ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. LCI 0047-03
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant
to the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d
742 (2000). Appellant Julian Ford, Jr. appeals the decision of the South Carolina Department of
Corrections (DOC or Department) to deny his request for an upgrade in his custody status from level
three to level two custody. Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties
in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
In this matter, Appellant challenges the results of his March 2003 annual custody review meeting.
During that review, classification officials at the Lee Correctional Institution found that, because of the
length of time remaining on his sentence and because of his prior conviction for a violent offense,
Appellant was ineligible for his requested advancement in custody status from level three to level two
custody. Appellant appealed this decision to the Department and then to this tribunal. On appeal,
Appellant contends that the sentence calculations underlying the custody review board’s decision are
incorrect. In particular, he contends that the Department has failed to calculate his sentence correctly
under “the 51% law” that requires him to serve only 51% of his stated sentences and that the
Department has failed to properly credit him with “good-time” credits and earned work credits to further
reduce his sentences.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final
decisions of the Department in certain “non-collateral” or administrative matters by appealing those
decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act. Al-Shabazz, 338
S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. The Court further found that the Division’s jurisdiction to hear such
matters is “typically” limited to cases where an inmate is disciplined and the punishment imposed affects
the inmate’s state-created liberty interests and cases where an inmate believes the Department has
erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status. Id. at 369-370, 527
S.E.2d at 750. Subsequently, in Sullivan v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124
(2003), the Court held that, under Al-Shabazz, the ALJD also has jurisdiction to hear cases where an
inmate challenges a condition of his confinement that implicates a state-created liberty interest.
Id. at
443, 586 S.E.2d at 127. In the case at hand, Appellant contends that, because of an improper calculation
of his sentences, the Department has improperly determined his custody status; accordingly, this tribunal
has jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an
appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal’s
review of inmate appeals is confined to the record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is
primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has granted aggrieved inmates the process they
are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750; Sullivan, 355 S.C.
at 443, 586 S.E.2d at 127. Further, recognizing that prison officials are in the best position to decide
inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional “hands off” approach to internal
prison disciplinary policies and other internal prison affairs when reviewing inmate appeals under the
APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266
S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina courts regarding
internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this
tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department’s actions to ensure that inmate grievances
are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at
757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department’s decision to leave him in level three
custody was made in violation both of his constitutional right to due process and of Departmental policy.
Each position will be discussed in turn. With regard to Appellant’s constitutional claims, it must first
be noted that “[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Id. at 369, 527
S.E.2d at 750 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). Therefore, an inmate does not
have a protected liberty interest in his custody status unless such an interest is created: (1) by the Due
Process clause of its own force because the challenged custody status is not “within the sentence
imposed upon him” or is “otherwise violative of the Constitution,” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468
(1983); see also Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); or (2) by state law because the challenged
custody status “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Here, Appellant has no protected liberty interest in his custody status. Appellant’s placement
in level three custody is “well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison
sentence,” Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, so as not to implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process clause
of its own force. And, placement in level three custody “does not present the type of atypical, significant
deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. Thus,
as Appellant has no constitutionally-recognized liberty interest affected by the Department’s decision
to deny his request for an upgrade in custody status, he cannot challenge the procedure used by the
Department to reach that decision on due process grounds. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
556-58 (1974).
Beyond the requirements of due process, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that an
inmate may challenge his custody status, even if he has no protected liberty interest at stake, if “prison
officials have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or from personal bias” in determining his custody status.
Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 381, 527 S.E.2d at 756 (citing Crowe v. Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 259 S.E.2d 614
(1979)). But, while review of these Crowe-based claims is not “improper or unavailable,” id., the level
of scrutiny devoted to such claims is limited. Accordingly, where the record suggests that the
Department’s decision to place an inmate in a particular custody status involved the “good faith exercise
of the discretionary power of the prison officials in the maintenance of order, discipline, and security
among the prison population,” Crowe, 273 S.C. at 764, 259 S.E.2d at 615, the Department’s decision
will not be disturbed on appeal. Such is the case here. The Department’s refusal to upgrade Appellant’s
custody status to level two custody is based, among other considerations, upon well-defined and clearly
stated policies that inmates with more than nine years remaining on their sentences and inmates with at
least one prior violent commitment to a current violent offense are ineligible for level two custody.
Appellant has approximately eleven years left to serve on his sentence and was imprisoned on a violent
burglary conviction prior to his current violent conviction for criminal sexual conduct.
Appellant’s underlying concerns about the calculation of his sentence are also unfounded, and
appear to be based upon two misunderstandings of how the Department calculates sentences. First,
Appellant contends that, at the time he was sentenced, a “51% law” provided that an inmate was only
required to serve 51% of his stated sentence. However, Appellant provides no citation for this “51%
law” and it does not appear that such a law existed at the time of his sentencing, or, for that matter, that
such a law currently exists. Appellant is likely confusing statutes providing for sentence-related credits
that can, if earned and retained, dramatically reduce an inmate’s sentence with a law specifically requiring
that an inmate need only serve 51% of his sentence.
Second, Appellant alleges that the Department is not properly applying his sentence-related
credits to his sentence. This contention is based on a misunderstanding of Appellant’s projected “max-out”–i.e., release–date. The projected max-out date is just that–a projection. It is a projected release
date based upon the assumption that an inmate will earn and retain the maximum of sentence-related
credits, such as good-time credits and earned work credits, available to him. Therefore, as an inmate
earns and retains his sentence-related credits, his projected max-out date will not move forward because
the date already presumes the earning of those credits. However, if an inmate losses or fails to earn
good-time credits, or if the rate at which he earns other credits changes (e.g., if the inmate is assigned
to a job that earns credits at a different rate than his previous job), his projected release date must be
adjusted to account for his failure to earn and retain the maximum amount of good-time credit available
or to reflect the change in the rate at which he earns his other sentence-related credits. Thus, even
though an inmate’s projected release date does not move forward as he earns and retains his sentence-related credits, and may move backward as he losses good-time credits or earns work credits at a
different rate, he is nonetheless earning and being properly credited with those sentence-related credits.
Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that the Department is not applying his sentence-related credits to his
sentence must be rejected.
In conclusion, Appellant has no ground upon which to assert the due process claim found in his
grievance. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the Department acted arbitrarily or from personal
bias in denying an advancement in his custody status. Further, the Department has correctly calculated
Appellant’s sentence and sentence-related credits. Accordingly, the Department’s decision to deny
Appellant’s grievance is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department’s denial of Appellant’s grievance is
AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
March 8, 2004
Columbia, South Carolina |