SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Richard Jefferson appeals the refusal of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to advance him to MI-3 custody status. Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

On January 7, 2001, Appellant filed a grievance with the Department contending that he had been improperly placed in Level II Security Detention and requesting that he "be removed from Security Detention back to MI-3 status." ("Action Requested," Grievance # KER 0001-01, Inmate Grievance Form, Step 1.) The Department denied this grievance and Appellant brought the instant appeal. On appeal, Appellant again argues that he should be placed in a lower custody status. ⁽¹⁾

ANALYSIS

In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand, Appellant contends that the Department has improperly determined his custody status; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.

When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and other internal prison affairs when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off" approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's actions to ensure that inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.

In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department's refusal to place him in MI-3 custody was made in violation of his due process rights. However, "[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). An inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in his custody status unless such an interest is created: (1) by the Due Process clause of its own force because the challenged custody status is not "within the sentence imposed upon him" or is "otherwise violative of the Constitution," Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983), see also Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); or (2) by state law because the challenged custody status "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

Here, Appellant has no protected liberty interest in his custody status. Appellant's placement in a higher custody status than MI-3 is "well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence," Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, so as not to implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process clause of its own force. And, this placement "does not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. Thus, as Appellant has no constitutionally-recognized liberty interest affected by the Department's refusal to place him in MI-3 custody, he cannot challenge the procedure used by the Department to reach that decision on due process grounds. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974).

Beyond the requirements of due process, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that an inmate may challenge his custody status, even if he has no protected liberty interest at stake, if "prison officials have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or from personal bias" in determining his custody status. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 381, 527 S.E.2d at 756 (citing Crowe v. Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 259 S.E.2d 614 (1979)). But, while review of these Crowe-based claims is not "improper or unavailable," id., the level of scrutiny devoted to such claims is limited. Accordingly, where, as here, the record suggests that the Department's decision to place an inmate in a particular custody status involved the "good faith exercise of the discretionary power of the prison officials in the maintenance of order, discipline, and security among the prison population," Crowe, 273 S.C. at 764, 259 S.E.2d at 615, the Department's decision will not be disturbed on appeal.

Appellant has no ground upon which to assert the due process claim found in his grievance. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the Department acted arbitrarily or from personal bias in refusing to reduce his custody status to MI-3. Accordingly, the Department's decision to deny Appellant's grievance is affirmed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's denial of Appellant's grievance is AFFIRMED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

JOHN D. GEATHERS

Administrative Law Judge

June 21, 2002

Columbia, South Carolina

1. The Department has filed a Motion to Dismiss this appeal, in which it contends that Appellant's claim is moot because he has been advanced to ME3 custody. (Resp't Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 4-5.) However, by letter dated September 20, 2001, Appellant responded to the motion to dismiss by asserting that his grievance had not been satisfied as he has not been placed in MI-3 custody as requested. As this tribunal has not been informed by either party of the differences between ME3 custody and MI-3 custody, it must presume that there is some difference between the two, and therefore, presume that Appellant has not been granted the relief he seeks. Accordingly, the Department's motion to dismiss is denied.