South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
Edgar A. Brown building 1205 Pendleton St., Suite 224 Columbia, SC 29201 Voice: (803) 734-0550

SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
SCDOR vs. J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., et al

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Revenue

PARTIES:
Petitioners:
South Carolina Department of Revenue

Respondents:
J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., and J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., d/b/a The Platinum Room
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
97-ALJ-17-0337

APPEARANCES:
Carol McMahan
Attorney for Petitioner

C. Tyrone Courtney
Attorney for Respondents
 

ORDERS:

ORDER AND DECISION

This matter is before this tribunal for a contested case hearing pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310, et seq. (Supp. 1996) and S.C. Code Ann. § 12-4-30(D) (Supp. 1996) on alleged administrative violations. The South Carolina Department of Revenue ("Department") alleges that on June 13, 1996, Respondents violated the "one separate employee" requirement of 27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996), thus constituting a violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A).

For alleged violations of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996), the Department seeks a $5,000 fine against each Respondent, revocation of five Class III video game machine licenses located at The Platinum Room on June 13, 1996, and preclusion of the use of any Class III video game machine licenses at this business for a period of six months from the date of revocation.

The hearing of this matter was held on October 2, 1997. The issues before this tribunal are (1) whether Respondents violated 27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996) and, (2) if so, what is the proper penalty for such violation. Based upon the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this tribunal concludes that Respondent J. M. Brown Vending Co., Inc. violated 27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996) by utilizing video game machine licenses in contravention of this regulation. Consequently, the licenses shall be revoked. No video game machine licenses shall be utilized in The Platinum Room for a period of six months from the date of revocation of the licenses. Further, the Department shall impose a fine of $500 against Respondent J. M. Brown Vending Co., Inc.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Having carefully considered all testimony and arguments presented at the hearing of this matter, and taking into account the credibility and accuracy of the evidence, I make the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. On June 13, 1996, the Department's agents Gus Carter and Keith Tennant conducted an inspection of the video gaming businesses located at I-85, Exit 83, 110 Truck Stop, Cowpens, South Carolina. After completion of the inspection on that day, the agents issued Respondents an administrative citation for a violation of the "single place or premises" requirement of 27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996).

2. At the time of the inspection, the facts relating to the "single place or premises" requirement of the 27 S.C. Regs 117-190 (Supp. 1996) were as follows:

a. There was a mall-type structure consisting of four separate rooms containing video gaming machines.

b. There was a main entrance into the structure that opened into a common area.

c. There was one payout counter located in the common area.

d. All of the businesses were open and contained operational Class III video game machines which were available for play.

e. There were employees present in all of the rooms except The Platinum Room.

f. Just prior to the inspection, the employee assigned to The Platinum Room left the room to buy a soft drink from the business in the common area. The employee did not make the room inaccessible during her absence. However, she returned during the inspection.

g. Each of the video gaming businesses had separate sales tax licenses. See Petitioner's Exhibit # 7.

3. On June 13, 1996, the following Class III licenses were affixed to the machines in The Platinum Room as designated on Petitioner's Exhibit # 4 and held by J. M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc: #s 041343, 041344, 041345, 041346, and 041347.

4. J. M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., holds the retail licenses for The Platinum Room.

5. No sufficient evidence was proffered by the Department to establish that Respondent J. M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., managed or operated the video game business located at the Platinum Room. Further, insufficient evidence was presented to establish that J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., applied for, received, maintained, or permitted to be used Class III video game machine licenses in contravention of § 12-21-2804(A).

6. The Department seeks a $5,000 fine against each Respondent, revocation of five Class III video game machine licenses located at The Platinum Room on June 13, 1996, and preclusion of the use of any Class III video game machine licenses at The Platinum Room for a period of six months from the date of revocation.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

1. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-4-30(D) (Supp. 1996) and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-320 (Supp. 1996), the Administrative Law Judge Division has jurisdiction to hear this matter.

B. Burden of Proof

2. In civil cases, generally, the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 127 (1994); Alex Sanders, et al., South Carolina Trial Handbook § 9:3 Party With Burden, Civil Cases (1994). The Department is the party asserting the affirmative in this case; therefore, the Department must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondents failed to have a separate employee in The Platinum Room in violation of 27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996) and have also violated S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) by virtue of violating Reg. 117-190. The preponderance of the evidence "is evidence which is of the greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it . . . ." Black's Law Dictionary 1182 (6th ed. 1990). "The preponderance of the evidence means such evidence as, when considered and compared with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and produces in the mind the belief that what is sought to be proved is more likely true than not true." Sanders, supra, § 9:5 Quantum of Evidence in Civil Cases (1994), (citing Frazier v. Frazier, 228 S.C. 149, 89 S.E.2d 225 (1955)).

3. The weight and credibility assigned to evidence presented at the hearing of a matter is within the province of the trier of fact. See South Carolina Cable Television Ass'n v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 417 S.E.2d 586 (1992). Furthermore, a trial judge, who observes a witness, is in the better position to judge the witness's demeanor and veracity and evaluate their testimony. See Mann v. Walker, 285 S.C. 194, 328 S.E.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1985); Marshall v. Marshall, 282 S.C. 534, 320 S.E.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1984); McAlister v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 481, 299 S.E.2d 322 (1982); Peay v. Peay, 260 S.C. 108, 194 S.E.2d 392 (1973).

C. Single Place or Premises Violation

4. Respondent J. M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., is the licensee of the Class III video game machines licensed under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720(A)(3) (Supp. 1996), which are the subject of this case.

5. Respondent J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., is the operator of the Class III video game machines located in The Platinum Room, which are the subject of this case.

6. The Video Game Machines Act ("Act"), which regulates video game machine activity in South Carolina, was enacted in 1993 and became effective on July 1, 1993. This Act is codified at S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-21-2770, et seq. (Supp. 1996). The purpose of the Act is to regulate the video game machines industry and to prevent large-scale casino type gambling operations in the State of South Carolina. See Reyelt v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, Nos. 6:93-1491-3 and 6:93-1493-3 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 1993); See also Op. Att'y. Gen 94-21 at 51 (1994).

7. Petitioner alleges that on June 13, 1996, Respondents violated 27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996) by applying for, receiving, maintaining, or permitting to be used permits for the operation of video gaming machines authorized under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720(A)(3) (Supp. 1996) in violation of the single place or premises requirement. Consequently, Petitioner alleges Respondents violated S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996). This section provides: No person shall apply for, receive, maintain, or permit to be used, and the commission shall not allow to be maintained, permits or licenses for the operation of more than eight machines authorized under Section 12-21-2720(A)(3) at a single place or premises for the period beginning July 1, 1993, and ending July 1, 1994. After July 1, 1994, the commission may not issue nor authorize to be maintained any licenses or permits for more than five machines authorized under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720(A)(3) at a single place or premises . . . . (emphasis added).

8. On June 23, 1995, regulations were promulgated which further clarify the provisions of the Video Game Machines Act, and, as such, these regulations have the force and effect of law. See Young v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways and Pub. Trans., 287 S.C. 108, 336 S.E.2d 879 (1985); Faile v. South Carolina Employment Sec. Comm'n, 267 S.C. 536, 230 S.E.2d 219 (1976). Specifically, Regulation 117-190 was promulgated to clarify the meaning of the phrase "single place or premises" as set forth in § 12-21-2804(A). This regulation, effective June 23, 1995, provides in relevant part:

A "single place" or "premises" means a structure surrounded by exterior walls or firewalls consistent with the requirements of the applicable building code (or where no building code is applicable, a one hour rated firewall), provided such exterior walls and firewalls may not have any windows, doors or other openings leading to another area where video game machines are located.

If a structure surrounded by exterior walls has two or more areas where video game machines are located, each surrounded by exterior walls or firewalls as defined and required above, the Department must review all the facts and circumstances to determine if each area in reality constitutes a single place or premise for video game machines. In determining whether each entity is in fact a single place or premises, the Department of Revenue will consider the following factors:

(1) Does each entity or business have a separate electric utility meter?

(2) Does each entity or business have at least one separate employee on the premises during business hours?

(3) Does each entity or business have a separate local business license where required?

(4) Does each entity or business have a separate state sales tax license?

A positive answer to these four questions is required for each area to be considered a "single place or premise" for purposes of the Video Game Machines Act.

27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).

9. It is well established that in interpreting a statute, the court's primary function is to ascertain the intention of the legislature. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991); First South Savings Bank, Inc. v. Gold Coast Assocs., 301 S.C. 158, 390 S.E.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Harris, 268 S.C. 117, 232 S.E.2d 231 (1977). In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, a court should not focus on any single section or provision but should consider the language of the statute as a whole. Creech v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645 (1942). Furthermore, in construing statutes, the language used should be given its plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Home Health Serv., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 312 S.C. 324, 440 S.E.2d 375 (1994); Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 368 S.E.2d 899 (1988). Where terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be applied according to their literal meaning. Medlock v. 1985 Ford F-150 Pick Up, et al., 308 S.C. 68, 417 S.E.2d 85 (1992); Green v. Zimmerman, 269 S.C. 535, 238 S.E.2d 323 (1977). "A statute should be so construed that no word, clause, sentence, provision or part shall be rendered surplusage, or superfluous . . . ." 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 346; Savannah Bank & Trust Co. of Savannah v. Shuman, 250 S.C. 344, 157 S.E.2d 864 (1967). This tribunal has no legislative powers, and the justice or wisdom of statutes rests exclusively with the General Assembly. See Smith v. Wallace, 295 S.C. 448, 369 S.E.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1988).

It should be emphasized that S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) clearly precludes any person, not just the licensees, from applying for, receiving, maintaining, or permitting to be used permits for the operation of more than five Class III video game machines in a single place or premises. The term person is not defined in the Act, but its common and ordinary meaning clearly encompasses an individual or a business entity as well as a licensee or machine owner. See Black's Law Dictionary 1142 (6th ed. 1995). Further, § 12-21-2804(A) mandates that the Department revoke the licenses of the machines located in an establishment which fails to meet the requirements of this section. Hence, § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) mandates revocation of the licenses so used, even if the licensee was not directly involved in applying for, receiving, maintaining, or permitting its licenses to be used in contravention of the statute. Such an interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the statute.

10. The facts of this case clearly indicate that there were five operational Class III video game machines located in The Platinum Room. The evidence further indicates that The Platinum Room was open for business at the time of inspection. However, no employee was present in the business at the time the inspection was initiated.

11. There is sufficient evidence to establish that J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., permitted licenses to be used in contravention of the single place or premises provision of Regulation 117-190. However, the Department did not present sufficient evidence to establish that Respondent J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., applied for, received, maintained, or permitted to be used permits for the operation of more than five machines authorized under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720(A)(3) (Supp. 1996) at a single place or premises, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) and 27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996).

Under § 12-21-2804(A), a license on a video game machine must be revoked by virtue of its misuse under the Act, regardless if the actual violator is the licensee, machine owner, or lessee. However, a monetary fine under § 12-21-2804(F) may only be imposed on the actual person directly involved in the violation of § 12-21-2804(A). When applying for a license, a licensee violates the statute if he applies for a license to be used in the operation of more than five machines at a single place or premises to violate the statute. The Department has not established that Respondent J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., violated the statute when applying for licenses or was involved in the operation and maintenance of The Platinum Room.

12. In the instant case, there is insufficient evidence to justify disregarding the corporate entity. Although both J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., and J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., are owned by the same individuals, this is not enough to disregard the separate legal entities formed by the two companies. "A corporation is a legal entity, separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers, and directors, and generally, from all other corporations with which it may be affiliated. It possesses a legal identity separate and distinct from its owners, regardless of whether such owner is another corporation, a group of individuals, or a single individual. The doctrine of corporate entity is clearly one of substance and vitality and is to be ignored with caution only when circumstances clearly justify it." 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 8 (1990).

The South Carolina Supreme Court followed this reasoning in Brown v. Moorhead Oil Co., 239 S.C. 604, 124 S.E.2d 47 (1962). In Brown, the court stated, "the mere fact that the entire stock in the two corporations was owned by the same person does not operate to create an identity of corporate interest between the two companies, or create the relationship of principal and agent, or representative, or alter ego between the two." Brown, 239 S.C. at 50 (citing 13 Am. Jur. 160 § 6 (cite omitted); 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 5(j) and 7(e) (cite omitted); Gordon v. Hollywood-Beaufort Package Corp., 213 S.Ct. 438, 49 S.E.2d 718 (1948); Cribbs v. Southern Coatings and Chemical Co., 218 S.C. 273, 62 S.E.2d 505 (1950)).

Thus, without sufficient evidence to show that the corporate veil should be pierced, J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., cannot be held liable for the actions of J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc.

13. Whether an establishment is being operated as a "single place or premises" is determined by evaluating the facts against the standard set forth in Regulation 117-190. With respect to the "employee" requirement, Regulation 117-190 requires that each entity or business have at least one separate employee on the premises of that respective entity or business during business hours to comply with the "single place or premises" requirements of § 12-21-2804(A).(1)

If a game room containing operational Class III video game machines is accessible to customers and no employee is present in that room, the room is being operated in violation of § 12-21-2804(A). An employee working in a common area or anywhere else outside the game room is not considered to be "on the premises" of the game room. See South Carolina Dep't of Revenue and Taxation v. Stacks, 95-ALJ-17-0742-CC (Mar. 8, 1996). This application is consistent with the intent of the General Assembly to prevent large-scale casino type gambling. See Singletary v. South Carolina Dep't of Educ., 316 S.C. 153, 447 S.E.2d 231 (Ct. App. 1994) citing State v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 440 S.E.2d 341 (1994) (legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered and language of a statute must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute).

14. Respondent J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., has failed to meet the "one separate employee" requirement set forth in Regulation 117-190 with regard to The Platinum Room. Failing to satisfy one requirement is a sufficient ground constituting a violation of the single place or premises requirement. Therefore, I conclude that The Platinum Room, I-85, Exit 83, 110 Truck Stop, Cowpens, South Carolina, was operated in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A). Consequently, the five Class III video game machine licenses at The Platinum Room are subject to revocation.

If a violation of Reg. 117-190 is not construed to result in a violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A), it would lead to an absurd result in light of the object and policy of the law. See Kiriakides v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 440 S.E.2d 364 (1994) (citing Stackhouse v. Rowland, 86 S.C. 419, 68 S.E. 561 (1910) (courts will reject the plain and ordinary meaning of words used in a statute when to accept it would lead to a result so absurd that it could not possibly have been intended by the legislature or would defeat the plain legislative intention)); South Carolina Coastal Council v. South Carolina State Ethics Comm'n, 306 S.C. 41, 410 S.E.2d 245 (1991) (citing Spartanburg Sanitary Sewer District v. City of Spartanburg, 283 S.C. 67, 321 S.E.2d 258, (1984) (in interpreting a statute, one does not look merely at a particular clause in which a word may be used, but should consider the word and its meaning in conjunction with the purpose of the statute, and the object and policy of the law)); Hamm v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 287 S.C. 180, 336 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (citing State, ex rel. McCleod v. Montgomery, 244 S.C. 308, 136 S.E.2d 778 (1964) (the interpretation of a term set forth in a statute should support the statute and not lead to an absurd result)).

D. Penalty

15. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) expressly authorizes the "commission" [Department] to enforce the provisions of this section and also requires the Department to revoke licenses utilized in a fashion that fails to comply with the provisions of this section.

16. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) provides that the penalty for exceeding the maximum number of video game machines permitted in a single place or premises requires the revocation of the licenses of machines located in the establishment.

17. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) further provides: "No license may be issued for a machine in an establishment in which a license has been revoked for a period of six months from the date of revocation." The clear meaning of this language is to preclude an establishment which has had a license revoked from utilizing new licenses for a six month period. Hence, as all of the current licenses have been revoked and no new licenses may be utilized at The Platinum Room, The Platinum Room must cease operations for six months. That is, the Department does not issue licenses for specific locations, but rather issues licenses to individuals. Therefore, licenses may be utilized by an operator at any, otherwise qualified, location in the State. Consequently, the above provision would be rendered meaningless if it were read not to require an establishment whose licenses have been revoked to cease operations for six months. See Singletary v. South Carolina Dep't of Educ., 316 S.C. 153, 447 S.E.2d 231 (Ct. App. 1994), citing State v. Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 440 S.E.2d 341 (1994) (legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered and language of a statute must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute).

18. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(F) (Supp. 1996) provides that a person who violates S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) is subject to a fine of up to $5,000. The Department seeks a $5,000 fine against J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., and J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc. However, the Department has not established that J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc. applied for, received, maintained, or permitted to be used permits for the operation of more than five machines authorized under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720(A)(3) (Supp. 1996) at a single place or premises. See Stacks v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue and Taxation, 95-CP-40-0239 at 8-9 (C.P. Richland County April 20, 1995).

Under § 12-21-2804(A), a license on a video game machine must be revoked by virtue of its misuse under the Act, regardless if the violator is the licensee, machine owner, or lessee. However, a monetary fine under § 12-21-2804(F) may only be imposed on the person directly involved in the violation of § 12-21-2804(A). In this case, the Department only presented sufficient evidence to establish that Respondent J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., was directly involved in violating the Act. The Department did not present sufficient evidence to warrant the imposition of a fine against Respondent J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(F) (Supp. 1996).

19. It is a generally recognized principle of administrative law that the fact-finder has the authority to impose an administrative penalty after the parties have had an opportunity to have a hearing and be heard on the issues. See Ohio Real Estate Comm'n v. Aqua Sun Inv., 655 N.E.2d 266 (Ohio 1995); Shadow Lake of Noel, Inc. v. Supervisor of Liquor Control, 893 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Matter of Henry Youth Hockey Ass'n, 511 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. Duranleau, 617 A.2d 143 (Vt. 1992); City of Louisville v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1990); State Police v. Cantina Gloria's, 639 A.2d 14 (Pa. 1994).

Prior to governmental restructuring, the South Carolina Tax Commission, sitting in its adjudicatory capacity, imposed penalties for violations of statutory provisions administered by the Commission's subordinate agency. In its capacity as the fact-finder, the Tax Commission would conduct an adjudicatory hearing in all contested cases arising under Title 12 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, and would render an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. As the fact-finder, it was the Commission's prerogative "to impose an appropriate penalty based on the facts presented." Walker v. South Carolina ABC Comm'n, 305 S.C. 209, 407 S.E.2d 633 (1991). With the advent of restructuring and the abolition of the Tax Commission, however, such authority has devolved to the Administrative Law Judge Division. Currently, "all contested cases, as defined by Section 1-23-310 and as previously considered by the three [Tax] commissioners, shall be heard by an administrative law judge. . .." S.C. Code Ann. § 12-4-30(D) (Supp. 1996). An administrative law judge, as the fact-finder, must also determine an appropriate penalty based on the facts presented at the contested case hearing. Parties are entitled to present evidence on all issues arising out of the contested agency action. Additionally, the tribunal responsible for conducting the contested case proceeding has the authority to decide the issues based on the facts presented, and make the final decision on all the issues, including the appropriate penalty.

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, as mandated by S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996), the Department shall revoke the five video game machine licenses referenced herein, located at The Platinum Room, I-85, Exit 83, 110 Truck Stop, Cowpens, South Carolina on June 13, 1996.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no video game machine licenses shall be utilized at The Platinum Room for a period of six months from the date of revocation of the licenses.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department shall impose a fine of $500 against Respondent J. M. Brown Vending Co., Inc.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the imposition of a $5,000 fine against Respondent J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., must fail.

IT IS FURTHER NOTED that according to ALJD Rule 29(B), issues raised in the proceedings, but not addressed in the Order are deemed denied.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________

JOHN D. GEATHERS

Administrative Law Judge

Post Office Box 11667

Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1667

November 20, 1997

Columbia, South Carolina

1. Regulation 117-190 has been held to be "valid and enforceable and a valid exercise of the power of the . . . Department." McNickel's, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 96-CP-07-1072 (C.P. Beaufort County June 6, 1997); See also AAA Entertainment Corp. v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 96-CP-07-1595 (C.P. Beaufort County June 6, 1997); Scurry v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 97-CP-07-0408 (C.P. Beaufort County June 6, 1997). The one separate employee requirement of Regulation 117-190 was specifically considered in each of these decisions and held to be a valid exercise of legislative authority. Id.


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