ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. LCI 9028-02
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Jackie Johnson appeals
the decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to revoke 180 days of his "good-time"
credit and to reprimand him as punishment for violating DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.08, Riot. Having reviewed the record,
applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be
affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On January 29, 2002, Corporal L. Holloway observed Appellant and several other inmates fighting in the east yard at the
Lee Correctional Institution. The inmates were fighting with several types of weapons, including sticks, shanks, and socks
weighted with rocks and padlocks. The inmates were apprehended by security staff and the weapons were confiscated. As
a result of this incident, Appellant was charged with violating DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.08, Riot.
A hearing of the charge against Appellant was held before a DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) on February 4,
2002. Corporal Holloway testified at the hearing and his report was read into the record. At the close of the hearing, the
DHO found Appellant guilty of the charge and revoked 180 days of his good-time credit and reprimanded him as
punishment for the offense. Appellant appealed his conviction to the Department and then to this tribunal. On appeal,
Appellant contends that he is not guilty of the charge of riot, because he was not found to be in possession of a weapon and
there was no evidence that any actual injury to property or persons resulted from his actions.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department
in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity
of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate
appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an
inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No.
00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand,
Appellant contends that the Department improperly revoked 180 days of his good-time credit as punishment in a major
disciplinary hearing; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the
record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has
granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at
750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the
Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are
in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to
internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C.
at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off"
approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this
deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's actions to ensure that
inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at
757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department's decision to revoke his good-time credit was made in violation
of his due process rights. Because inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits under
the Fourteenth Amendment, they are entitled to "minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by
the Due Process clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 557 (1974). Thus, where, as here, an inmate faces the revocation of good-time credits as punishment in a disciplinary
hearing, prison officials must provide that inmate with certain procedural safeguards. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 370, 527
S.E.2d at 750. (1) These procedural safeguards include:
(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that
factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the
inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to
institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be
allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the
matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial.
Id. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (paraphrasing Wolff). Beyond these procedural requirements, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the revocation of an inmate's good-time credits does not comport with Due Process unless "there [is]
some evidence from which the conclusion of the [prison official] could be deduced." Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). (2) Thus, if the Department affords the inmate a Wolff-type hearing and has at least some
evidence in the record to support its decision, the Department's revocation of an inmate's good-time credits satisfies the
requirements of due process.
In the disciplinary proceedings underlying the instant appeal, Appellant was afforded all the process due him pursuant to
Wolff and Al-Shabazz. The record indicates that Appellant received written notice of the charges against him in excess of
twenty-four hours prior to a hearing that was held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. At the hearing,
Appellant was given the opportunity, through a counsel substitute, to offer evidence, call witnesses, and confront his
accuser. The record reflects that Appellant was found guilty of violating DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.08, Riot, based on the
testimony and written report of Corporal Hollowy, and a written statement to that effect was prepared by the hearing
officer. After his conviction, Appellant filed a grievance and received a prompt response from his warden, which
Appellant then appealed to the Department. In its denial of his appeal, the Department informed Appellant of his right to
appeal the Department's final decision under the APA.
Further, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the decision reached by the Department. The DOC
Disciplinary Code defines the offense of rioting as "[w]hen an inmate, with two or more persons, intentionally participates
in conduct that creates danger of damage or injury to property or persons and substantially obstructs the performance of unit
operations or institutional operations." DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.08, Riot (emphasis added). This provision does not
require that an inmate have used a weapon during the disturbance or that actual injury or damage result from the incident.
Rather, an inmate is guilty of rioting if his actions merely "create[] a danger of damage or injury to property or persons."
The evidence in the record in the instant case is clearly sufficient to support a finding that Appellant's actions during the
January 29, 2002 incident created a danger of injury to other persons.
The Department provided Appellant with the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment before revoking his
sentence-related credits as punishment in a disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly, the Department's decision to deny
Appellant's grievance is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's denial of Appellant's grievance is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
December 16, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina
1. However, this set of safeguards is necessarily a limited one. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560 ("[I]t is immediately apparent
that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society . . . to the very different
situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.").
2. This review "does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or
weighing of the evidence," Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; rather, this standard only requires this tribunal to determine whether
"there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the [prison official]." Id. at 455-56. |