ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. McCI 0924-00
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Gary Slezak contends
that the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) has denied him due process by failing to bring
criminal charges against an inmate that stabbed him and that the Department arbitrarily denied his request for a transfer to a
particular correctional institution in response to the incident. Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs
filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On August 24, 2000, Appellant, while housed at the McCormick Correctional Institution, filed a Step 1 grievance form
with the Department requesting: (1) that criminal charges be brought against an inmate who stabbed him, and (2) that,
because of the stabbing incident, the Department "transfer [the] inmate involved or transfer me back to [the Tyger River
Correctional Institution]." ("Action Requested," Grievance # McCI 0924-00, Inmate Grievance Form, Step 1.)
Dissatisfied with the warden's response to his grievance form and with the Department's decision to transfer him to the
Lieber Correctional Institution, Appellant filed a Step 2 grievance form, in which he objected to his transfer to Lieber and
again requested that criminal charges be brought against the inmate who attacked him. Dissatisfied with the Department's
response to this grievance, Appellant then brought the instant appeal before the ALJD. On appeal, Appellant argues that
the Department has denied him due process by failing to bring criminal charges against his attacker and that the
Department's decision to deny his request to be transferred to Tyger River was made arbitrarily.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department
in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity
of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate
appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an
inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No.
00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand,
Appellant contends that the Department has improperly determined his custody status by failing to transfer him to another
correctional institution; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter. However, Appellant's argument that the
Department should bring criminal charges against the inmate who stabbed him does not fall within the jurisdiction of this
tribunal as set forth in McNeil, and Appellant's appeal of that request must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the
record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has
granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at
750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the
Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are
in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to
internal prison disciplinary policies and other internal prison affairs when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the
traditional "hands off" approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However,
notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's
actions to ensure that inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at
383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department's decision to transfer him to Lieber, instead of Tyger River, as
he requested, was made in violation of his due process rights. However, "[t]he requirements of procedural due process
apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property."
Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). An inmate does not have a
protected liberty interest in his custody status unless such an interest is created: (1) by the Due Process clause of its own
force because the challenged custody status is not "within the sentence imposed upon him" or is "otherwise violative of the
Constitution," Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983), see also Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); or (2) by
state law because the challenged custody status "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Here, Appellant has no protected liberty interest in his custody status. Appellant's transfer to Lieber rather than Tyger
River is "well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence," Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, so
as not to implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process clause of its own force. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,
225 (1976) (holding that the Due Process clause does not "protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one
institution to another within the state prison system"). And, this transfer does not "present the type of atypical, significant
deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. Thus, as Appellant has
no constitutionally-recognized liberty interest affected by the Department's decision to transfer him to Lieber instead of
Tyger River, he cannot challenge the procedure used by the Department to reach that decision on due process grounds. See
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974).
Beyond the requirements of due process, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that an inmate may challenge his
custody status, even if he has no protected liberty interest at stake, if "prison officials have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
from personal bias" in determining his custody status. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 381, 527 S.E.2d at 756 (citing Crowe v.
Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 259 S.E.2d 614 (1979)). But, while review of these Crowe-based claims is not "improper or
unavailable," id., the level of scrutiny devoted to such claims is limited. Accordingly, where, as here, the record suggests
that the Department's decision to place an inmate in a particular custody status involved the "good faith exercise of the
discretionary power of the prison officials in the maintenance of order, discipline, and security among the prison
population," Crowe, 273 S.C. at 764, 259 S.E.2d at 615, the Department's decision will not be disturbed on appeal. See
"Responsible Official's Decision and Reason," Grievance # McCI 0924-00, Inmate Grievance Form, Step 2 ("[Y]ou
[Appellant] are now housed at Lieber CI, away from Inmate Owens [Appellant's attacker].")
Appellant has no ground upon which to assert the due process claim found in his grievance. Nor is there any evidence to
suggest that the Department acted arbitrarily or from personal bias in transferring him to Lieber rather than Tyger River, as
he requested. Accordingly, the Department's decision to deny Appellant's grievance is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's denial of Appellant's grievance is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
June 21, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina |
