ORDERS:
FINAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter comes before me upon request for a Hearing by the Respondents after being
cited for violating S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804 (A)(Supp. 1996). The South Carolina Department
of Revenue (DOR) contends that the Respondents operated more than eight video poker machines
in a "single place or premise."
A Hearing was held before the Administrative Law Judge Division on August 29, 1995.
Respondents failed to appear and the hearing was held in their absence. I thereafter found the
Respondents violated the Video Game Machines Act and issued an Order revoking the Respondents'
video poker machine licenses and imposing a $5,000 fine on October 11, 1995. However, after that
decision, Respondents made a Motion for Reconsideration. A hearing was held concerning the
Respondents' Motion on June 24, 1996. Following that hearing, I vacated the August 29, 1995
Order and rescheduled this case for a hearing. The subsequent de novo hearing in this matter was
held before the Administrative Law Judge Division on November 7, 1996.
I find the Respondents violated Section 12-21-2804.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Having observed the witnesses and exhibits presented at the hearing and closely passed upon
their credibility, taking into consideration the burden of persuasion by the Parties, I make the
following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of evidence:
1. Notice of the time, date, place and subject matter of the Hearing was given
to the Petitioner and the Respondent.
2. J & W Corporation ("J & W") owns a business entitled "Flamingo." The
business is located on Highway 17 in Beaufort County, three miles North of the
Savannah Bridge. J & W advertised the Flamingo by a sign outside the business.
That sign advertised "Flamingo" in large letters. The names of the businesses
operated within the Flamingo were located at the bottom of the sign in small letters.
See Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1.
3. On May 26, 1994, the Department's revenue officers, Sanders and
Muckenfuss, delivered a copy of Revenue Procedure 94-2 and Information Letter 94-13 explaining the Department's interpretation of "single place or premise." At that
time, the officers specifically informed the manager, Larry Cook, that the Flamingo
had until June 1, 1994, to come into compliance with the Video Game Machines Act
("Act") as set forth in Revenue Procedure 94-2 and Information Letter 94-13.
4. On June 10, 1994, an inspection revealed that the Flamingo reduced the
number of the Class III video poker machines located on the premises to eight
machines. Thereafter, J & W sought an injunction against the Department from the
enforcement of the Act. On July 21, 1994, a Consent Order was entered by Judge
Kemmerlin in the case of J & W Corporation, et al. v. South Carolina Department
of Revenue and Taxation, 94-CP-07-1124. That Order provided that no adverse
action would be taken against J & W until "John Taylor of the South Carolina
Department of Revenue and Taxation shall conduct an investigation of each of the
Plaintiffs in order to determine if each of the Plaintiffs is operating a 'single place or
premises' within the meaning of Section 12-21-2804(A) . . . " This investigation
would be held within a reasonable time so as to decide whether J & W was in
violation of the Act, Section 12-21-2804 (A).
5. On August 8, 1994, Revenue Officers Muckenfuss, Kennedy and Sanders,
conducted an investigation under the oversight of John Taylor and found the
following facts:
a. The Flamingo was a double-wide modular unit
owned by J & W.
b. The Flamingo had one main entrance which opened
into a large hallway. From that hallway, all of the
business sections could be entered.
c. The sections were separated by partitions of
latticework, with large openings allowing movement
into and out of the sections. Each section was
designated as a separate business by placards with the
business' name outside each area and each section
individually had eight Class III video poker machines
located within the area.
6. The thirty-two (32) Class III machine licenses were owned by Hilton Head
Amusement, which is a business operated by the Ingrams' Worldwide Satellite
Corporation. In May 1995, all the licenses which had been at the J&W businesses
expired, and the Ingrams purchased new licenses.
7. J & W leased the four sections located within the modular unit to each of the
designated businesses. Those businesses were:
a. Flamingo Check Cashing;
b. Freeport Shuttle;
c. Freeport Tours; and
d. Broadcreek Transportation.
Similarly, all of the video poker machines were leased to J & W from Henry Ingram.
8. The location had one office and one snack bar. The customers went to the
Flamingo's cashier's office to receive their winnings' payouts from the four
businesses.
9. All of the profits from the video poker machines located within the four
sections were deposited into the J & W account identified as Flamingo. Though the
business sections did have separate telephone numbers which were paid by the
corporation and pro-rated to the four businesses, the electrical bill for all four
sections was paid entirely by J&W.
10. Each business section had separate employees, though those employees
moved freely throughout the location. Moreover, all the employees were paid out of
the same payroll. Additionally, the employer withholding taxes for these employees
were filed on a single tax return.
11. After the Department reviewed the facts pursuant to the officers'
investigation, a violation report was issued against J & W Corporation and
Worldwide Satellite, Inc., d/b/a Hilton Head Amusement.
12. Subsequent to the issuance of the above violation report by the Department,
the Respondents' Class III machine permits expired. The Department thereafter
issued new permits to the Respondents. The Department seeks revocation of all
thirty-two (32) Class III video poker machine permits subsequently issued to the
Respondents and a Five Thousand ($5,000.00) fine. However, there is no language
in any of the license application forms that indicate that the license applied for is a
renewal of an existing license. In fact, each license issued by the Department has a
new number, is not restricted to any particular machine or location and is not tied in
any way to any previous license that the Department may have issued.
13. I find that the Respondents violated S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804 by having
more than eight machines in one location and impose a $3,000 fine.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the above Findings of Fact, I conclude as a matter of law, the following:
1. The Administrative Law Judge Division has jurisdiction to hear this matter
pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-4-30 (D) (Supp. 1996) and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-320 (Supp. 1996).
2. The Department contends that the Respondents violated S.C. Code Ann. §
12-21-2804(A)(Supp. 1996). That section provides:
No person shall apply for, receive, maintain, or permit to be used, and
the commission [Department] shall not allow to be maintained,
permits or licenses for the operation of more than eight machines
authorized under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720 (A)(3) at a single
place or premise. . . .
3. Machines licensed under Section 12-21-2720(A)(3) include video games with
a free play feature operated by a slot in which a coin or thing of value is deposited.
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720 (Supp. 1996).
4. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp.1996) states that the penalty for
failing to comply with the maximum number of machines in a "single place or
premise" is the revocation of the licenses of machines located in the establishment.
5. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(F) (Supp. 1996) states that a person who
violates Section 12-21-2804(A) may be fined up to five thousand dollars.
6. The Video Game Machines Act ("Act") does not define the term "single place
or premise." The Department issued S.C. Revenue Procedure #94-2 on March 23,
1994 that advised video poker operators of the factors considered by the Department
in determining whether a business is a "single place or premise" pursuant to S.C.
Code Ann. § 12-28-2804(A) (Supp. 1996). The twelve factors set forth by the
Department were:
a. Is the ownership of the business establishment
independent of the ownership of any other business
establishment operating video game machines? Is the
ownership the same? If the ownership is not the
same, is there any relationship between the owners
(i.e., common stockholder)?
b. Does each business establishment have its own
licenses, such as those required by the State, city,
county, etc.? Do they operate under the same licenses?
c. Does each business establishment keep its own books
and records? Are the books and records kept
together? Does each business establishment maintain
its financial accounts, such as bank checking and
investment accounts? Do they maintain joint
financial accounts?
d. If the business establishment leases its location, is that
lease agreement separate from any lease agreement
entered into by any other business establishment
operating video game machines? Are these business
establishments operating under the same lease
agreement?
e. If the business establishment does not own the video
game machines in its location, is the machine profit
sharing or lease agreement with a licensed coin
operator separate from any machine profit sharing or
lease agreement entered into by any other business
establishment operating video game machines? Are
these business establishments operating under the
same machine profit sharing or lease agreement?
f. Does each business establishment have its own,
separate and distinct, address listed through the
United States Postal Service or a 911- emergency
system? Is the address for both business
establishments the same?
g. Does each business establishment have its own signs
and business marquis? Do they operate under the
same signs and marquis?
h. Do the business establishments operate under
different names? Do they operate under the same
name?
I. Does each business establishment have its own
employees? Do the same employees work for both
establishments?
j. Does each business establishment have its own
account with each of the utility companies (i.e.,
telephone, water, power)? Do they operate under the
same account?
k. How are the business establishments physically
separated (i.e., walls, no walls, lattice work, separate
or common amenities, etc.)?
l. Does each business establishment file its own returns
for any taxes that may be due (i.e., property tax - PT-100, admissions tax - L-511, sales and use tax - ST-3,
In, etc.)? Do they remit such taxes on the same
return?
7. After the Department issued Revenue Procedure #94-2, the Department then
issued Information Letter #94-13 clarifying the Revenue Procedure. In that Letter,
the Department adopted an Attorney General's opinion issued March 24, 1994 that
explained that "subdividing a single building or structure with partitions to create so-called discrete 'premises' is contrary to the legislative scheme."
8. The Department's guidelines and revenue procedures do not constitute a
binding norm, since they are not promulgated as regulations. See Ryder Truck Lines,
Inc. v. United States, et al., 716 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1983); Home Health Service v.
S.C. Tax Comm'n, __ S.C. ___, 440 S.E.2d 375 (1994).
9. The Honorable G. Ross Anderson held that the term "single place or premise"
is "sufficiently defined and susceptible of a common and ordinary meaning to provide
a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable notice of the prescribed conduct."
Reyelt et al. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, C/A No. 6: 93-1491-3 (D.S.C. July
5, 1994). I find that the above holding in Reyelt correctly characterizes the proper
interpretation of "single place or premise." Accordingly, in making the finding that
the Respondents had more than eight Class III video poker machines at this "single
place or premise," this tribunal considered all the evidence presented at the hearing
concerning this issue and made this determination on the weight and credibility of
that evidence. Neither the Department's twelve factors nor the March 24, 1994
Attorney General's opinion were binding upon this decision in any manner.
10. The Respondents argue that the Department was required to promulgate
regulations before enforcing the provisions limiting the number of video poker
machines allowed in a "single place or premise." S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804
(Supp. 1994) expressly authorizes the "commission" [Department] to enforce the
provisions of this section and also authorizes the Department to revoke the license
of an establishment that fails to comply with the provisions of this section. While
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2798 (Supp. 1994) provides: "the commission shall
promulgate rules and regulations pertaining to the machines and persons licensed by
it," this section does not impose a specific duty on the Department to promulgate
regulations with respect to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A). When the legislature
grants general authority to an agency to promulgate regulations, it is logically
consistent that an agency would adopt or promulgate regulations as necessary to
enable the agency to accomplish its objectives. See David E. Shipley, South Carolina
Administrative Law 4-4 (1989). It is equally logical that an agency need not
promulgate regulations if they are not necessary to accomplish its objectives, that is,
to enforce clearly defined laws. In this case, as set forth above, a "single place or
premise" is "sufficiently defined and susceptible of a common and ordinary meaning
to provide a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable notice of the prescribed
conduct." Reyelt, supra.
11. The Respondents argue that the Department failed to comply with S.C. Code
Ann. § 1-23-370(c) (1986) because it instituted these proceedings before giving
notice by mail of the facts or conduct which would warrant the intended action and
before giving the licensee an opportunity to show compliance with all lawful
requirements for the retention of the license. That section provides in pertinent part:
No revocation, suspension, annulment, or withdrawal of any license
is lawful unless, prior to the institution of agency proceedings, the
agency gave notice by mail to the licensee of facts or conduct which
warrant the intended action, and the licensee was given an
opportunity to show compliance with all lawful requirements for the
retention of the license.
In Garris v. Governing Bd. of S. Carolina, S.C. , 461 S.E.2d 819 (1995), the
Court addressed the requirements of Section 1-23-370. The Court held that 1-23-370
requires that a licensee be "given an opportunity to show compliance with all lawful
requirements for the retention of the license." The Court concluded that the statute
requires the licensee be given an opportunity to show compliance existed at the time
the alleged violation occurred, not to rectify any matters they failed to comply with
at the time of the violation. The Court stated:
Showing compliance means showing that at the time of the alleged
violation appellant was in full compliance with the law. See Hinson
v. Georgia State Board of Dental Examiners, 135 Ga. App. 488, 218
S.E.2d 162 (1975). We construe Section 1-23-370 as providing an
opportunity to show that no violation occurred instead of providing
an opportunity to correct deficiencies.
Here, on August 8, 1994, Respondents operated 32 Class III video game
machines on their "single place or premise." Therefore, they did not meet the
statutory requirements for the legal operation of those machines on that date. Any
attempts to meet the requirement subsequent to that date would not cure the prior
violation.
12. In May 1995, the Department issued new licenses to J&W upon the
expiration of the Respondents' 32 licenses in effect when the violation occurred. The
Department seeks revocation of all thirty-two (32) of these subsequently issued Class
III video poker machine permits. The Department relies on S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-370 (b) (1986) which states that:
When a licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the
renewal of a license or a new license with reference to any activity of
a continuing nature, the existing license does not expire until the
application has been finally determined by the agency, and, in case
the application is denied or the terms of the new license limited, until
the last day for seeking review of the agency order or a later date
fixed by order of the reviewing court.
The Department contends that since 1-23-370 requires the Department to renew the
original license of an ongoing business, its only alternative is to issue another license
and thereafter seek to have that license revoked. However, that section does not
require the issuance of a new license. In fact 1-23-370 (b) provides that if the
Department opposes the renewal of a license, the existing license does not expire
"until the last day for seeking review of the agency order or a later date fixed by order
of the reviewing court." In other words, that section provides that the existing license
will remain valid until the business has had an opportunity to present its defense to
the denial of its license. It certainly does not mandate that the Department issue an
entirely new license.
The Department further argued that the "new" license application is simply
a renewal license issued in accordance with S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720 (A) (Supp.
1996) which provides that all licenses issued pursuant to the Act are to be valid only
for two (2) years. However, as noted above, each license issued by the Department
has a new number, is not restricted to any particular machine or location and is not
tied in any way to any previous license that the Department may have issued. S.C.
Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) directs the Department to "revoke the
licenses of machines located in an establishment which fails to meet the requirements
of this section." "To revoke means to recall, and, with reference to privileges, to
annul, repeal, rescind, cancel." 37A Words and Phrases 180 (Supp. 1996).
Obviously, an agency cannot recall or rescind something that has not yet been issued.
Penal statutes must be strictly construed against the state in favor of the
citizen. Feldman v. S.C. Tax Commission, 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22 (1943). The
current statutory scheme contemplates revocation of licenses in existence when a
violation occurs, and makes no provision for revoking new licenses issued after the
violation occurs. Since there is no nexus whatsoever between the previous license
and the license the Department seeks to revoke, there simply is no authority for
visiting the sins of a previous license upon a subsequently issued "new" license.
Therefore, as the licenses in dispute are no longer in effect, the Department has no
authority to revoke new licenses issued subsequent to the violation.
13. On June 23, 1995, S.C. Code Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996) became effective.
It provides as follows:
The Video Game Machines Act, found in Article 20, Chapter
21 of Title 12, limits the number of machines that may be located in
a "single place" or "premises."
A single place or premises must be a fixed location. It does
not include moving property such as a boat or a train, unless such
property is permanently affixed to a specific location.
A "single place" or "premises" means a structure surrounded
by exterior walls or firewalls consistent with the requirements of the
applicable building code (or where no building code is applicable, a
one hour rated firewall), provided such exterior walls and firewalls
may not have any windows, doors or other openings leading to
another area where video game machines are located.
If a structure surrounded by exterior walls has two or more
areas where video game machines are located, each surrounded by
exterior walls or firewalls as defined and required above, the
Department must review all the facts and circumstances to determine
if each area in reality constitutes a single place or premise for video
game machines. In determining whether each entity is in fact a single
place or premises, the Department of Revenue will consider the
following factors: (1) Does each entity have at least one separate
electric utility meter? (2) Does each entity or business have at least
one separate employee on the premises during business hours? (3)
Does each entity or business have a separate local business license
where required? (4) Does each entity or business have a separate
state sales tax license? A positive answer to these four questions is
required for each area to be considered a "single place or premise" for
purposes of The Video Game Machines Act.
The Respondents argue that at the time of the investigation on August 8, 1994, the
Department was erroneously interpreting the words "single place or premises"
contained in S.C. Code Ann. §12-21-2804. The Respondents contend the legislative
intent is found in Regulation 117-190 because that is the only interpretation which
has been approved by the General Assembly. However, where the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is
no occasion for employing rules of statutory interpretation and a court has no right
to look for or impose another meaning. Miller v. Doe, 312 S.C. 444, 441 S.E.2d 319
(1994). In this case, the term "single place or premise" as used in Section 12-21-2804(A) is "sufficiently defined and susceptible of a common and ordinary meaning
to provide a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable notice of the prescribed
conduct." Reyelt, supra. Accordingly, it is inappropriate to attempt to interpret
Section 12-21-2804(A) by resorting to rules of statutory construction. Moreover,
even if Respondent's argument were correct and the legislative intent behind Section
12-21-2804(A) could only be determined by referring to Regs. 117-190, it is clear
that Respondents would still be guilty of a violation. One of the determining factors
in whether a given establishment constitutes a discrete "place or premise" pursuant
to Regs. 117-190 is whether each individual establishment is surrounded by exterior
walls or firewalls. In this case, the undisputed evidence indicates that the game
rooms were not surrounded by firewalls, but were merely partitioned off with
latticework. Therefore, Respondents' argument is without merit.
14. It is a generally recognized principle of administrative law that the fact finder
has the authority to impose an administrative penalty after the parties have had an
opportunity to have a hearing and be heard on the issues. See Ohio Real Estate
Comm'n v. Aqua Sun Investments, 655 N.E. 2d 266 (Ohio 1995); Shadow Lake of
Noel, Inc. v. Supervisor of Liquor Control, 893 S.W. 2d 835 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995);
Matter of Henry Youth Hockey Ass'n, 511 N.W. 2d 452 (Minn. App. 1994);
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. Duranleau, 617 A.2d 143 (Vt. 1992); City
of Louisville v. Milligan, 798 S.W. 2d 454 (Ky. 1990); Com., Dept. of Transp. v.
Slipp, 550 A.2d 838 (Pa. 1988); Dept. of Transp. v. Miller, 528 A.2d 1030 (Pa.
1987); State Police v. Cantina Gloria's, 639 A. 2d 14 (Pa. 1994).
Prior to governmental restructuring, a commission sitting in its adjudicatory
capacity imposed penalties for violations of statutory provisions its agency
administered. In its capacity as the fact-finder, the Tax Commission would conduct
an adjudicatory hearing in all contested cases arising under Title 12 of the South
Carolina Code, and would render an order containing findings of fact and conclusions
of law. As the fact-finder, it was the commission's prerogative "to impose the
appropriate penalty based on the facts presented." Walker v. South Carolina ABC
Comm'n, 305 S.C. 209, 407 S.E.2d 633, 634 (1991). With the advent of
restructuring and the abolition of the Tax Commission, however, the Administrative
Law Judge Division was given the authority to hear "all contested cases, as defined
by Section 1-23-310 and as previously considered by the three [Tax] commissioners.
. . ." S.C. Code Ann. §12-4-30(D) (Supp. 1996). The Administrative Law Judge, as
the current fact-finder, must also impose a penalty based on the facts presented at the
contested case hearing. As parties are entitled to present evidence on all issues
arising out of the contested agency action, it follows that the tribunal responsible for
conducting the contested case proceedings as mandated by the legislature must have
the authority to decide the issues based on the facts presented and make the final
decisions on all the issues, including the appropriate penalty.
ORDER
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby:
ORDERED that a fine of $3,000 is imposed upon the Respondent World Wide Satellite Inc.
___________________________
Ralph King Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
April 28, 1997 |