ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. TYRCI 0018-02UY
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Billy Teague appeals the
decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to revoke 180 days of his "good-time"
credit as punishment for the possession of marijuana in violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10. Having reviewed the
record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must
be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On December 15, 2001, Lieutenant Edward Mobley and Lieutenant David Parks conducted a strip search of Appellant
inside of his assigned room. During the search, the officers found 87 sacks of a green, leafy substance later determined to
be 7.7 grams of marijuana on Appellant's person. As a result of this incident, Appellant was charged with violating DOC
Disciplinary Code § 1.10, Use or Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana or Unauthorized Drugs, Including Prescription Drugs.
A hearing of this charge was held before a DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) on December 27, 2001. At the
hearing, Appellant pleaded guilty to the charge, stating "I know I done wrong and [I'm] trying to accept whatever
punishment." (Hr'g Tr. at 3.) As a result of the officers' incident report and Appellant's guilty plea, the DHO found
Appellant guilty of the charge against him and revoked 180 days of his good-time credit as punishment for the offense.
Appellant appealed his disciplinary conviction to the Department and then to this tribunal. On appeal, Appellant argues
that his disciplinary conviction violates his due process rights and his protection against double jeopardy because his
conviction for possessing marijuana and a previous conviction for using marijuana arose out of the same stash of
marijuana.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department
in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity
of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate
appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an
inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No.
00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand,
Appellant contends that the Department improperly revoked 180 days of his good-time credit as punishment in a major
disciplinary hearing; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the
record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has
granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at
750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the
Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are
in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to
internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C.
at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off"
approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this
deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's actions to ensure that
inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at
757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department's decision to revoke his good-time credit was made in violation
of his due process rights. However, an inmate may waive his right to due process by knowingly and voluntarily pleading
guilty to a disciplinary charge. See Tiemens v. United States, 724 F.2d 928, 929 (11th Cir. 1984) ("It has thus been held
that a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects occurring prior to the time of the plea, including violations of the
defendant's right[] to . . . due process."); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (holding that, once a
defendant has pleaded guilty to a charge, "he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea"); Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 599, 524 S.E.2d
623, 624 (1999) (noting that "[e]ntering a guilty plea results in a waiver of several constitutional rights"). Here, Appellant
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleaded guilty to the charge brought against him, and thus waived his right to raise
due process and double jeopardy challenges to his disciplinary conviction. Moreover, it is clear that, in the disciplinary
proceedings underlying the instant appeal, Appellant was afforded all the process due him pursuant to Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974), and Al-Shabazz.
Appellant has, by his guilty plea, waived his due process and double jeopardy objections to his disciplinary conviction, and,
in any event, the Department provided Appellant with the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment before
revoking his sentence-related credits as punishment in a disciplinary proceeding.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's denial of Appellant's grievance is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
November 21, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina |
