SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant April Main appeals the decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to revoke twenty days of her “good-time” credit as punishment for refusing or failing to obey orders in violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 2.13. Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

On March 17, 2003, Appellant was given a direct order to return to her room by WRA Counselor Christy Branton. Appellant, however, refused to follow the order and instead walked outside to smoke. Counselor Branton then ordered Appellant, twice, to stop smoking and return to her cell, and Appellant again refused to follow the orders. DOC Corrections Officer Perin intervened in the situation, and had to order Appellant to go to the holding cell three times before she complied with the order, which she did only after lighting another cigarette. Based upon her failure to follow the directives of Counselor Branton and Officer Perin, Appellant was charged with violating DOC Disciplinary Code § 2.13, Refusing or Failing to Obey Orders.

A hearing on the charge was held before a DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) on March 25, 2003. At the close of the hearing, the DHO found Appellant guilty of the charge against her and revoked twenty days of her good-time credit as punishment for the offense. Appellant appealed her disciplinary conviction to the Department and then to this tribunal. On appeal, Appellant contends that her conviction was obtained in violation of her due process rights, because she was not afforded an opportunity to present evidence or call witnesses, was not given adequate substitute counsel, and was discriminated against, in that she received a more severe penalty than other inmates convicted of similar disciplinary offenses.

ANALYSIS

In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department in certain “non-collateral” or administrative matters by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. The Court further found that the Division’s jurisdiction to hear such matters is “typically” limited to cases where an inmate is disciplined and the punishment imposed affects the inmate’s state-created liberty interests and cases where an inmate believes the Department has erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status. Id. at 369-370, 527 S.E.2d at 750. Subsequently, in Sullivan v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124 (2003), the Court held that, under Al-Shabazz, the ALJD also has jurisdiction to hear cases where an inmate challenges a condition of his confinement that implicates a state-created liberty interest. Id. at 443, 586 S.E.2d at 127. In the case at hand, Appellant contends that the Department improperly revoked twenty days of her good-time credit as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.

When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal’s review of inmate appeals is confined to the record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750; Sullivan, 355 S.C. at 443, 586 S.E.2d at 127. Further, recognizing that prison officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and other internal prison affairs when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department’s actions to ensure that inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.

In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department’s decision to revoke her good-time credit was made in violation of her due process rights. Because inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits under the Fourteenth Amendment, they are entitled to “minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). Thus, where, as here, an inmate faces the revocation of good-time credits as punishment in a disciplinary hearing, prison officials must provide that inmate with certain procedural safeguards. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 370, 527 S.E.2d at 750. These procedural safeguards include:

(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial.

Id. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (paraphrasing Wolff). Beyond these procedural requirements, the United States Supreme Court has held that the revocation of an inmate’s good-time credits does not comport with Due Process unless “there [is] some evidence from which the conclusion of the [prison official] could be deduced.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Thus, if the Department affords the inmate a Wolff-type hearing and has at least some evidence in the record to support its decision, the Department’s revocation of an inmate’s good-time credits satisfies the requirements of due process.

In the disciplinary proceedings underlying the instant appeal, Appellant was afforded all the process due her pursuant to Wolff and Al-Shabazz. The record indicates that Appellant received written notice of the charges against her in excess of twenty-four hours prior to a hearing that was held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. Upon receiving these charges, Appellant clearly indicated on the notice that she did not wish to have her accuser present at the hearing. Further, Appellant was given the opportunity, through a counsel substitute, to offer evidence and call witnesses at the disciplinary hearing. However, the record plainly demonstrates that neither Appellant nor her counsel substitute sought to present any witnesses other than Appellant or to introduce any evidence other than Appellant’s testimony.

Here, the record reflects that Appellant was found guilty of refusing or failing to obey orders in violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 2.13, based on the written report of Counselor Branton, and a written statement to that effect was prepared by the hearing officer. After her conviction, Appellant filed a grievance and received a prompt response from her warden, which Appellant then appealed to the Department. In its denial of her appeal, the Department informed Appellant of her right to appeal the Department’s final decision under the APA. Further, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the decision reached by the Department.

The Department provided Appellant with the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment before revoking her sentence-related credits as punishment in a disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly, the Department’s decision to deny Appellant’s grievance is affirmed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department’s denial of Appellant’s grievance is AFFIRMED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

JOHN D. GEATHERS

Administrative Law Judge

March 5, 2004

Columbia, South Carolina