ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. LCI 0005-00
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant David Cross appeals the
decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or "Department") to place him in Security Detention at the
Lieber Correctional Institution. Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this
matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On February 25, 2000, Appellant was transferred from the McCormick Correctional Institution to the Lieber Correctional
Institution. Having determined Appellant to be a member of a Security Threat Group, the Department placed Appellant in
the Special Management Unit (SMU) at Lieber. Appellant appealed this decision to the Administrative Law Judge
Division (ALJD or "Division"). Due to an insufficient record, by an Order dated February 14, 2002, this tribunal remanded
this matter to the Department to re-evaluate Appellant's custody status. The Department has now re-evaluated Appellant's
custody status and finds his continued placement in the SMU to be appropriate.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department
in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity
of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate
appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an
inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No.
00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand,
Appellant contends that the Department has improperly determined his custody status; accordingly, this tribunal has
jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the
record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has
granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at
750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the
Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are
in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to
internal prison disciplinary policies and other internal prison affairs when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the
traditional "hands off" approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However,
notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's
actions to ensure that inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at
383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department's decision to place him in Security Detention was made in
violation of his due process rights. However, "[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation
of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750
(quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). An inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in his
custody status unless such an interest is created: (1) by the Due Process clause of its own force because the challenged
custody status is not "within the sentence imposed upon him" or is "otherwise violative of the Constitution," Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983), see also Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); or (2) by state law because the
challenged custody status "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Here, Appellant has no protected liberty interest in his custody status. Appellant's placement in Security Detention is "well
within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence," Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, so as not to
implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process clause of its own force. And, placement in Security Detention "does not
present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Sandin,
515 U.S. at 486. Thus, as Appellant has no constitutionally-recognized liberty interest affected by the Department's
decision to place him in Security Detention, he cannot challenge the procedure used by the Department to reach that
decision on due process grounds. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974).
Beyond the requirements of due process, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that an inmate may challenge his
custody status, even if he has no protected liberty interest at stake, if "prison officials have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
from personal bias" in determining his custody status. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 381, 527 S.E.2d at 756 (citing Crowe v.
Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 259 S.E.2d 614 (1979)). But, while review of these Crowe-based claims is not "improper or
unavailable," id., the level of scrutiny devoted to such claims is limited. Accordingly, where, as here, the record suggests
that the Department's decision to place an inmate in a particular custody status involved the "good faith exercise of the
discretionary power of the prison officials in the maintenance of order, discipline, and security among the prison
population," Crowe, 273 S.C. at 764, 259 S.E.2d at 615, the Department's decision will not be disturbed on appeal. The
Department's proceedings on remand in this matter more than adequately establish that Appellant's custody status was not
determined arbitrarily or with bias.
Appellant has no ground upon which to assert the due process claim found in his grievance. Nor is there any evidence to
suggest that the Department acted arbitrarily or from personal bias in placing him in Security Detention. Accordingly, the
Department's decision to deny Appellant's grievance is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's denial of Appellant's grievance is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
May 7, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina |
