SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Kelly Willingham appeals the decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to revoke sixty days of his "good-time" credit as punishment for threatening to inflict harm on another inmate in violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 2.11. Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be reversed.

BACKGROUND

On July 22, 2000, Officer R. Clay witnessed some sort of disturbance involving approximately twenty inmates at the McCormick Correctional Institution. In his Incident Report, Officer Clay indicated that he observed Appellant and another inmate, Kwame Lilly, attempting to stab Inmate Joseph Butler in the back with what appeared to be homemade weapons. Accordingly, Appellant was charged with a violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 2.11, Threatening to Inflict Harm, Physical or Otherwise, on Another Inmate.

A hearing of the charge was held on August 3, 2000, before a DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO). At the hearing, Inmate Lilly admitted that he had been involved in a physical altercation with Inmate Butler. However, he further testified that Appellant was only involved in the altercation in an attempt to break-up the fight. Another inmate who witnessed the incident testified that Appellant was merely attempting to be a peacemaker during the incident and was not a participant in the fight. In his testimony at the hearing, Officer Clay stated that he did not observe how the disturbance had arisen; rather, he had only seen several inmates, including Appellant, running after Inmate Butler. Further, when questioned about the weapon allegedly possessed by Appellant during the disturbance, Officer Clay testified that he "couldn't exactly tell what [Appellant] had" (Hr'g Tr. at 9) despite the fact that his written report indicated that Appellant had a weapon.

At the close of the hearing, the DHO found Appellant guilty of threatening to inflict harm on another inmate and revoked sixty days of Appellant's good-time credit as punishment. Appellant appealed his conviction to the Department, and then to this tribunal. On appeal, Appellant argues that insufficient evidence was presented to support his conviction and that he should have been allowed to call additional witnesses at the hearing.

ANALYSIS

In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand, Appellant contends that the Department improperly revoked sixty days of his good-time credit as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.

When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off" approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's actions to ensure that inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.

In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department's decision to revoke his good-time credit was made in violation of his due process rights. Because inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits under the Fourteenth Amendment, they are entitled to "minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). Thus, where, as here, an inmate faces the revocation of good-time credits as punishment in a disciplinary hearing, prison officials must provide that inmate with certain procedural safeguards. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 370, 527 S.E.2d at 750. ⁽¹⁾ These procedural safeguards include:

(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial.

Id. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (paraphrasing Wolff). Beyond these procedural requirements, the United States Supreme Court has held that the revocation of an inmate's good-time credits does not comport with Due Process unless "there [is] some evidence from which the conclusion of the [prison official] could be deduced." Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). ⁽²⁾ Thus, if the Department affords the inmate a Wolff-type hearing and has at least some evidence in the record to support its decision, the Department's revocation of an inmate's good-time credits satisfies the requirements of due process.

In the case at hand, Appellant's disciplinary conviction was made in violation of his due process rights as the evidence presented at the hearing does not support the DHO's finding that Appellant threatened to inflict harm upon another inmate. No part of the testimony offered at Appellant's disciplinary hearing suggests that Appellant was threatening to inflict harm upon Inmate Butler. The reporting officer testified that he did not know how the disturbance arose, and that all he witnessed was Appellant running in the direction of Inmates Butler and Lilly, the two inmates that had been fighting. Further, the uncontradicted testimony of Inmate Lilly and another inmate indicates that the fight was solely between Inmates Lilly and Butler and that Appellant was only involved in the incident as a peacemaker. In short, there is no evidence in the record to support the DHO's conclusion that Appellant was threatening to inflict harm upon Inmate Butler during the incident in question. Accordingly, Appellant's disciplinary conviction must be reversed. ⁽³⁾

The Department did not provide Appellant with the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment before revoking his sentence-related credits as punishment in a disciplinary proceeding.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Appellant's August 3, 2000 disciplinary conviction for violating DOC Disciplinary Code § 2.11 is REVERSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department restore to Appellant the sixty days of good-time credit revoked from him as punishment for his disciplinary conviction.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

JOHN D. GEATHERS

Administrative Law Judge

April 11, 2002

Columbia, South Carolina

1. However, this set of safeguards is necessarily a limited one. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560 ("[I]t is immediately apparent that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society . . . to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.").

2. This review "does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence," Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; rather, this standard only requires this tribunal to determine whether "there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the [prison official]." Id. at 455-56.

3. As I find that Appellant's conviction must be reversed on this ground, there is no need to reach Appellant's second ground for appeal, namely that he was not allowed to call additional witnesses at the hearing. Moreover, this ground for appeal would ultimately have been unsuccessful as prison officials have nearly unfettered discretion in limiting the witnesses to be called at a disciplinary hearing. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566-67.