ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. PCI 0112-01
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Shabaka S. Makhu
contends that Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) officials have arbitrarily manipulated his "max-out" (i.e.,
release) date, and that, in reviewing his grievance on that count, the Department neglected to conscientiously address his
claims. Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the
decision of the Department to deny Appellant's grievance must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On August 14, 2000, Appellant filed a grievance alleging that his "max-out" date was being arbitrarily manipulated by a
DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer and the warden of his correctional institution in a manner contrary to Department policy.
Specifically, Appellant claims that his projected release date could not have been extended as a result of recent disciplinary
convictions because "[he] had at no time been discipline free whereas to earn [good-time credit] . . . for seizure."
("Inmate's Reason for Appeal," Grievance # PCI 0112-01, Inmate Grievance Form, Step 2) (emphasis in original).
Unsatisfied with the Department's response to this grievance, Appellant brought the instant appeal before the ALJD,
claiming that the Department had failed to "conscientiously address" the issues raised in his grievance.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department
in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity
of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate
appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an
inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No.
00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand,
Appellant contends that the Department improperly calculated his sentence; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over
this matter.
When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the
record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has
granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at
750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the
Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are
in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to
internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C.
at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off"
approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this
deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's actions to ensure that
inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at
757.
Here, Appellant's contention that his "max-out" date has been arbitrarily manipulated is unfounded. Appellant may be
correct in stating that he had no earned good-time credits to be revoked as a result of his most recent disciplinary
convictions, and thus correct in noting that his projected release date could not have been adjusted based on such
revocations. However, Appellant clearly overlooks another ground upon which his projected "max-out" date can be
adjusted: his failure to earn good-time credits in the first place as a result of disciplinary convictions. Under Department
policy, "[a]n inmate who pleads guilty or is found guilty of violating an Agency rule or regulation will fail to earn [20] days
of good time for the month during which the infraction occurred." DOC Policy/Procedure OP-21.11(3)(a) (emphasis
added). Therefore, even if the Department does not, or cannot (e.g., because an inmate has no accrued good-time credit),
revoke an inmate's earned good-time credit as punishment for a disciplinary conviction, the inmate will nevertheless still
fail to earn good-time credit as a result of the conviction. And, this failure to earn good-time credit will result in an
adjustment to the inmate's projected release date. (1)
In the case at hand, while Appellant has not had good-time credit revoked as a result of his most recent disciplinary
convictions, he has failed to earn good-time credit because of those convictions, and his release date has been adjusted
accordingly. Therefore, there has been no "arbitrary manipulation" of Appellant's "max-out" date. (2)
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's denial of Appellant's grievance is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
June 21, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina
1. The projected "max-out" date is a projection of an inmate's release date that presumes an inmate will earn and retain the
maximum amount of good-time credit possible for the remainder of his sentence. See Maxout Date Calculation
Worksheet.
2. Appellant's other contention-that the Department failed to "conscientiously address" his grievance-is also without merit.
See "Responsible Official's Decision and Reason," Grievance # PCI 0112-01, Inmate Grievance Form, Step 2 (explaining
that Appellant fails to earn twenty days of good-time credit for a month in which he commits a disciplinary infraction). |