ORDERS:
ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND RULING
I. Introduction
The South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) filed a Motion to Amend under SCRCP 59(e).(1)
The motion seeks five rulings as amendments to the original order of February 25, 1998:
1. Amend the order to hold that no Class III machine may be operated on the premises here in
dispute for six months from the date of the order.
2. Amend the order to state that DOR is entitled to great deference and should not be overruled
absent compelling reason.
3. Amend the order to state that DOR's interpretation is reasonable and Andrews and Piedmont
failed to offer compelling reasons to overturn DOR's interpretation.
4. Amend the order to state that DOR has consistently applied its interpretation of S.C. Code
Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1997).
5. Amend the order to show that failing to give deference to DOR results in "pandemonium as
law enforcement, [DOR], and the regulated business would have no idea as to what rules to
follow . . ." and that "a regulated business could find itself attempting to comply with six
different interpretations of a statute as each [ALJ] overturned the [DOR]'s construction at
will to follow his or her whims."
II. Analysis
A. No New Issue Raised
A party cannot use a motion to alter or amend a judgment to present an issue that could have been
raised prior to the judgment but was not so raised. Anderson Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Hagen, 313
S.C. 497, 443 S.E.2d 399 (Ct. App.1994). DOR, however, is not raising any new issue by its motion.
Rather, DOR is essentially asserting the order failed to apply certain aids in statutory construction
in determining the meaning ascribed to the six month prohibition imposed by S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1997). Accordingly, no new issue is raised by DOR's motion.(2)
B. Rulings Considered
DOR's requested rulings either seek a reversal or provide grounds that support a reversal of the
February 25, 1998. That order holds that the six month revocation applies to the machines but not
to locations.
1. Reconsideration Not Warranted
In the absence of specific prohibition, a party may seek to have the adjudicator change its decision.
See Kiawah Resort Associates v. South Carolina Tax Com'n, 318 S.C. 502, 458 S.E.2d 542 (1995)
(nothing in the APA prohibits or prevents a party from seeking reconsideration or requesting a
rehearing). While permissible, the power to reconsider should be exercised only when there is
justification and good cause. See Bennett v. City of Clemson, 293 S.C. 64, 358 S.E.2d 707 (1987)
(good cause may be based on the presence of newly discovered evidence, fraud, surprise, mistake,
inadvertence or change in conditions); see ALJD Rule 29C (basis for reconsideration found in
SCRCP 60(B) 1 through 5 as being mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; void
judgment; or the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged). Here, while no grounds
justify reconsideration, each of the rulings requested by DOR are ruled upon in this order.
2. Specific Consideration of Rulings Sought
DOR's motion essentially presents three positions. First, DOR believes the facts are well established
that it has consistently applied its interpretation of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1997).
Second, under such circumstances, DOR believes that its position is reasonable and should be
accorded great deference. Third, in deciding whether to deviate from DOR's position, compelling
reasons must be established.
a. Consistently Applied Position
No doubt exists that DOR has consistently applied its position. Judicial notice is taken of the
published decisions of the Administrative Law Judge Division and of the numerous instances in
which DOR has advanced this position in hearings before the Division. DOR has consistently
viewed S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) as imposing a six month prohibition on the use of any
Class III machine at the offending location.
However, judicial notice is also taken of the extensive opposition to DOR's view. In hearings before
the Division, license holders routinely and repeatedly object to DOR's position. The validity of that
position is now pending in the S.C. Supreme Court in the case of Gateway Enterprise, Inc., v. DOR.
Thus, the position of DOR is not one which has found routine acceptance by the affected public. On
the contrary, DOR's position is far from a settled view.
b. Deference To DOR's Position
The issue in interpreting a statute is what did the legislature intend. Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
243 S.C. 388, 395 S.E.2d 206 (1964). Depending upon the nature of the language under review, an
agency's view may or may not be entitled to deference.
i. Plain Meaning
No deference to an agency's position is warranted where the language presents a clear meaning.
Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. City of Columbia, 242 S.C. 237, 130 S.E.2d 573 (1963) (no occasion
arises for considering an agency's position where the language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning). Further, and of particular significance to
this case, the clear and definite meaning will always be applied despite an agency's contrary but
consistently followed position. Davidson v. Eastern Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 245 S.C. 472, 141 S.E.2d
135 (1965) ("An uninsured motorist endorsement that contravenes the requirements of the statute
is, to that extent, invalid, regardless of the Department's approval of it.").
Here, the February 25, 1998 order found the statute in dispute was plain and unambiguous. The order
holds that the plain language of § 12-21-2804(A) imposes a six month prohibition on either DOR
issuing or an owner acquiring licenses on those Class III machines that were in an establishment at
the time any machine in that establishment was revoked. Thus, having found the plain meaning of
the statute establishes legislative intent, no deference to DOR's position was required.
ii. Ambiguous Meaning
The order held the statute was clear. However, the order further addressed the result that would
follow from finding an ambiguity in the statute. Under that examination, the order found that even
resort to rules of construction supported the view that the revocation affected the machines but not
the location. While the order does not mention deference to DOR's position, in examining the rules
of construction, deference was considered but found not to have been a meaningful indicator of
legislative intent when compared to other more significant indicators.
When required to apply the rules of construction, the construction of a statute by an agency charged
with administering that statute is entitled to most respectful consideration. Stephenson Finance Co.
v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 242 S.C. 98, 130 S.E.2d 72 (1963). More particularly,
however, the degree of respect rises to one of "great weight" only if the agency position "has been
acquiesced in by the Legislature for a long period of time." Etiwan Fertilizer Co. v. S.C. Tax
Commission, 217 S.C. 354, 60 S.E.2d 682 (1950).
Here, the Video Games Machine Act became effective July 1, 1993. Thus, even assuming DOR's
position was announced, enforced or in some way made known to the Legislature from the first day
the statute became effective, DOR's position is less than five years old. Such a time frame is far too
short to amount to a showing of acquiescence "by the Legislature for a long period of time." Id.
Hence, the short period does not show strong evidence of acquiescence by the Legislature and does
not allow according "great weight" to DOR's position. Such is especially so where, as here, the
agency position is challenged repeatedly by the affected public. At best, only respectful
consideration is due.
The Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of its own laws. See Ingram v. Bearden, 212 S.C.
399, 47 S.E.2d 833 (1948)(a machine was definitely outlawed by prior statute and the General
Assembly was deemed to be aware of that fact). Respectful consideration to DOR's position (which
consideration relies upon a presumption that the Legislature has knowledge of and gives tacit
approval to the agency's actions) pales in comparison to the Legislature's presumptive knowledge
of its own laws. The order found that the Legislature intentionally created licensed establishments
and created machine licenses. Further, the Legislature defined licensed establishments and
demonstrated it clearly knew the difference between machine licenses and establishment licenses.
Thus, reliance upon the Legislature's knowledge of its own laws was a far superior indicator of
legislative intent than was reliance upon the respectful consideration of DOR's position.
c. Compelling Reasons
DOR asserts that its position should not be deviated from unless compelling reasons are shown and
that, from DOR's point of view, no compelling reasons were presented. While others may exist, at
least two compelling reasons warrant deviating from DOR's view. First, DOR's position is
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute such that reliance upon DOR's view places far too
much weight on an administrative interpretation. See Stone Mfg. Co. v. South Carolina
Employment Sec. Com'n, 219 S.C. 239, 64 S.E.2d 644 (1951) citing F. W. Woolworth Co. v.
United States, 2 Cir., 91 F.2d 973, 976) ("At most, administrative practice is a weight in the scale,
to be considered, but not to be inevitably followed. * * * While we are of course bound to weigh
seriously such rulings, they are never conclusive."). Second, a compelling reason to deviate from
DOR's view is that following the position perpetuates an administrative error. Fennell v. South
Carolina Tax Commission, 233 S.C. 43, 103 S.E.2d 424 (1958) (an interpretation presented by an
administrative position is not so sacrosanct as to be beyond the correction of error; it need not
perpetuate error.). In short, sufficient and compelling reasons exist to deviate from DOR's position.
III. Conclusion
DOR's requested rulings are addressed as follows:
1. Amend the order to hold that no Class III machine may be operated on the premises here in
dispute for six months from the date of the order.
DENIED
2. Amend the order to state that DOR is entitled to great deference and should not be overruled
absent compelling reason.
DENIED
3. Amend the order to state that DOR's interpretation is reasonable and Andrews and Piedmont
failed to offer compelling reasons to overturn DOR's interpretation.
DENIED
4. Amend the order to state that DOR has consistently applied its interpretation of S.C. Code
Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1997).
DOR HAS CONSISTENTLY APPLIED ITS INTERPRETATION BUT THAT INTERPRETATION IS CONSISTENTLY CHALLENGED BY LICENSE
HOLDERS.
5. Amend the order to show that failing to give deference to DOR results in "pandemonium as
law enforcement, [DOR], and the regulated business would have no idea as to what rules to
follow . . ." and that "a regulated business could find itself attempting to comply with six
different interpretations of a statute as each [ALJ] overturned the [DOR]'s construction at
will to follow his or her whims."
DENIED(3)
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
This 17th day of March, 1998
Columbia, South Carolina
1. ALJD Rule 52 applies the SCRCP to resolve questions not addressed by the Rules of the
Administrative Law Judge Division. ALJD Rule 29C addresses motions to reconsider the
decision reached but does not specifically address motions which seek rulings on matters
allegedly raised but not ruled upon. Accordingly, SCRCP 59(e) is applicable, at least in part, to
the current motion.
2. To the extent DOR's motion seeks to ensure its statutory construction positions raised in
its motion are preserved for appeal, I conclude the positions raised are properly preserved and
further I conclude this order rules on the positions raised.
3. Alas, the poor Administrative Law Judge. When agreeing with the agency, the judge is a
"rubber-stamp" (so saith the losing citizen); when disagreeing with the agency, the judge is an
arbitrary adjudicator acting on pure "whim" (so saith the losing agency). Against such barbs, my
colleagues and I take humble shelter under the comforting words of Mark Twain: "Always do
right; this will gratify some people and astonish the rest." |