SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

Willie Dobey, #179388 (Dobey) brings this appeal challenging a decision by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC) which convicted Dobey of refusing or failing to obey orders for which Dobey lost good time credit. Jurisdiction is invoked in the instant case since this matter is a disciplinary hearing in which Dobey was punished by the loss of good time credits, a loss which impacts a created liberty interest. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750 (2000); McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP (September 5, 2001). After a review of the record and the arguments, the DOC decision is AFFIRMED.

In this review, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) acts "in an appellate capacity" and is "restricted to reviewing the decision below." Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 754 (2000). The review must apply the criteria of S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2000). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2000) (where an ALJ is directed to conduct a review "in the same manner prescribed in [§ 1-23-380](A)."). Section 1-23-380(A)(6) establishes the following:

The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

In this case, Dobey argues that the DOC decision is made upon unlawful procedure and is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Dobey argues the hearing was carried out under unlawful procedure since DOC failed to follow procedural due process. Due process for an inmate subjected to the loss of good time credits requires the following procedures:

(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial. Wolff, 418 U.S. 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2978-82, 41 L.Ed.2d at 954-60.

Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 751 (2000)

In the instant case Dobey argues that he was not allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence for his case since he was wrongly excluded from a portion of the hearing.

As pointed out in Judge Scott's previous order, while Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) does not expressly state that an inmate has a right to be present during a disciplinary hearing, courts have generally held that an inmate has a right to be present at his own disciplinary hearing subject to that right being conditioned on "maintaining institutional safety and other correctional goals." See Moody v. Miller, 864 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir.1989); Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497, 105 S.Ct. 2192, 2196, 85 L.Ed.2d 553 (1985). Here the record shows that confidential statements of other inmates were entered into the evidence and that a threat of harm to those inmates existed if Dobey learned their identity. Thus, inmate safety is a proper basis for removal since it is "logically related to 'institutional safety or correctional goals'." Accordingly, temporarily removing Dobey did not create a due process violation.

Dobey argues the DOC decision must be reversed since the decision is not supported by the evidence. I cannot agree.

In examining a DOC determination for the presence of evidentiary support, an ALJ must review the matter in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742. In that capacity, an ALJ reviewing factual disputes between DOC and the inmate "will not substitute [the ALJ's] judgment for that of the [DOC Hearing Officer] as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2000).

Thus, once the facts are established by the Hearing Officer, the ALJ will not re-weigh the evidence in an attempt to come to an independent conclusion on the factual dispute. Rather, the ALJ will rely upon the Hearing Officers factual determinations unless those determinations are "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23- 380(A)(6)(e) (Supp. 2000). In determining if substantial evidence supports the Hearing Officer's factual determinations, the ALJ does not look for "a mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence viewed blindly from one side, but [rather looks for ] evidence which, when considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the agency reached." Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984). Accordingly, if such evidence is present, substantial evidence is present and the factual determinations will not be overturned.

Here, substantial evidence supports the factual determinations made below. Numerous statements support the conclusion that Dobey had improper communication with another inmate after being directed to have no such contact. These statements would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that Dobey committed the act here in dispute. Thus, substantial evidence supports the DOC decision.

The guilty verdict entered by DOC against Willie Dobey, #179388 is AFFIRMED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________

RAY N. STEVENS

Administrative Law Judge

Dated: October 17, 2002

Columbia, South Carolina