ORDERS:
FINAL DECISION AND ORDER
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 11, 1999, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Office of Ocean and Coastal
Resource Management ("OCRM") issued two permits(1) to John Perkins ("Perkins") which allow the construction of a
private residence and an erosion control structure on each of two adjoining ocean front lots Perkins owns on Fripp Island in
Beaufort County.
Windell and Frances Drury ("Drurys" or "Petitioners") own an improved lot on Fripp Island immediately behind Perkins' lots.
On March 3, 1999, the Drurys filed an appeal of the permit decisions. The Drurys initiated this appeal based on numerous
concerns, including their belief that the properties in front of theirs had been abandoned by the property owner and could not
be developed(2).
The specific grounds set forth by the Drurys in support of their appeal are as follows:
1. S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-290(B)(2)(e), which allows for the construction of new erosion control structures on
Fripp Island, is unconstitutional special legislation;
2. Alternatively, S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-290(B)(2)(e) should not be interpreted to allow for the construction of a
new rock revetment on the lots owned by Perkins;
3. The permits as issued violate provisions of S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-10 et seq. and OCRM's Rules and Regulations.
Perkins asserts the permits were properly issued and that denial of the permits will result in a "regulatory taking" of his
property for which he must be compensated. OCRM also contends the permits were proper under the facts and law.
The appeal was forwarded to the Administrative Law Judge Division by OCRM. Contemporaneous with the filing of the
appeal, Petitioners filed a Motion for Temporary Injunction seeking to preserve the status quo of the property until the
permit appeals could be heard. Following notice and arguments from counsel for all parties, a Temporary Injunction was
issued from the bench on March 17, 1999, and a written Order of injunction was filed on May 27, 1999. A contested case
hearing on the merits of the appeal was set for June 30, 1999.
On June 23, 1999, Fripp Island Property Owners Association ("POA") moved to intervene in the appeal for the limited
purpose of contesting Petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-290(B)(2)(e) . On
June 29, 1999, Fripp Island Public Service District ("PSD") also moved to intervene for similar reasons. Both motions were
granted on June 30, prior to taking testimony in the contested case hearing. Both intervenors sought to defend the
constitutionality of this section.
In addition to defending the constitutional validity of Section 48-39-290(B)(2)(e), the intervenors raised a threshold
objection to the Division's consideration of this issue based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, prior to
opening statements and the receipt of testimony, the Court heard arguments from counsel for the Intervenors on their motion
to dismiss the constitutional challenge. After taking the matter under advisement, the Court granted the motion. A separate
order setting forth the basis for granting the motion was filed on August 6, 1999.
The issue of statutory construction raised by the Drurys was two-fold. Petitioners had initially challenged OCRM's
interpretation of Section 48-39-290(B)(2)(e) so as to be applicable to Fripp Island generally. In addition, Petitioners
challenged OCRM's determination that this section specifically applied to the Perkins' property. However, at the beginning
of the contested case proceeding, the Petitioners advised the Court that they were no longer challenging OCRM's
interpretation of the statute. Therefore, the statutory construction issue is now moot.
The issues which remained for consideration of this appeal relate to the Petitioners' claims that these permits violate S. C.
Code Ann. Section 48-39-10 et seq. and R. 30-1 et seq. Petitioners cited numerous sections of the Act and Regulations
which they claim are inconsistent with the issued permit.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
Having observed the witnesses and exhibits presented at the hearing and closely passed upon their credibility, taking into
consideration the burden of persuasion by the parties, I make the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of evidence:
1. Fripp Island is a privately owned island adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean in Beaufort County, South Carolina. Access to the
island is across a privately owned and maintained bridge
connecting Fripp Island to Hunting Island. Development of Fripp Island as a private resort began in the early 1960's.
2. In 1964, Perkins purchased two lots (729 and 731 Seahorse Lane) designated on the Fripp Island subdivision plat as lots
3 and 4, Block F. These lots are bordered on the south by the Atlantic Ocean. At the time of Perkins' acquisition, the bridge
to Fripp Island had not been constructed.
3. Beginning in the late 1970's and continuing into the 1980's, the beachfront at Fripp Island experienced both extensive
development and severe erosion. In response to the erosion of their lots, many Fripp Island property owners obtained
permits to erect erosion control devices in the form of seawalls and revetments in front of their lots.
4. Perkins' lots were not immune to this erosion, and he was issued a permit(3) to build a seawall by OCRM's predecessor, the
South Carolina Coastal Council ("Coastal Council"). Perkins chose not to construct the wall because of what he viewed to
be onerous conditions placed on the permit. The owners of the other ocean front properties along this stretch of beach
accepted the permit conditions and erected seawalls.
5. As the erosion intruded further into Perkins' lots, the owner of the property landward of Perkins' lots (Lot 6, Block F)
constructed a seawall. The result was the creation of what was described as a "pocket beach" where the line of revetments
drops back at Perkins' lots and then resumes closer to the ocean past those lots.
6. Notwithstanding the erosion of his lots and resulting limited (if not nonexistent) uses(4), from the date of his acquisition to
the present, Perkins has continued to pay his annual property tax assessment for these lots to Beaufort County as well as
paying property owner association fees for these lots to the Fripp Island POA.
7. In 1988, the South Carolina General Assembly passed the Beachfront Management Act(5) ("BMA"). This legislation, inter
alia, prohibited new erosion control structures from being built on the Atlantic shoreline. The seawall prohibition was
adopted as a method of implementing a "retreat" policy(6) espoused in the legislation.
8. At the time of the adoption of the BMA, approximately 95% of the shoreline at Fripp Island was armored with existing
rock revetments.
9. In 1991, property owners representing ten lots on the south end of Fripp Island sought to construct a rock revetment
across their oceanfront lots.
10. Coastal Council refused to accept an application from these property owners based on the BMA's prohibition of such
structures, and the property owners then brought a civil action seeking a declaration that this revetment could be
constructed. This civil action, captioned Berry - Leithouser et al. v. South Carolina Coastal Council, was docketed in
Beaufort County as case number 92-CP-07-105.
11. The outcome of this civil action was an order issued by the Court of Common Pleas for Beaufort County, through the
Honorable Thomas Kemmerlin, Jr., requiring the Coastal Council to issue permits allowing the construction of these
revetments.
12. Coastal Council issued a permit to construct a rock revetment in front of the ten lots located on the south end of Fripp
Island, which were the subject of the above-referenced civil action before Judge Kemmerlin. In addition, the Coastal Council
later issued permit # CC-93-115 to individuals named Jesse Craven and Al Schaufelberger for construction of a rock
revetment on two lots located at 510 and 512 Tarpon Boulevard on the south end of Fripp Island.
13. Following construction of these revetments, all of the oceanfront lots on Fripp Island, with the exception of Perkins' two
lots, were armored with rock revetments.
14. In September of 1992, the Drurys purchased lot 6, Block F (also designated 727 Seahorse Lane) on Fripp Island for
$300,000. According to the Fripp Island subdivision plat, this lot is located immediately landward of the Perkins lots and is
separated from those lots by a reserved right of way; however, the property was listed by the Fripp Island Company on 1992
marketing literature as "oceanfront." At the time of the Drurys' purchase, the property was improved with a private
residence and a seawall, the Atlantic Ocean reached the rock revetment in front of the lot on a daily basis, and Lots 3 and 4
were regularly inundated in front of the revetment.
15. Prior to closing on this property, the Drurys were made aware of the Fripp Island subdivision plat and the existence of
platted lots in front of the property they were purchasing. The Drurys discussed these lots with, among others, the realtor, a
member of the OCRM staff stationed in Beaufort County and their closing attorney. The Drurys concluded the Perkins' lots
had been "abandoned" when Perkins failed to build a seawall and allowed the lots to erode. Significantly, the Drurys did not
contact Perkins to discuss these lots with him, or even attempt to learn who the owner was, nor did they inquire into whether
or not taxes and POA fees were being paid for those lots.
16. In 1993 the BMA was amended(7) with the following language: Subitem (a) does not apply to a private island with an Atlantic Ocean shoreline of twenty thousand, two hundred ten feet of
which twenty thousand, ninety feet of shoreline is revetted with existing erosion control devices and one hundred twenty feet
of shoreline is not revetted with existing erosion control devices. Nothing contained in this subitem makes this island eligible
for beach renourishment funds.
S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-290(B)(2)(e)
17. Fripp Island fits the description of this amendment.
18. The referenced subitem provides, "No new erosion control structures or devices are allowed seaward of the setback line
except to protect a public highway which existed on the effective date of this act." S. C. Code Ann. Section
48-39-290(B)(2)(a).
19. Beginning some time in the mid-1990's the erosion of Fripp Island's beachfront ceased, the process reversed, and the
beachfront has experienced significant accretion over the last 4-5 years, to the extent that there is now a significant stretch of
dry sand between Perkins' seaward lot lines and the Atlantic Ocean high water mark.
20. On September 28, 1998 Perkins submitted two applications to OCRM seeking to construct a revetment and houses on
Lots 3 and 4.
21. OCRM complied with all public notice requirements in the processing of these applications and received comments from
the Drurys, other property owners on Fripp Island, and State and Federal resource agencies.
22. On February 11, 1999 OCRM issued its permits to Perkins. The permits authorized construction of houses on Lots 3
and 4 not to exceed 3,500 square feet of heated space. In addition the permits authorized construction of the revetment,
provided that it was moved landward so that it extended no farther seaward than the existing revetments at Lot 2. Finally,
the permits authorized this revetment to be constructed in line with the existing wall to the northeast and would connect by
way of a wing wall to the revetment on the southwest.
23. The BMA requires OCRM to establish baselines along the Atlantic coast shoreline of South Carolina and limits or
restricts what may be built seaward of the baseline. See, S.C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-280.
24. The baseline established for Fripp Island in the vicinity of the properties at issue is along the line of revetments and
seawalls, so that Perkins' lots are entirely seaward of that baseline.
25. Special permits are available for construction seaward of the baseline when the property owner would have no
reasonable use of his property without such a permit, or where there is an overriding public interest. See, S.C. Code Ann.
Section 48-39-290(D) and S.C. Code Ann. Regs 30-15F.
26. The proposed use, a single family private residence, is consistent with the uses presently being made of the other ocean
front lots in the vicinity of the Perkins' lots.
27. The revetments authorized by the permits are limited to extending no further seaward than the existing line of revetments
on either side of the Perkins' lots and must tie-in to the existing revetments so that a continuous line is formed.
28. The private residences authorized by the permits are required to extend no further seaward than the existing houses on
either side of the Perkins' lots and are to be similar in size to those existing houses.
29. While special permits may be issued allowing construction seaward of the baseline, the " structure cannot be constructed
or reconstructed on a primary oceanfront dune or on the active beach." S. C. Code Ann. Regs 30-15F(2).
30. There is no contention that any portion of the permitted structures are proposed to be built on primary oceanfront sand
dunes, but the Drurys do contend the Perkins' lots are active beach and therefore the proposed construction cannot be
authorized.
31. OCRM regulations define "active beach" as "the area seaward of the escarpment or the first line of stable natural
vegetation, whichever first occurs, measured from the ocean landward." S. C. Code Ann. Regs 30-1C(32).
32. Both petitioner and respondents produced expert witnesses on the issue of where the active beach at this site should
properly be located. Petitioner's expert testified it was his opinion there was no line of stable natural vegetation between the
ocean and the existing revetment on the Drurys' property. It was also his opinion that there was no escarpment, as he
understood that term, present on Perkins' lots and the first escarpment was the revetment on the Drurys' property.
Therefore, according to this witness, under the plain language of OCRM regulations, all of Perkins' lots are "active beach."
33. According to OCRM's experts, the Perkins lots are classified as "transitional," which means that the lots are in the
process of changing from active beach to high ground. This opinion is based upon the facts that the lots are characterized by
developing vegetation and dune hummocks which appear to be coalescing into a sand dune, and the lots appear to be of
sufficient elevation to withstand flooding during a 2 year design storm event. Moreover, neither vegetation nor developing
sand dunes are generally found on an active beach.
34. Fripp Island is classified as a long-term accretional beach, meaning that more sand accretes onto the beach than erodes
from it, when considered over long periods of time. Fripp Island experiences short term, episodic, erosion events, caused by
a phenomenon of sand shoal attachment. 35. Coastal processes on Fripp Island are heavily influenced by Fripp Inlet, one of
the largest inlets in the Coastal Zone. Because of the size of the inlet, the island is relatively stable over longer periods of
time. An accretional phase on the island such as is currently occurring can be expected to last several years, and possibly
decades.
36. The determination of whether or not a beach is "active" represents a consideration of recent coastal processes, rather
than a consideration of the history of the site. The fact that a beach may be characterized as unstable, because of periods of
erosion and accretion, is not relevant to a determination as to whether the beach is active beach.
37. Elevations of +6 feet NGVD (National Geodetic Vertical Datum) are sufficient to support the colonization and growth
of vegetation, and to withstand flooding and regular inundation. The Perkins lots are at elevations above six feet NGVD.
38. Shoreline armoring through the construction of hard erosion control structures, namely seawalls, revetments, and
bulkheads, can have negative down drift impacts to adjacent areas. Erosion control structures block the transport of sand,
which moves from north to south down the beach. Erosion control structures can starve adjacent areas of sand transport,
and increase erosion on adjacent areas.
39. The construction of revetments on Perkins' lots is not likely to have any adverse impacts to down-drift areas. Fripp
Island is entirely revetted, and therefore these revetments will have no impact on adjacent structures and no measurable
adverse impact on the beach.
40. The construction of revetments on Perkins' lots will have no negative impact on the Drurys' property. In fact, from an
engineering perspective, the Perkins revetment will provide a benefit to the Drurys' property.
41. No credible or persuasive evidence was produced to support a contention that the construction of a house on each of
Perkins' lots is likely to increase the threat of storm damage to the Drurys.
42. These permits are not likely to lead to adverse, cumulative impacts since the Perkins' lots are the only remaining
oceanfront lots which are not currently revetted on Fripp Island.
43. There is no evidence to support a contention that Perkins legally abandoned his property. Rather, Perkins paid taxes on
his property, and remained involved with issues concerning his lots, including rejecting a permit issued by the South Carolina
Coastal Council for a revetment which would have resulted in him losing a significant portion of his property(8).
44. Even designated as a "second row" property, the Drury lot and home has a value of approximately $450,000, which
represents an increase of 50% in value for the six years they have owned it.
45. If Perkins is allowed to develop his lots, they have a value of approximately $400,000 apiece. If no development is
allowed, the lots have no value and may constitute a negative asset because taxes and POA fees will continue to be assessed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, I conclude as a matter of law, the following:
1. The Administrative Law Judge Division has subject matter jurisdiction in this action pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. Sec.
1-23-600 et seq. and 1-23-310 et seq. (1986 and Supp. 1998).
2. S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 48-39-150 (Supp. 1998) authorizes the Administrative Law Judge Division to hear contested cases
arising under Chapter 39 of Title 48 of the 1976 Code.
3. These permits do not violate S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-20, as this section is not proscriptive in nature, but instead
sets forth a legislative declaration of findings. In addition, these findings are not relevant to this project. The legislative
findings contained in the BMA which are found in S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-250 are the relevant findings for review of
this project.
4. Likewise, these permits do not violate S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-30, as this section is not proscriptive in nature, but
instead sets forth a legislative declaration of policy. In addition, these policies are not relevant to this project. The legislative
declaration of state policy set forth in the BMA at Section 48-39-260 is the relevant policy for review of this project.
5. These permits do not violate S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-120(C) which provides the department the authority to
remove all erosion control structures which have an adverse effect on the public interest. There is no evidence that these
permits will have an adverse effect on the public interest. The revetment construction will occur on private property. Fripp
Island is a private island, not a public beach. Because Fripp Island is already entirely revetted, this construction will have no
quanitifiable adverse environmental effects.
6. Petitioners claims that the issuance of these permits violates certain of the "ten general considerations" which are weighed
by OCRM in its evaluation of all permits. These are codified in S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-150 and S. C. Code Ann.
Regs 30-11. Specifically:
a. Petitioners claim that the issued permits will harmfully obstruct the flow of navigable water. (Section 48-39-150(A)(2)).
While it is true that one of the functions of a revetment is to stop the up-rush of wave activity, this does not result in the
obstruction of navigable water. The intertidal area of the ocean-front is certainly not the area where any type of navigation
takes place. In addition, any obstruction of water is already occurring with the existence of the Drury revetment and the
other revetments along the beachfront at Fripp Island.
b. Petitioners claim that OCRM failed to consider that the construction authorized by the issued permits will cause erosion.
(Section 48-39-150(A)(4)). All expert testimony presented at the hearing before me, including that of Petitioners' expert,
supported the conclusion that these permits will cause no measurable effects by way of increased or accelerated erosion on a
beach system that is already entirely revetted.
c. Petitioners claim that OCRM failed to consider that the issued permits will effect public access to tidal and submerged
lands and beaches. (Section 48-39-150(A)(5)). While there is evidence that some public use was made of these lots over
the years, that does not alter the character of this property as private property. Further, the majority of the uses made of the
lots was by invitees of Perkins and was authorized. Any other use was nothing more than a trespass.
d. Petitioners claim that OCRM failed to consider that this project may have adverse environmental impacts which cannot be
avoided by reasonable safeguards. (Section 48-39-150(8)) However, no evidence of such adverse environmental impacts
was presented at the hearing. Thus, this consideration is inapplicable.
e. Finally, Petitioners assert that OCRM failed to consider the impact that this project could have on the value and enjoyment
of adjacent property owners. It is undisputed that the Drurys' home is worth more as a front row beach house than as
second row. However, at the time the Drurys purchased their house the subdivision plat clearly indicated a road right of way
and lots in front of the Drury property. There is no dispute as to either the existence of the lots or Perkins' ownership of
those lots. Perkins' proposed construction does not affect the value of the Drurys' property, rather, the Drurys lose the
benefit they have enjoyed for several years of no construction on the lots in front of their property. Finally, even accepting
that construction on the Perkins' lots will negatively effect to some degree the Drurys' enjoyment of their property, as
OCRM's witness explained, this impact on the Drurys is insufficient to warrant a denial of Perkins' right to any use and
enjoyment of his property. Moreover, South Carolina law does not recognize any prescriptive right to an ocean view. See
Hill v. The Beach Co., 279 S.C. 313, 306 S.E.2d 604 (1983); Schroeder v. O'Neill, 179 S.C. 310, 184 S.E. 679 (1936).
7. The fact that for some period of time the Perkins' lots were inundated by daily tides does not, of itself, support a finding
that the lots were abandoned. In Horry County v. Woodward, 282 S.C. 366, 318 S.E.2d 584 (S.C.App. 1984), the Court of
Appeals adopted the doctrine of reemergence of title when land lost to erosion later returns through accretion. "[W]hen
riparian land, which was separated from remoter land by a fixed boundary at the time of the original grant, is lost by erosion
so that the remoter land becomes riparian, and land is thereafter added by accretion to the land which was originally remote,
extending over the location formerly occupied by the original riparian land, the owner of the land which was originally
remote has title to the accreted land up to the fixed boundary of his formerly nonriparian tract. All other land so accreted,
extending beyond the fixed boundary over the area formerly occupied by the original riparian land, becomes the property of
the owner of the original riparian land." 318 S.E.2d at 589.
8. Petitioners allege that the permits are contrary to the legislative findings set forth in S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-250.
In particular, these findings address the negative impacts of shoreline armoring and the need for a "policy of retreat," forcing
development to retreat from the shoreline. Since there is no evidence that these permits will cause any increase in negative
environmental impacts on Fripp Island, I conclude that these findings are inapplicable. In addition, the policy of retreat is
promoted on Fripp Island based on the limited nature of the exemption found in Section 48-39-290(B)(2)(e). While this
exemption allows the construction of new erosion control structures on Fripp, property owners on Fripp, including Perkins,
are not exempt from the limitations on rebuilding erosion control structures found in Section 48-39-290(B)(2)(b).
9. Petitioners claim that the issued permits violate S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-260, setting forth the state's policy for
beachfront permitting. The policy includes a restriction of the use of armoring and advocates an effort to achieve a gradual
retreat from the shoreline. As stated supra, however, these permits do not violate the state's policy of retreat and
restrictions on erosion control structures. The permits are consistent with the exemption found in Section 48-39-290(B)(2)(e). No measurable harm has been identified which will result from the construction of a revetment on a private
island that is already entirely armored. In addition, the policy of retreat continues to be applicable to Fripp Island because, in
the event any of the revetments on Fripp are destroyed or damaged, the criteria set forth in Section 48-39-290(B)(2)(b) will
govern any applications to rebuild the erosion control structures. Perkins is simply being placed in a position equal to other
Fripp Island oceanfront owners.
10. Petitioners claim that these permits violate S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-280, which sets forth the methodology for
establishing OCRM's jurisdictional lines. All evidence presented by the expert witnesses at the hearing indicated that these
jurisdictional lines were established utilizing the applicable methodology and the best available historical and scientific
evidence. In fact, there was no dispute between the Petitioners' expert and the Respondents' experts regarding the accuracy
of the location of OCRM's jurisdictional lines on Fripp Island. Thus, this contention is without merit.
11. Petitioner claims that these permits violate S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-290's prohibition on new seawalls. The
exemption for private islands such as Fripp is contained within this section. There is no dispute that the exemption describes
Fripp Island. There is no dispute that a plain reading of the exemption allows for the construction of new erosion control
devices on Fripp Island. There is no language in the exemption that would limit its applicability to certain locations on the
island - it applies to the entire island.
12. The Petitioners claim that the permits violate the policy statement contained in S. C. Code Ann. Regs 30-1. This
statement is not proscriptive, and reiterates the policy set forth in the statute. In addition, the Petitioner claims that the
permits violate the considerations set forth in S. C. Code Ann. Regs 30-11. These considerations are identical to those
stated in Section 48-39-150, and have been discussed fully supra.
13. Finally, Petitioners claim that these permits violate S. C. Code Ann. Regs 30-15(F) which sets forth the standards for
"special permits" or permits for activities seaward of the OCRM baseline. The permits issued to Perkins are OCRM "special
permits" precisely because Perkins property is located seaward of the OCRM baseline as it has been mapped on this portion
of Fripp Island. I conclude that these permits do not violate the standards set forth in Regs 30-15. Of the eight standards set
forth in this regulation, the bulk of the evidence presented at trial related to whether or not the permits authorized structures
on the active beach (R. 30-15(2)) and whether the permits were contrary to state policy (R. 30-15(4)). Active beach is
defined as "the area seaward of the escarpment or the first line of stable natural vegetation, whichever first occurs, measured
from the ocean landward." S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-1C(32). The expert evidence concerning the characteristics of the site
supports OCRM's determination that the "active beach" was seaward of the proposed construction. Photographic evidence
of the site, as described by the experts, indicated a line of vegetation located well seaward of the proposed construction. I
conclude, therefore, that these permits were consistent with the standards for special permits as set forth in R. 30-15(F).
CONCLUSION
Based on these foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I hold that the applications by John Perkins to construct
seawalls and houses on his lots at 729 and 731 Seahorse Boulevard are consistent with the requirements of S. C. Code Ann.
Section 48-39-10 et seq. and S. C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-1 et seq. Accordingly, I hereby affirm the issuance of OCRM-98-431-H and OCRM-98-441-H and dissolve the injunction granted March 17, 1999.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Marvin F. Kittrell
Chief Judge
September 29, 1999
Columbia, South Carolina
1. OCRM-98-431-H and OCRM-98-441-H.
2. This belief was based, in part, on the existence of a rock revetment located in front of their lot which presumably was
constructed for the purpose of controlling erosion on the beach in front of the Drurys' home. As noted infra, the Perkins'
property is located entirely seaward of this revetment; for extended periods of time during the 1970's and 1980's the
Perkins' property was under water, and the high water line was the Drurys' revetment.
3. Perkins exhibit 1.
4. The only use Perkins identified was allowing other Fripp Island Property owners to store their sailboats on his lots.
5. S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-250, et seq.
6. See, S. C. Code Ann. Section 48-39-280.
7. The BMA also had been amended in 1990. Relevant to these proceedings was an amendment to allow special permits.
See, Finding of Fact #25, infra.
8. In fact, in a letter written by Perkins in September of 1985 shortly after rejecting the offered permit, Perkins states, with
almost clairvoyant omniscience, his belief the "beachfront is coming back within the foreseeable future (10 yrs.)," and he will
wait until then to develop his property. Perkins exhibit 5. |
