ORDERS:
ORDER OF REMAND
This matter comes before me as a result of Petitioner MRI at
Belfair, LLC’s (Belfair) request for a contested case hearing and a motion that
the automatic stay provision of Section 4(G)(2) of Act 387 be enforced against Respondent
Coastal Carolina Medical Center (CCMC). See S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-600 (G)(2)
(1976, as amended by 2006 Act No. 387, effective July 1, 2006). Specifically,
Belfair seeks an order prohibiting CCMC from continuing to provide mobile
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) services during contested case review of the
Department of Health and Environmental Control’s (DHEC or Department) decision
approving the provision of those services by the CCMC. During a conference
call on September 19, 2006, regarding Belfair’s September 15, 2006 letter, CCMC
and the Department raised several issues regarding the proper filing of this
contested case. In light of the issues raised by the parties, a hearing was
held on September 28, 2006 to determine if jurisdiction was properly before
this Court. Because I conclude that this matter must be remanded to the Board
of Health and Environmental Control, I deny Belfair’s motion concerning the
automatic stay as moot, as set forth below.
FACTS/BACKGROUND
The
parties in this case were originally before this Court in 2005 on Belfair’s
request for contested case review of the Department’s decision to approve the CCMC’s
Certificate of Need (CON) application for the addition of a fixed 1.5
Tesla MRI unit for use in diagnosing and treating CCMC’s patients. On November
10, 2005, after a contested case hearing, this Court issued a Final Order and
Decision affirming the CON determination. Afterwards, Belfair appealed to the
Board of Health and Environmental Control. On May 25, 2006, the Board issued
an order affirming the Court’s Final Order and Decision.
On
July 3, 2006, Belfair appealed the Board’s decision to the Court of Appeals
following the procedures established in 2006 by Act No. 387, which became
effective on July 1, 2006. CCMC then filed a Motion to Dismiss Belfair’s
appeal to the Court of Appeals challenging the applicability of the Act to
Belfair’s case. The Court is advised by the parties that the Court of Appeals
has ordered Belfair’s appeal held in abeyance until the Court of Appeals rules
on the CCMC’s Motion to Dismiss.
Nevertheless,
after its appeal Belfair did not seek a stay of the Board’s decision approving CCMC’s
application to add a fixed 1.5 Tesla MRI unit. Therefore, CCMC requested the
Department issue the MRI CON and on August 3, 2006, the Department granted that
request and issued the MRI CON authorizing CCMC to acquire and install the
fixed unit. On August 4, 2006, CCMC further requested “authorization to
utilize a mobile MRI at Coastal Carolina Medical Center until construction and
installation of its fixed MRI, granted in the above-referenced CON application,
is completed.” (emphasis added).
The Departmen,t without notice to Belfair, issued a letter approving “temporary
full-time use of a mobile MRI unit during the interim period of the fixed MRI
construction and installation for temporary full-time use of a mobile MRI unit
during the interim period of the fixed MRI construction and installation” of
the Fixed MRI Project that same day.
On
August 9, 2006, an article appeared in the local newspaper, The Island
Packet, announcing CCMC’s intent to provide mobile MRI services pending
establishment of permanent services. In response to that article, Belfair’s
counsel e-mailed the Department on August 22, 2006, to determine what
regulatory approval, if any, DHEC had issued to CCMC for it to initiate mobile
MRI services. On August 24, 2006, Ms. Tori Tibshrany replied with a facsimile
copy of the CCMC Mobile MRI Request, the Alliance Imaging MRI Services
Proposal, and the DHEC Staff Decision to Belfair’s counsel. Belfair then filed
its request for contested case review of this matter with the Administrative Law Court on September 8, 2006.
On September 15, 2006, Belfair by letter moved that the Court
apply the automatic stay provisions of Act 387 to the Department’s approval of CCMC’s
mobile MRI services and requested that the Court “require CCMC to cease and
desist providing mobile MRI services.” CCMC and the Department responded to
Belfair’s motion contending, in the alternative, that (1) the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because the provision of mobile
MRI services by CCMC is subsumed in the hospital’s Certificate of Need for the
fixed MRI unit and that matter is on appeal to the Court of Appeals; or that
(2) the Court lacks authority to hear this matter because Belfair failed to follow the procedures set forth
in S.C. Code Ann. § 44-1-60 (as added by 2006 Act No. 387), which provides for
Board review of Department staff actions prior to contested case review by the
Administrative Law Court.
DISCUSSION
Act
No. 387 amended numerous statutes pertaining to agency proceedings to harmonize
those laws with the new contested case and appeals procedures created in the
Act. Of particular relevance to this matter, Act 387 established new
procedures for requesting review of decisions by the Department of Health and
Environmental Control. Section 48 of the Act added S.C. Code Ann. § 44-1-60 to
the existing law in relevant part as follows:
(A) All
department decisions involving the issuance, denial, renewal, suspension, or
revocations of permits, license or other actions of the department which may
give rise to a contested case shall be made using the procedures set forth
in this section.
* * *
(C) The
initial decision involving the issuance, denial, renewal, suspension, or
revocations of permits, license or other action of the department shall
be a staff decision.
* * *
(E) Notice of
the department decision must be sent to the applicant, permittee, licensee, and
affected persons who have asked to be notified by certified mail, return
receipt requested. The department decision becomes the final agency
decision fifteen days after notice of the department decision has been mailed
to the applicant, unless a written request for final review is filed with the
department by the applicant, permittee, licensee, or affected person.
(F) No later
than sixty days after the date of receipt of a request for final review, a
final review conference must be conducted by the board, its designee, or a
committee of three members of the board appointed by the chair. If a final
review conference is not conducted within sixty days, the department decision
becomes the final agency decision and an applicant, permittee, licensee, or
affected person may request a contested case hearing before the Administrative Law Court, in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, within
thirty days after the deadline for the final review conference.
* * *
(2) After the administrative
review, the board, its designee, or a committee of three members of the board
appointed by the chair shall issue a written final agency decision based upon
the evidence presented. …The written decision must be mailed to the parties no
later than thirty days after the date of the administrative review. Within
thirty days after the receipt of the decision an applicant, permittee,
licensee, or affected person desiring to contest the final agency decision may request
a contested case hearing before the Administrative Law Court, in accordance
with the Administrative Procedures Act.
(Emphasis
added).
South Carolina Constitution Article I, § 22
It is undisputed that Belfair
did not seek a “final review conference” before the Board prior to filing this contested
case with the ALC. The Department and CCMC argue that a request for a “final
review conference” is a prerequisite for contested case review by this Court
and thus the Court lacks the authority to hear Belfair’s case. Belfair contends that it did not
have to seek Board review in this case because Section 44-1-60 by its terms
applies only to Department decisions “which may give rise to a contested case.”
In other words, Belfair argues that since it was not given notice of the
Department’s decision as required by Section 44-1-60(E), its right of review in
this matter is grounded in Article I, § 22 of the South Carolina Constitution
rather than as a “contested case” under the Department’s statutes.
The South Carolina
Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be finally bound by a judicial or
quasi-judicial decision of an administrative agency affecting private rights
except on due notice and an opportunity to be heard.” S.C. Const. art. I, §
22. However, “[o]ne cannot complain of a due process violation if he has
recourse to a constitutionally sufficient administrative procedure but merely
declines or fails to take advantage of it.” Zaman v. S.C. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 305 S.C. 281, 408 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1991). Therefore,
assuming that Belfair’s case does arise under Article I, § 22, it is not
entitled to seek review of the Department’s decision pursuant to Section 22 if
a sufficient procedure is afforded by the statutes and regulations. Here, the
CON Act provides an affected person a constitutionally sufficient procedure to
pursue their due process rights in a hearing. In other words, though Belfair
seeks to present its claim pursuant to Section 22, it nonetheless must follow
the hearing procedure set forth in the statute and regulations unless declared
unconstitutional by a court of law. S.C. Tax Comm’n v. S.C. Tax Bd. of
Review, 278 S.C. 556, 299 S.E.2d 489 (1983).
Moreover, this case
should not be viewed as a Section 22 case simply because the Department failed
to give Belfair proper notice. Rather, Section 44-1-60 (A) provides that: “All
. . . other actions of the department which may give rise to a contested
case shall be made using the procedures set forth in this section.”
(Emphasis added). Belfair’s request for review in this matter concerns an
“action of the department which may give rise to a contested case.” Thus, since
Belfair had an avenue of review as an “affected person” in this case, there is
no need to seek review by the ALC under the general principle of Article I, §
22. It therefore appears that in this case, even if Belfair failed to receive
notice under Section 44-1-60 (E), it must follow the proper procedures upon
receiving notice.
Appeal
to the ALC
Belfair’s
argues that even if this case is reviewed under the procedures set forth in
Section 44-1-60, Board review is not a prerequisite to contested case review by
this Court. Belfair contends that Section 44-1-60(E), which provides that “the
department decision becomes the final agency decision fifteen days after notice
of the department decision has been mailed to the applicant, unless a written
request for final review is filed with the department,” must be interpreted to
mean that, once fifteen days passes with no request for Board review, the staff
decision becomes the final agency decision upon which ALC contested case review
can be had.
The cardinal rule of
statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
legislature. Charleston County School Dist. v. State Budget and Control Bd.,
313 S.C. 1, 437 S.E.2d 6 (1993). Furthermore, “[i]n construing statutory language, the statute must be read as a whole and sections which are a part of the same general
statutory law must be construed together and each one given effect. A statute should not be construed by
concentrating on an isolated phrase.” S.C. State Ports Auth.
v. Jasper County, 368 S.C. 388, 398, 629 S.E.2d 624, 629 (2006) (Citations
omitted). Here, Section 44-1-60 (F) provides that when a request
for a “final review conference” is filed, the Board must act on the request
within sixty days or “the department decision becomes the final agency decision and an applicant, permittee, licensee, or affected person may request a
contested case hearing before the Administrative Law Court . . . within thirty
days after the deadline for the final review conference.” (Emphasis added).
Subparagraph (F)(2) also provides that, if the Board actually conducts a review,
then “the written decision must be mailed to the parties no later than thirty
days after the date of the administrative review” and “within thirty
days after the receipt of the decision an applicant, permittee, licensee, or
affected person desiring to contest the final agency decision may request a
contested case hearing before the Administrative Law Court, in accordance with
the Administrative Procedures Act.” The only use of the term “contested case
hearing” in Section 44-1-60 occurs in reference to the above filings made after
a request for Board review. Since there is no language in Section 44-1-60 that
provides for the ALC to review cases in which no request for final
review has been filed, presuming that the legislature held such an intention
would be errant. See, e.g., Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C.
79, 533 S.E.2d 578 (2000)(“The canon of construction ‘expressio unius est exclusio alteriu’ or ‘inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’ holds that ‘to express or
include one thing implies the exclusion of another, or of the alternative’.”).
In that light, a reasonable interpretation of the language that “the staff
decision becomes the final agency decision” is that if the decision is not
challenged, it becomes the final decision. However, if challenged the decision
will not be final until the ALC reaches a decision or the Board’s decision is
unchallenged for the requisite period of time.
Therefore,
because I find that Board review is a mandatory prerequisite to any review by
this Court, I hold that this matter must be remanded to the Board of Health and
Environmental Control for its consideration of Belfair’s request in accordance
with Section 44-1-60.
Timeliness
of Filing
The
parties briefed and argued the issue of whether Belfair timely filed its request
for review of this decision.
Section 44-1-60 (E) sets forth that a request for review must be filed within
fifteen days of the date the staff decision was mailed to the applicant. In
this case the Department does not question that it failed to mail Belfair
notice of its August 4, 2006 decision. The Department nevertheless contends
that even though Belfair failed to receive contemporaneous notice, the
statutory mailing deadline should be enforced against it because the law must
be followed as written.
In Hamm v.
S.C. Public Service Comm'n, 287 S.C. 180, 336 S.E.2d 470 (1985), the
Supreme Court interpreted a similar notice provision of the APA codified at
S.C. Code Ann. Section 1-23-380 (b) (Supp.1984). At that time, Section
1-23-380 (b) provided that:
Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a
petition in the circuit court within thirty days after the final decision of
the agency or, if a rehearing is requested, within thirty days after the
decision thereon. Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and
all parties of record.
The Court held “[w]hile a literal
reading of Section 1-23-380 (b) suggests the thirty days to appeal runs from
the time the decision is made, we believe the statute must be read to allow a
party thirty days after notice of a decision to bring an appeal.” 336 S.E.2d
at 471. Any other interpretation could lead to an absurd result that “an
agency could preclude judicial review in all
cases simply by
concealing its decision until the thirty days had run.” Id. Moreover, “there is a basic presumption that the legislature has knowledge of
previous legislation as well as of judicial decisions construing that
legislation when later statutes are enacted concerning related subjects.” Whitner
v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 6, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1997). Accordingly, the
legislature is presumed to be aware of the Courts interpretation in Hamm in enacting this related statute.
Here, a literal reading
could equally lead to an absurd result. For instance, under a literal reading
of Section 44-1-60 (E) an affected person who asked to be notified but who
never received notice of the Department’s determination would not have a right
to contest the Department’s decision if that person did not file a request for
final review 15 days after notice of the department decision was mailed to the
applicant. Likewise, Belfair contends that its interest in the
provision of MRI services at CCMC was known to both the
Department and CCMC through Belfair’s
participation in the underlying Certificate of Need process for the fixed MRI
unit and that, as an affected person, Belfair should have been given
contemporaneous notice of the decision to allow temporary mobile MRI services
during the CON implementation process.
Therefore,
I find that in instances in which a person participated in the review process,
a request for final review must be received by the Department 15 days after
notice to the applicant, permittee, licensee, or affected person receives
notice. Furthermore, in instances as in this case where the Department makes a
determination without any formal review process and with no notice to an
“affected person,” I find that the affected person has fifteen days from the
date it received actual or constructive notice of the decision. See also,
ALC Rule 11 (C). Thus, Belfair had fifteen days from the date it received actual or
constructive notice of the August 4, 2006 decision of the Department to file
its request for review. Nevertheless, as there is no record developing the
facts upon this issue, I make no finding as to whether or not Belfair’s filing
was timely or as to the date Belfair received constructive notice.
Conclusion
All
other issues raised by Belfair in its motion for a cease and desist order and
in the Department and CCMC’s responses thereto are moot in light of remand of
this matter to the Board. Therefore, Belfair’s motion for application of the
automatic stay and for a cease and desist order is denied.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE
ORDERED that Belfair’s September 15, 2006 motion for cease and desist order
is denied and this matter is remanded to the Board of Health and Environmental
Control for a determination of all issues raised by the parties.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that, for purposes of remand, Belfair is deemed to have filed its request for
Board review under § 44-1-60(E) on September 8, 2006.
IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that, for purposes of determining whether Belfair’s request for
review was timely, the Board shall utilize a deadline of fifteen days from the
date Belfair received actual or constructive notice of the August 4, 2006
decision of the Board, such deadline to be determined by the Board based on the
evidence presented to it.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________
Ralph
King Anderson, III
Administrative
Law Judge
October 18, 2006
Columbia, South Carolina
[T]he concepts of
subject matter jurisdiction and ripeness are separate and distinct. “Subject
matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong.” Dove v.
Gold Kist, Inc., 314 S.C. 235, 237, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994)
(citations omitted). In comparison, “[t]he basic rationale of the doctrine of
ripeness is to prevent courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication,
from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies,
and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete
way by challenging parties.” 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 485 (citations omitted). The concepts of subject matter jurisdiction and
ripeness are often discussed simultaneously as they both involve threshold
requirements; however, we find the concepts are distinguishable and should be
considered separate and distinct issues.
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