ORDERS:
ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES
I. Introduction
Robert Caprood # 199227 (Caprood) seeks reasonable attorney's fees under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-77-300 since he believes
he is a prevailing party in a civil action. I disagree.
II. Analysis
S.C. Code Ann. §15-77-300 provides, in pertinent part, the following:
In any civil action brought by the State, any political subdivision of the State or any party who is contesting state action,
unless the prevailing party is the State or any political subdivision of the State, the court may allow the prevailing party to
recover reasonable attorney's fees to be taxed as court costs against the appropriate agency if:
(1) The court finds that the agency acted without substantial justification in pressing its claim against the party; and
(2) The court finds that there are no special circumstances that would make the award of attorney's fees unjust.
Among others, the statute at least requires that the party seeking the fees must be the "prevailing party" in a "civil action."
Jasper County Bd. of Educ. v. Jasper County Grand Jury 303 S.C. 49, 398 S.E.2d 498 (1990). Here, no "civil action" is
involved, and Caprood is not a "prevailing party."
As to the lack of a "civil action," it is certainly true enough that one seeking judicial review of an agency decision is one
who is bringing a "civil action" for purposes of §15-77-300. McDowell v. S.C. Dept. of Social Services, 304 S.C. 539, 405
S.E.2d 830 (1991). However, an equally true conclusion is that attorney's fees cannot be awarded for proceedings before a
State agency since at such a stage the agency is functioning as an "administrative decision-maker" and not as an adjudicator
in a "civil action." McDowell, 405 S.E.2d at 833. For the matter here under review, both DOC and the ALJD were
functioning as administrative decision-makers. See Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Thus,
attorney's fees are unavailable.
Further, such fees are not available in any event since Caprood cannot establish that he is a "prevailing party." Rather, the
term "envisions a victory to some degree on the merits." Jasper County Bd. of Educ. v. Jasper County Grand Jury 303
S.C. 49, 398 S.E.2d 498 (1990). Here, the ALJ simply remanded the matter to DOC for a new hearing due to procedural
errors which occurred below. Thus, no victory on the merits has been achieved. Accordingly, Caprood cannot demonstrate
he is a "prevailing party."
III. Order
The request for attorney's fees is DENIED and this case is ended.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED
______________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
Post Office Box 11667
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1667
Dated: June 20, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina |