ORDERS:
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is currently pending before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD) pursuant to the South Carolina Department
of Corrections' (Respondent or Department) Motion to Dismiss filed on October 16, 2000. Respondent seeks a dismissal on the
grounds that the Appellant has received the relief that he requested and, therefore, the claim is moot.
In Appellant's Step 1 Grievance, Appellant requested that the Department reclassify his escape from the York County Jail from a
Level I escape to a Level II escape. In Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, Respondent asserts that Appellant's claim is moot because,
since the filing of the grievance, Appellant's escape has been reclassified to a Level II escape. The Record submitted by the
Respondent reflects that the escape was reclassified on September 29, 2000. In Appellant's Response to the Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss, Appellant stated that he also wanted his records audited and so that any allegation of a grand larceny charge could be
removed. Appellant was not found guilty of grand larceny and a Circuit Court Judge ordered his records expunged. In Respondent's
Reply, Respondent agreed to audit Appellant's records to make sure that there is no reference to a grand larceny charge. This is the
relief that Appellant sought in his Step 1 Grievance. Because this tribunal can provide no further relief, this appeal has been rendered
moot.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has stated:
This Court will not pass on moot and academic questions or make an adjudication where there remains no actual controversy.
Wallace v. City of York, S.C., 281 S.E.2d 487 (1981). A case becomes moot when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical
legal effect upon existing controversy. This is true when some event occurs making it impossible for reviewing Court to grant
effectual relief. Such is the situation here. Mathis v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 260 S.C. 344, 195 S.E.2d 713
(1973).Jones v. Dillon-Marion Human Resources Development Commission, 277 S.C. 533, 291 S.E.2d 195 (1982); see Dodge v.
Dodge, 332 S.C. 401, 505 S.E.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1998).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellant's Motion to Supplement the Issues is DENIED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
C. DUKES SCOTT
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
April 10, 2001
Columbia, South Carolina
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