent
deemed necessary, the hearing officer may hold additional hearings to allow proper development
of the issues.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
May 11, 1998
Columbia, South Carolina