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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
Julian Ford, Jr. #155800 vs. DOC

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Corrections

PARTIES:
Appellant:
Julian Ford, Jr. #155800

Respondent:
South Carolina Department of Corrections
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
03-ALJ-04-00604-AP

APPEARANCES:
n/a
 

ORDERS:

ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. LCI 0047-03

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Julian Ford, Jr. appeals the decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to deny his request for an upgrade in his custody status from level three to level two custody. Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

In this matter, Appellant challenges the results of his March 2003 annual custody review meeting. During that review, classification officials at the Lee Correctional Institution found that, because of the length of time remaining on his sentence and because of his prior conviction for a violent offense, Appellant was ineligible for his requested advancement in custody status from level three to level two custody. Appellant appealed this decision to the Department and then to this tribunal. On appeal, Appellant contends that the sentence calculations underlying the custody review board’s decision are incorrect. In particular, he contends that the Department has failed to calculate his sentence correctly under “the 51% law” that requires him to serve only 51% of his stated sentences and that the Department has failed to properly credit him with “good-time” credits and earned work credits to further reduce his sentences.

ANALYSIS

In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department in certain “non-collateral” or administrative matters by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. The Court further found that the Division’s jurisdiction to hear such matters is “typically” limited to cases where an inmate is disciplined and the punishment imposed affects the inmate’s state-created liberty interests and cases where an inmate believes the Department has erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status. Id. at 369-370, 527 S.E.2d at 750. Subsequently, in Sullivan v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124 (2003), the Court held that, under Al-Shabazz, the ALJD also has jurisdiction to hear cases where an inmate challenges a condition of his confinement that implicates a state-created liberty interest. Footnote Id. at 443, 586 S.E.2d at 127. In the case at hand, Appellant contends that, because of an improper calculation of his sentences, the Department has improperly determined his custody status; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.

When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal’s review of inmate appeals is confined to the record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750; Sullivan, 355 S.C. at 443, 586 S.E.2d at 127. Further, recognizing that prison officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and other internal prison affairs when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department’s actions to ensure that inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.

In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department’s decision to leave him in level three custody was made in violation both of his constitutional right to due process and of Departmental policy. Each position will be discussed in turn. With regard to Appellant’s constitutional claims, it must first be noted that “[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). Therefore, an inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in his custody status unless such an interest is created: (1) by the Due Process clause of its own force because the challenged custody status is not “within the sentence imposed upon him” or is “otherwise violative of the Constitution,” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); see also Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); or (2) by state law because the challenged custody status “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

Here, Appellant has no protected liberty interest in his custody status. Appellant’s placement in level three custody is “well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence,” Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, so as not to implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process clause of its own force. And, placement in level three custody “does not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. Thus, as Appellant has no constitutionally-recognized liberty interest affected by the Department’s decision to deny his request for an upgrade in custody status, he cannot challenge the procedure used by the Department to reach that decision on due process grounds. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974).

Beyond the requirements of due process, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that an inmate may challenge his custody status, even if he has no protected liberty interest at stake, if “prison officials have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or from personal bias” in determining his custody status. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 381, 527 S.E.2d at 756 (citing Crowe v. Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 259 S.E.2d 614 (1979)). But, while review of these Crowe-based claims is not “improper or unavailable,” id., the level of scrutiny devoted to such claims is limited. Accordingly, where the record suggests that the Department’s decision to place an inmate in a particular custody status involved the “good faith exercise of the discretionary power of the prison officials in the maintenance of order, discipline, and security among the prison population,” Crowe, 273 S.C. at 764, 259 S.E.2d at 615, the Department’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Such is the case here. The Department’s refusal to upgrade Appellant’s custody status to level two custody is based, among other considerations, upon well-defined and clearly stated policies that inmates with more than nine years remaining on their sentences and inmates with at least one prior violent commitment to a current violent offense are ineligible for level two custody. Appellant has approximately eleven years left to serve on his sentence and was imprisoned on a violent burglary conviction prior to his current violent conviction for criminal sexual conduct. Footnote

Appellant’s underlying concerns about the calculation of his sentence are also unfounded, and appear to be based upon two misunderstandings of how the Department calculates sentences. First, Appellant contends that, at the time he was sentenced, a “51% law” provided that an inmate was only required to serve 51% of his stated sentence. However, Appellant provides no citation for this “51% law” and it does not appear that such a law existed at the time of his sentencing, or, for that matter, that such a law currently exists. Appellant is likely confusing statutes providing for sentence-related credits that can, if earned and retained, dramatically reduce an inmate’s sentence with a law specifically requiring that an inmate need only serve 51% of his sentence. Footnote

Second, Appellant alleges that the Department is not properly applying his sentence-related credits to his sentence. This contention is based on a misunderstanding of Appellant’s projected “max-out”–i.e., release–date. The projected max-out date is just that–a projection. It is a projected release date based upon the assumption that an inmate will earn and retain the maximum of sentence-related credits, such as good-time credits and earned work credits, available to him. Therefore, as an inmate earns and retains his sentence-related credits, his projected max-out date will not move forward because the date already presumes the earning of those credits. However, if an inmate losses or fails to earn good-time credits, or if the rate at which he earns other credits changes (e.g., if the inmate is assigned to a job that earns credits at a different rate than his previous job), his projected release date must be adjusted to account for his failure to earn and retain the maximum amount of good-time credit available or to reflect the change in the rate at which he earns his other sentence-related credits. Thus, even though an inmate’s projected release date does not move forward as he earns and retains his sentence-related credits, and may move backward as he losses good-time credits or earns work credits at a different rate, he is nonetheless earning and being properly credited with those sentence-related credits. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that the Department is not applying his sentence-related credits to his sentence must be rejected.

In conclusion, Appellant has no ground upon which to assert the due process claim found in his grievance. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the Department acted arbitrarily or from personal bias in denying an advancement in his custody status. Further, the Department has correctly calculated Appellant’s sentence and sentence-related credits. Accordingly, the Department’s decision to deny Appellant’s grievance is affirmed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department’s denial of Appellant’s grievance is AFFIRMED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.


JOHN D. GEATHERS

Administrative Law Judge


March 8, 2004

Columbia, South Carolina


Brown Bldg.

 

 

 

 

 

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