ORDERS:
ORDER AND DECISION
This matter is before this tribunal for a contested case hearing pursuant to S.C. Code Ann.
§§ 1-23-310, et seq. (Supp. 1996) and S.C. Code Ann. § 12-4-30(D) (Supp. 1996) on alleged
administrative violations. The South Carolina Department of Revenue ("Department") alleges that
on June 13, 1996, Respondents violated the "one separate employee" requirement of 27 S.C. Code
Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996), thus constituting a violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A).
For alleged violations of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996), the Department
seeks a $5,000 fine against each Respondent, revocation of five Class III video game machine
licenses located at The Platinum Room on June 13, 1996, and preclusion of the use of any Class III
video game machine licenses at this business for a period of six months from the date of revocation.
The hearing of this matter was held on October 2, 1997. The issues before this tribunal are
(1) whether Respondents violated 27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996) and, (2) if so,
what is the proper penalty for such violation. Based upon the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, this tribunal concludes that Respondent J. M. Brown Vending Co., Inc. violated
27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996) by utilizing video game machine licenses in
contravention of this regulation. Consequently, the licenses shall be revoked. No video game
machine licenses shall be utilized in The Platinum Room for a period of six months from the date
of revocation of the licenses. Further, the Department shall impose a fine of $500 against
Respondent J. M. Brown Vending Co., Inc.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Having carefully considered all testimony and arguments presented at the hearing of this
matter, and taking into account the credibility and accuracy of the evidence, I make the following
Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. On June 13, 1996, the Department's agents Gus Carter and Keith Tennant conducted
an inspection of the video gaming businesses located at I-85, Exit 83, 110 Truck Stop, Cowpens,
South Carolina. After completion of the inspection on that day, the agents issued Respondents an
administrative citation for a violation of the "single place or premises" requirement of 27 S.C. Code
Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996).
2. At the time of the inspection, the facts relating to the "single place or premises"
requirement of the 27 S.C. Regs 117-190 (Supp. 1996) were as follows:
a. There was a mall-type structure consisting of four separate rooms containing
video gaming machines.
b. There was a main entrance into the structure that opened into a common area.
c. There was one payout counter located in the common area.
d. All of the businesses were open and contained operational Class III video
game machines which were available for play.
e. There were employees present in all of the rooms except The Platinum
Room.
f. Just prior to the inspection, the employee assigned to The Platinum Room left
the room to buy a soft drink from the business in the common area. The
employee did not make the room inaccessible during her absence. However,
she returned during the inspection.
g. Each of the video gaming businesses had separate sales tax licenses. See
Petitioner's Exhibit # 7.
3. On June 13, 1996, the following Class III licenses were affixed to the machines in
The Platinum Room as designated on Petitioner's Exhibit # 4 and held by J. M. Brown
Amusement Co., Inc: #s 041343, 041344, 041345, 041346, and 041347.
4. J. M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., holds the retail licenses for The Platinum Room.
5. No sufficient evidence was proffered by the Department to establish that Respondent
J. M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., managed or operated the video game business located at the
Platinum Room. Further, insufficient evidence was presented to establish that J.M. Brown
Amusement Co., Inc., applied for, received, maintained, or permitted to be used Class III video game
machine licenses in contravention of § 12-21-2804(A).
6. The Department seeks a $5,000 fine against each Respondent, revocation of five
Class III video game machine licenses located at The Platinum Room on June 13, 1996, and
preclusion of the use of any Class III video game machine licenses at The Platinum Room for a
period of six months from the date of revocation.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
1. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-4-30(D) (Supp. 1996) and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-320 (Supp. 1996), the Administrative Law Judge Division has jurisdiction to hear this matter.
B. Burden of Proof
2. In civil cases, generally, the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the
affirmative of an issue. 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 127 (1994); Alex Sanders, et al., South Carolina
Trial Handbook § 9:3 Party With Burden, Civil Cases (1994). The Department is the party asserting
the affirmative in this case; therefore, the Department must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that Respondents failed to have a separate employee in The Platinum Room in violation of 27 S.C.
Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996) and have also violated S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A)
(Supp. 1996) by virtue of violating Reg. 117-190. The preponderance of the evidence "is evidence
which is of the greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition
to it . . . ." Black's Law Dictionary 1182 (6th ed. 1990). "The preponderance of the evidence means
such evidence as, when considered and compared with that opposed to it, has more convincing force
and produces in the mind the belief that what is sought to be proved is more likely true than not
true." Sanders, supra, § 9:5 Quantum of Evidence in Civil Cases (1994), (citing Frazier v. Frazier,
228 S.C. 149, 89 S.E.2d 225 (1955)).
3. The weight and credibility assigned to evidence presented at the hearing of a matter
is within the province of the trier of fact. See South Carolina Cable Television Ass'n v. Southern
Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 417 S.E.2d 586 (1992). Furthermore, a trial judge, who
observes a witness, is in the better position to judge the witness's demeanor and veracity and evaluate
their testimony. See Mann v. Walker, 285 S.C. 194, 328 S.E.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1985); Marshall v.
Marshall, 282 S.C. 534, 320 S.E.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1984); McAlister v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 481, 299
S.E.2d 322 (1982); Peay v. Peay, 260 S.C. 108, 194 S.E.2d 392 (1973).
C. Single Place or Premises Violation
4. Respondent J. M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., is the licensee of the Class III video
game machines licensed under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720(A)(3) (Supp. 1996), which are the
subject of this case.
5. Respondent J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., is the operator of the Class III video game
machines located in The Platinum Room, which are the subject of this case.
6. The Video Game Machines Act ("Act"), which regulates video game machine activity
in South Carolina, was enacted in 1993 and became effective on July 1, 1993. This Act is codified
at S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-21-2770, et seq. (Supp. 1996). The purpose of the Act is to regulate the
video game machines industry and to prevent large-scale casino type gambling operations in the
State of South Carolina. See Reyelt v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, Nos. 6:93-1491-3 and 6:93-1493-3 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 1993); See also Op. Att'y. Gen 94-21 at 51 (1994).
7. Petitioner alleges that on June 13, 1996, Respondents violated 27 S.C. Code Ann.
Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996) by applying for, receiving, maintaining, or permitting to be used permits
for the operation of video gaming machines authorized under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720(A)(3)
(Supp. 1996) in violation of the single place or premises requirement. Consequently, Petitioner
alleges Respondents violated S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996). This section provides:
No person shall apply for, receive, maintain, or permit to be used, and
the commission shall not allow to be maintained, permits or licenses
for the operation of more than eight machines authorized under
Section 12-21-2720(A)(3) at a single place or premises for the period
beginning July 1, 1993, and ending July 1, 1994. After July 1, 1994,
the commission may not issue nor authorize to be maintained any
licenses or permits for more than five machines authorized under S.C.
Code Ann. § 12-21-2720(A)(3) at a single place or premises . . . .
(emphasis added).
8. On June 23, 1995, regulations were promulgated which further clarify the provisions
of the Video Game Machines Act, and, as such, these regulations have the force and effect of law.
See Young v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways and Pub. Trans., 287 S.C. 108, 336 S.E.2d 879
(1985); Faile v. South Carolina Employment Sec. Comm'n, 267 S.C. 536, 230 S.E.2d 219 (1976).
Specifically, Regulation 117-190 was promulgated to clarify the meaning of the phrase "single place
or premises" as set forth in § 12-21-2804(A). This regulation, effective June 23, 1995, provides in
relevant part:
A "single place" or "premises" means a structure surrounded by
exterior walls or firewalls consistent with the requirements of the
applicable building code (or where no building code is applicable, a
one hour rated firewall), provided such exterior walls and firewalls
may not have any windows, doors or other openings leading to
another area where video game machines are located.
If a structure surrounded by exterior walls has two or more areas
where video game machines are located, each surrounded by exterior
walls or firewalls as defined and required above, the Department must
review all the facts and circumstances to determine if each area in
reality constitutes a single place or premise for video game machines.
In determining whether each entity is in fact a single place or
premises, the Department of Revenue will consider the following
factors:
(1) Does each entity or business have a separate electric utility meter?
(2) Does each entity or business have at least one separate employee on the premises during business hours?
(3) Does each entity or business have a separate local business license where required?
(4) Does each entity or business have a separate state sales tax license?
A positive answer to these four questions is required for each area to
be considered a "single place or premise" for purposes of the Video
Game Machines Act.
27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
9. It is well established that in interpreting a statute, the court's primary function is to
ascertain the intention of the legislature. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991);
First South Savings Bank, Inc. v. Gold Coast Assocs., 301 S.C. 158, 390 S.E.2d 486 (Ct. App.
1990); State v. Harris, 268 S.C. 117, 232 S.E.2d 231 (1977). In ascertaining the intent of the
legislature, a court should not focus on any single section or provision but should consider the
language of the statute as a whole. Creech v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 200 S.C. 127, 20
S.E.2d 645 (1942). Furthermore, in construing statutes, the language used should be given its plain
and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's
operation. Home Health Serv., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 312 S.C. 324, 440 S.E.2d 375
(1994); Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 368 S.E.2d 899 (1988). Where terms of a statute
are clear and unambiguous, they must be applied according to their literal meaning. Medlock v.
1985 Ford F-150 Pick Up, et al., 308 S.C. 68, 417 S.E.2d 85 (1992); Green v. Zimmerman, 269 S.C.
535, 238 S.E.2d 323 (1977). "A statute should be so construed that no word, clause, sentence,
provision or part shall be rendered surplusage, or superfluous . . . ." 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 346;
Savannah Bank & Trust Co. of Savannah v. Shuman, 250 S.C. 344, 157 S.E.2d 864 (1967). This
tribunal has no legislative powers, and the justice or wisdom of statutes rests exclusively with the
General Assembly. See Smith v. Wallace, 295 S.C. 448, 369 S.E.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1988).
It should be emphasized that S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) clearly precludes
any person, not just the licensees, from applying for, receiving, maintaining, or permitting to be used
permits for the operation of more than five Class III video game machines in a single place or
premises. The term person is not defined in the Act, but its common and ordinary meaning clearly
encompasses an individual or a business entity as well as a licensee or machine owner. See Black's
Law Dictionary 1142 (6th ed. 1995). Further, § 12-21-2804(A) mandates that the Department revoke
the licenses of the machines located in an establishment which fails to meet the requirements of this
section. Hence, § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) mandates revocation of the licenses so used, even
if the licensee was not directly involved in applying for, receiving, maintaining, or permitting its
licenses to be used in contravention of the statute. Such an interpretation is consistent with the plain
language of the statute.
10. The facts of this case clearly indicate that there were five operational Class III video
game machines located in The Platinum Room. The evidence further indicates that The Platinum
Room was open for business at the time of inspection. However, no employee was present in the
business at the time the inspection was initiated.
11. There is sufficient evidence to establish that J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., permitted
licenses to be used in contravention of the single place or premises provision of Regulation 117-190.
However, the Department did not present sufficient evidence to establish that Respondent J.M.
Brown Amusement Co., Inc., applied for, received, maintained, or permitted to be used permits for
the operation of more than five machines authorized under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720(A)(3)
(Supp. 1996) at a single place or premises, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) and 27
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996).
Under § 12-21-2804(A), a license on a video game machine must be revoked by virtue of its
misuse under the Act, regardless if the actual violator is the licensee, machine owner, or lessee.
However, a monetary fine under § 12-21-2804(F) may only be imposed on the actual person directly
involved in the violation of § 12-21-2804(A). When applying for a license, a licensee violates the
statute if he applies for a license to be used in the operation of more than five machines at a single
place or premises to violate the statute. The Department has not established that Respondent J.M.
Brown Amusement Co., Inc., violated the statute when applying for licenses or was involved in the
operation and maintenance of The Platinum Room.
12. In the instant case, there is insufficient evidence to justify disregarding the corporate
entity. Although both J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., and J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., are
owned by the same individuals, this is not enough to disregard the separate legal entities formed by
the two companies. "A corporation is a legal entity, separate and distinct from its shareholders,
officers, and directors, and generally, from all other corporations with which it may be affiliated.
It possesses a legal identity separate and distinct from its owners, regardless of whether such owner
is another corporation, a group of individuals, or a single individual. The doctrine of corporate entity
is clearly one of substance and vitality and is to be ignored with caution only when circumstances
clearly justify it." 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 8 (1990).
The South Carolina Supreme Court followed this reasoning in Brown v. Moorhead Oil Co.,
239 S.C. 604, 124 S.E.2d 47 (1962). In Brown, the court stated, "the mere fact that the entire stock
in the two corporations was owned by the same person does not operate to create an identity of
corporate interest between the two companies, or create the relationship of principal and agent, or
representative, or alter ego between the two." Brown, 239 S.C. at 50 (citing 13 Am. Jur. 160 § 6 (cite
omitted); 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 5(j) and 7(e) (cite omitted); Gordon v. Hollywood-Beaufort
Package Corp., 213 S.Ct. 438, 49 S.E.2d 718 (1948); Cribbs v. Southern Coatings and Chemical Co.,
218 S.C. 273, 62 S.E.2d 505 (1950)).
Thus, without sufficient evidence to show that the corporate veil should be pierced, J.M.
Brown Amusement Co., Inc., cannot be held liable for the actions of J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc.
13. Whether an establishment is being operated as a "single place or premises" is
determined by evaluating the facts against the standard set forth in Regulation 117-190. With respect
to the "employee" requirement, Regulation 117-190 requires that each entity or business have at least
one separate employee on the premises of that respective entity or business during business hours
to comply with the "single place or premises" requirements of § 12-21-2804(A).(1)
If a game room containing operational Class III video game machines is accessible to
customers and no employee is present in that room, the room is being operated in violation of § 12-21-2804(A). An employee working in a common area or anywhere else outside the game room is
not considered to be "on the premises" of the game room. See South Carolina Dep't of Revenue and
Taxation v. Stacks, 95-ALJ-17-0742-CC (Mar. 8, 1996). This application is consistent with the
intent of the General Assembly to prevent large-scale casino type gambling. See Singletary v. South
Carolina Dep't of Educ., 316 S.C. 153, 447 S.E.2d 231 (Ct. App. 1994) citing State v. Thrift, 312
S.C. 282, 440 S.E.2d 341 (1994) (legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered
and language of a statute must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute).
14. Respondent J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., has failed to meet the "one separate
employee" requirement set forth in Regulation 117-190 with regard to The Platinum Room. Failing
to satisfy one requirement is a sufficient ground constituting a violation of the single place or
premises requirement. Therefore, I conclude that The Platinum Room, I-85, Exit 83, 110 Truck
Stop, Cowpens, South Carolina, was operated in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A).
Consequently, the five Class III video game machine licenses at The Platinum Room are subject to
revocation.
If a violation of Reg. 117-190 is not construed to result in a violation of S.C. Code Ann. §
12-21-2804(A), it would lead to an absurd result in light of the object and policy of the law. See
Kiriakides v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 440 S.E.2d 364 (1994) (citing
Stackhouse v. Rowland, 86 S.C. 419, 68 S.E. 561 (1910) (courts will reject the plain and ordinary
meaning of words used in a statute when to accept it would lead to a result so absurd that it could
not possibly have been intended by the legislature or would defeat the plain legislative intention));
South Carolina Coastal Council v. South Carolina State Ethics Comm'n, 306 S.C. 41, 410 S.E.2d
245 (1991) (citing Spartanburg Sanitary Sewer District v. City of Spartanburg, 283 S.C. 67, 321
S.E.2d 258, (1984) (in interpreting a statute, one does not look merely at a particular clause in which
a word may be used, but should consider the word and its meaning in conjunction with the purpose
of the statute, and the object and policy of the law)); Hamm v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
287 S.C. 180, 336 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (citing State, ex rel. McCleod v. Montgomery, 244 S.C. 308,
136 S.E.2d 778 (1964) (the interpretation of a term set forth in a statute should support the statute
and not lead to an absurd result)).
D. Penalty
15. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) expressly authorizes the
"commission" [Department] to enforce the provisions of this section and also requires the
Department to revoke licenses utilized in a fashion that fails to comply with the provisions of this
section.
16. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) provides that the penalty for
exceeding the maximum number of video game machines permitted in a single place or premises
requires the revocation of the licenses of machines located in the establishment.
17. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) further provides: "No license may
be issued for a machine in an establishment in which a license has been revoked for a period of six
months from the date of revocation." The clear meaning of this language is to preclude an
establishment which has had a license revoked from utilizing new licenses for a six month period.
Hence, as all of the current licenses have been revoked and no new licenses may be utilized at The
Platinum Room, The Platinum Room must cease operations for six months. That is, the Department
does not issue licenses for specific locations, but rather issues licenses to individuals. Therefore,
licenses may be utilized by an operator at any, otherwise qualified, location in the State.
Consequently, the above provision would be rendered meaningless if it were read not to require an
establishment whose licenses have been revoked to cease operations for six months. See Singletary
v. South Carolina Dep't of Educ., 316 S.C. 153, 447 S.E.2d 231 (Ct. App. 1994), citing State v.
Thrift, 312 S.C. 282, 440 S.E.2d 341 (1994) (legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably
discovered and language of a statute must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the
statute).
18. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(F) (Supp. 1996) provides that a person who violates
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) is subject to a fine of up to $5,000. The Department seeks a
$5,000 fine against J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., and J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc. However,
the Department has not established that J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc. applied for, received,
maintained, or permitted to be used permits for the operation of more than five machines authorized
under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720(A)(3) (Supp. 1996) at a single place or premises. See Stacks
v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue and Taxation, 95-CP-40-0239 at 8-9 (C.P. Richland County
April 20, 1995).
Under § 12-21-2804(A), a license on a video game machine must be revoked by virtue of its
misuse under the Act, regardless if the violator is the licensee, machine owner, or lessee. However,
a monetary fine under § 12-21-2804(F) may only be imposed on the person directly involved in the
violation of § 12-21-2804(A). In this case, the Department only presented sufficient evidence to
establish that Respondent J.M. Brown Vending Co., Inc., was directly involved in violating the Act.
The Department did not present sufficient evidence to warrant the imposition of a fine against
Respondent J.M. Brown Amusement Co., Inc., pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(F) (Supp.
1996).
19. It is a generally recognized principle of administrative law that the fact-finder has the
authority to impose an administrative penalty after the parties have had an opportunity to have a
hearing and be heard on the issues. See Ohio Real Estate Comm'n v. Aqua Sun Inv., 655 N.E.2d 266
(Ohio 1995); Shadow Lake of Noel, Inc. v. Supervisor of Liquor Control, 893 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995); Matter of Henry Youth Hockey Ass'n, 511 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v. Duranleau, 617 A.2d 143 (Vt. 1992); City of Louisville v. Milligan,
798 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1990); State Police v. Cantina Gloria's, 639 A.2d 14 (Pa. 1994).
Prior to governmental restructuring, the South Carolina Tax Commission, sitting in its
adjudicatory capacity, imposed penalties for violations of statutory provisions administered by the
Commission's subordinate agency. In its capacity as the fact-finder, the Tax Commission would
conduct an adjudicatory hearing in all contested cases arising under Title 12 of the South Carolina
Code of Laws, and would render an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. As the
fact-finder, it was the Commission's prerogative "to impose an appropriate penalty based on the facts
presented." Walker v. South Carolina ABC Comm'n, 305 S.C. 209, 407 S.E.2d 633 (1991). With
the advent of restructuring and the abolition of the Tax Commission, however, such authority has
devolved to the Administrative Law Judge Division. Currently, "all contested cases, as defined by
Section 1-23-310 and as previously considered by the three [Tax] commissioners, shall be heard by
an administrative law judge. . .." S.C. Code Ann. § 12-4-30(D) (Supp. 1996). An administrative
law judge, as the fact-finder, must also determine an appropriate penalty based on the facts presented
at the contested case hearing. Parties are entitled to present evidence on all issues arising out of the
contested agency action. Additionally, the tribunal responsible for conducting the contested case
proceeding has the authority to decide the issues based on the facts presented, and make the final
decision on all the issues, including the appropriate penalty.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that, as mandated by S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996), the Department
shall revoke the five video game machine licenses referenced herein, located at The Platinum Room,
I-85, Exit 83, 110 Truck Stop, Cowpens, South Carolina on June 13, 1996.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no video game machine licenses shall be utilized at The
Platinum Room for a period of six months from the date of revocation of the licenses.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department shall impose a fine of $500 against
Respondent J. M. Brown Vending Co., Inc.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the imposition of a $5,000 fine against Respondent J.M.
Brown Amusement Co., Inc., must fail.
IT IS FURTHER NOTED that according to ALJD Rule 29(B), issues raised in the
proceedings, but not addressed in the Order are deemed denied.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
Post Office Box 11667
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1667
November 20, 1997
Columbia, South Carolina
1. Regulation 117-190 has been held to be "valid and enforceable and a valid exercise of
the power of the . . . Department." McNickel's, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 96-CP-07-1072 (C.P. Beaufort County June 6, 1997); See also AAA Entertainment Corp. v. South
Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 96-CP-07-1595 (C.P. Beaufort County June 6, 1997); Scurry v. South
Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 97-CP-07-0408 (C.P. Beaufort County June 6, 1997). The one
separate employee requirement of Regulation 117-190 was specifically considered in each of
these decisions and held to be a valid exercise of legislative authority. Id. |
