ORDERS:
ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES
I. Introduction
Robert Caprood # 199227 (Caprood) seeks reasonable attorney's fees under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-77-300 since he believes
he is a prevailing party in a civil action. I disagree.
II. Analysis
S.C. Code Ann. §15-77-300 provides, in pertinent part, the following:
In any civil action brought by the State, any political subdivision of the State or any party who is contesting state action,
unless the prevailing party is the State or any political subdivision of the State, the court may allow the prevailing party to
recover reasonable attorney's fees to be taxed as court costs against the appropriate agency if:
(1) The court finds that the agency acted without substantial justification in pressing its claim against the party; and
(2) The court finds that there are no special circumstances that would make the award of attorney's fees unjust.
Among other requirements, the party seeking the fees must at least be the "prevailing party" in a "civil action." Jasper
County Bd. of Educ. v. Jasper County Grand Jury 303 S.C. 49, 398 S.E.2d 498 (1990). Here, the matter involved is not a
"civil action" and Caprood is not a "prevailing party."
As to the lack of a "civil action" in the instant matter, it is certainly true enough that one seeking judicial review in the
Circuit Court of an agency decision is one who is bringing a "civil action" for purposes of §15-77-300. McDowell v. S.C.
Dept. of Social Services, 304 S.C. 539, 405 S.E.2d 830 (1991). However, equally true is the conclusion that attorney's fees
cannot be awarded for proceedings before a State agency since at such a stage the agency is functioning as an
"administrative decision-maker" and not as an adjudicator in a "civil action." McDowell, 405 S.E.2d at 833. For the
matter here under review, both DOC and the ALJD functioned as administrative decision-makers. See Al-Shabazz v. State,
338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Thus, attorney's fees are unavailable.
Further, such fees are not available since Caprood cannot establish that he is a "prevailing party." Rather, the term
"envisions a victory to some degree on the merits." Jasper County Bd. of Educ. v. Jasper County Grand Jury 303 S.C.
49, 398 S.E.2d 498 (1990). Here, the ALJ simply remanded the matter to DOC for a new hearing. Such a decision was
issued since procedural errors occurred below requiring a new hearing. Thus, no victory on the merits has been achieved
and Caprood cannot demonstrate he is a "prevailing party."
III. Order
The request for attorney's fees is DENIED and this case is ended.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED
______________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
Post Office Box 11667
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1667
Dated: June 20, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina |
