ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
I. Introduction
Daria L. Andriole (Andriole) seeks to have her property taxed under the 4% assessment ratio
available for residential property via S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c). The Charleston County
Assessor (Assessor) opposes Andriole's position.
II. Issue
Does Andriole qualify for the 4% assessment ratio available for residential property via S.C. Code
Ann. § 12-43-220(c)?
III. Analysis
A. Findings of Fact
I find by a preponderance of the evidence the following facts:
Andriole owns property in Charleston County located at 146 Red Cedar Lane, Kiawah Island, South
Carolina which she asserts is her domicile. She has demonstrated that she filed a part-year resident
tax return for the 2001 tax year showing a date of South Carolina residency beginning July 1, 2001,
registered a vehicle showing 146 Red Cedar Lane as her address on May 16, 2001, paid taxes on the
vehicle to Charleston County on May 5, 2001, obtained a South Carolina drivers' license on May 17,
2001, and obtained a South Carolina vehicle license plate on May 5, 2001.
In asserting her position, she fully agrees that she is amicably married to her husband who is a resident
and domiciliary of Connecticut. Further, she agrees that the Connecticut property on which her
husband resides is jointly owned by the couple.
In reliance upon her position that she is domiciled in South Carolina, on October 23, 2001, she
submitted to Charleston County an application identified as the "Legal Residence (4%) Special
Assessment Application." Based on the law in existence at the time of filing, she affirmed the
following statement:
Under penalty of perjury, I certify that: (A) the residence which is the subject of this
application is my legal residence and where I am domiciled; and (B) that neither I nor
any other member of my household is residing in or occupying any other residence in
South Carolina which I or any other member of my immediate family has qualified for
the special assessment ratio allowed by this section.
She attached to the application her 2001 South Carolina Income Tax Return, South Carolina voter
registration card, South Carolina driver's license, and South Carolina vehicle registration. After a
review, the Assessor on January 26, 2002, granted the requested 4% legal residence classification for
the 2001 tax year.
However, on May 23, 2002, the Assessor removed the 4% classification for the 2002 tax year. The
basis for the removal was that for 2002 Andriole's husband was a legal resident of Connecticut,
owned and maintained a residence in Connecticut, and obtained a property tax reduction on that
residence due to his being a disabled veteran. While Andriole agrees that her husband receives a
property tax benefit in Connecticut due to his status as a disabled veteran, she does not agree that her
husband's property tax benefit in Connecticut denies her the 4% ratio in South Carolina.
Accordingly, on June 11, 2003, Andriole appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals (Board). The
Board agreed with the Assessor's determination, and this matter is now here for decision.
B. Conclusions of Law
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:
1. Domicile
At the hearing, the Assessor argued that Andriole was a resident of Connecticut and because of that
status could not receive the 4% assessment ratio for residential property. Legal residency (and
therefore domicile) is a relevant factor under §12-43-220(c)(2)(i) since the 4% ratio is granted only
to owner-occupied property that is the owner's legal residence and that has been the owner's domicile
for some period of the tax year for which the 4% ratio is sought. Here, the facts establish residency
and domicile for the 2002 tax year. See Gasque v. Gasque, 246 S.C. 423, 426-427, 143 S.E.2d 811,
812 (1965) (domicile is "the place where a person has his true, fixed and permanent home and
principal establishment, to which he has, whenever he is absent, an intention of returning" with that
determination being "largely one of intent to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each
case.").
The evidence shows that Andriole occupied property at 146 Red Cedar Lane, Kiawah Island, South
Carolina during 2002. Indeed, the evidence establishes that she established her legal residence and
domicile at the 146 Red Cedar Lane, Kiawah Island, South Carolina property well before the 2002
tax year.
For example, she filed a part-year resident tax return for the 2001 tax year showing that her South
Carolina residency began July 1, 2001, registered a vehicle showing 146 Red Cedar Lane as her
address on May 16, 2001, paid taxes on the vehicle to Charleston County on May 5, 2001, obtained
a South Carolina drivers' license on May 17, 2001, and obtained a South Carolina vehicle license plate
on May 5, 2001. Such connections with South Carolina are sufficient to establish a fixed and
permanent home to which she has, whenever she is absent, an intention of returning. Accordingly,
the 4% ratio cannot be denied on the basis that Andriole "continues to be a legal resident of the state
of Connecticut."
2. Connecticut Property Exemption
Beyond the domicile argument, the Assessor argues that the 4% ratio must be denied since the
amendments to §12-43-220(c)(2)(ii) applicable to tax year 2002 have not been satisfied. As
amended, that provision requires the applicant to certify "that neither I nor any other member of my
household is residing in or occupying any other residence which I or any member of my immediate
family has qualified for the special assessment ratio allowed by this section." The Assessor argues the
certification is not met since Andriole's husband receives a $4,500 exemption in Connecticut against
the value of his Connecticut property due to his being a disabled veteran. For two reasons I disagree
with the Assessor's position.
First, the plain language of the statue must control. Anders v. South Carolina Parole and
Community Corrections Bd., 279 S.C. 206, 209, 305 S.E.2d 229, 230 (1983) ("when the terms of
the statute are clear and unambiguous, the Court must apply them according to the literal meaning.");
Lindsay v. Main Ins. Co., 281 S.C. 331, 334, 315 S.E.2d 166, 168 (1984) ("There is no room for
construction where the terms are clear."). Under the statute, the applicant must certify that no
"member of my immediate family has qualified for the special assessment ratio allowed by this
section." (emphasis added). The ratio "allowed by this section" is plainly the 4% ratio allowed by
§12-43-220(c).
Thus, the clear language allows one member of an immediate family to obtain a 4% ratio under
§12-43-220(c) but denies a second 4% ratio under §12-43-220(c) to a second member of that same
immediate family. Such an approach is entirely reasonable and seeks to avoid the potential abuse that
might occur if a couple obtained a 4% residential status on their "permanent" home in Charleston
County and also sought to obtain a second 4% ratio on the couple's "mountain home" in Oconee
County or their "beach house" in Horry County.
In other words, the General Assembly granted one 4% residential ratio to an immediate family.
Under the facts of this case, Andriole and all of her immediate family will receive only one 4% ratio
under §12-43-220(c). Therefore, she has not violated the certification.
Second, even if §12-43-220(c) could be construed to deny the 4% ratio if a taxing jurisdiction beyond
South Carolina granted a benefit "allowed by this section," the benefit granted by Connecticut is much
too dissimilar to be classified as one "allowed by this section."
Indeed, here the benefit to Andriole's husband under the Connecticut exemption is a flat dollar
amount (apparently $4,500) and is not a ratio at all. Further, the benefit under §12-43-220(c) is
premised almost exclusively on domicile. However, Andriole's husband only qualifies for the
Connecticut benefit since he meets the statute's requirement of having "a disability rating by the
Veterans' Administration of the United States amounting to ten per cent or more of total disability."
C.G.S.A. § 12-81(20). Thus, the Connecticut exemption is not a domiciliary exemption at all but
instead is a disability exemption. Therefore, the Connecticut exemption is too dissimilar to the
"special assessment ratio allowed by this section [§12-43-220(c)]" and cannot form a basis for
denying Andriole the requested 4% ratio.
IV. Order
The Charleston County Assessor shall take all steps necessary to restore the 4% assessment ratio
available for residential property via S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c) to Daria L. Andriole for the
2002 tax year.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED
______________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: January 15, 2004
Columbia, South Carolina |
