ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. McCI 1065-00
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Richard Sturkie appeals
the decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to revoke ninety days of his "good-time" credit as punishment for the use of an unauthorized drug in violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10. Having
reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the
Department must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On September 6, 2000, Corporal Chris Alberts, a Drug Testing Officer, and Lieutenant William Crouch conducted a
random drug test on Appellant. Appellant tested positive for the use of benzodiazepine. A confirmation test was
administered and Appellant again tested positive for benzodiazepine. During this testing, Corporal Alberts apparently
commented that one of the tests yielded a borderline positive result. As a result of these tests, Appellant was charged with
violating DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10, the Use or Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana or Unauthorized Drugs, Including
Prescription Drugs.
A hearing of this charge was held before a DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) on September 18, 2000. Appellant
and Lieutenant Crouch testified at the hearing and Appellant's test results and Lieutenant Crouch's report were read into
the record. Appellant and Lieutenant Crouch gave conflicting testimony regarding whether Lieutenant Crouch witnessed
the tests, whether Corporal Alberts commented on borderline results during the first or second test, and whether the second
test yielded a positive or negative result. At the close of the hearing, the DHO found Appellant guilty of the charge and
revoked ninety days of Appellant's good-time credit as punishment for the offense. Appellant appealed his conviction to
the Department and then to this tribunal. On appeal, Appellant contends that his conviction should be overturned because
the confirmation test returned a negative result for benzodiazepine and the DHO improperly refused to allow Appellant to
call an inmate who observed the testing as a witness.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department
in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity
of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate
appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an
inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No.
00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand,
Appellant contends that the Department improperly revoked ninety days of his good-time credit as punishment in a major
disciplinary hearing; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the
record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has
granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at
750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the
Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are
in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to
internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C.
at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off"
approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this
deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's actions to ensure that
inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at
757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department's decision to revoke his good-time credit was made in violation
of his due process rights. Because inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits under
the Fourteenth Amendment, they are entitled to "minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by
the Due Process clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 557 (1974). Thus, where, as here, an inmate faces the revocation of good-time credits as punishment in a disciplinary
hearing, prison officials must provide that inmate with certain procedural safeguards. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 370, 527
S.E.2d at 750. (1) These procedural safeguards include:
(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that
factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the
inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to
institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be
allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the
matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial.
Id. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (paraphrasing Wolff). Beyond these procedural requirements, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the revocation of an inmate's good-time credits does not comport with Due Process unless "there [is]
some evidence from which the conclusion of the [prison official] could be deduced." Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). (2) Thus, if the Department affords the inmate a Wolff-type hearing and has at least some
evidence in the record to support its decision, the Department's revocation of an inmate's good-time credits satisfies the
requirements of due process.
In the disciplinary proceedings underlying the instant appeal, Appellant was afforded all the process due him pursuant to
Wolff and Al-Shabazz. The record indicates that Appellant received written notice of the charges against him in excess of
twenty-four hours prior to a hearing that was held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. At the hearing,
Appellant was given the opportunity, through a counsel substitute, to offer evidence, call witnesses, and confront his
accuser. The record reflects that Appellant was found guilty of violating DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10, the Use or
Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana or Unauthorized Drugs, Including Prescription Drugs, based on the written drug test
results and the testimony of Lieutenant Crouch, and a written statement to that effect was prepared by the hearing officer.
After his conviction, Appellant filed a grievance and received a prompt response from his warden, which Appellant then
appealed to the Department. In its denial of his appeal, the Department informed Appellant of his right to appeal the
Department's final decision under the APA.
Appellant's remaining arguments must also fail. First, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support Appellant's
disciplinary conviction. While it seems clear that Corporal Alberts did comment that one of the two tests administered
upon Appellant yielded a borderline result, both Corporal Alberts, a Drug Testing Officer, and Lieutenant Crouch certified
that both tests administered on Appellant returned positive results for benzodiazepine. Further, Lieutenant Crouch testified
to that effect at the hearing. This evidence is plainly sufficient to support Appellant's conviction. Second, the DHO's
decision to refuse to allow Appellant to call another inmate as a witness did not violate Appellant's due process rights.
Prison officials have broad discretion in limiting the witnesses to be called at a disciplinary hearing. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at
566-67. Here, the DHO found that it would be unnecessary for Appellant's proposed witness to testify regarding the testing
officer's decision to administer a confirmation test on Appellant because Department policy required that such
confirmation tests be administered. See Hr'g Tr. at 3. The refusal to call Appellant's proposed witness did not, therefore,
violate Appellant's right to due process.
The Department provided Appellant with the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment before revoking his
sentence-related credits as punishment in a disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly, the Department's decision to deny
Appellant's grievance is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's denial of Appellant's grievance is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
July 17, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina
1. However, this set of safeguards is necessarily a limited one. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560 ("[I]t is immediately apparent
that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society . . . to the very different
situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.").
2. This review "does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or
weighing of the evidence," Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; rather, this standard only requires this tribunal to determine whether
"there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the [prison official]." Id. at 455-56. |