ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. LCI 0005-00
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant David Cross appeals the
decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to place him in Security Detention at the
Lieber Correctional Institution. Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this
matter, I conclude that this case must be remanded to the Department for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Appellant has been incarcerated with the DOC since April 9, 1993, for the distribution of cocaine. On February 25, 2000,
Appellant was transferred to the Lieber Correctional Institution from the McCormick Correctional Institution. At Lieber,
he was placed in the Special Management Unit (SMU) on Level II Security Detention after having been determined to be a
member of a Security Threat Group (STG) by an Institutional Classification Committee. Appellant challenged this
determination through the inmate grievance system and received a final agency decision from the Department on July 17,
2000. Contending that the Department's decision to place him in Security Detention was without evidentiary support,
Appellant appealed the Department's final decision to this tribunal.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department
in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity
of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate
appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an
inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No.
00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand,
Appellant contends that the Department has improperly determined his custody status; accordingly, this tribunal has
jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the
record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has
granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at
750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the
Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are
in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to
internal prison disciplinary policies and other internal prison affairs when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the
traditional "hands off" approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However,
notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's
actions to ensure that inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at
383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department's decision to place him in Security Detention was made in
violation of his due process rights. However, "[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation
of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750
(quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). An inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in his
custody status unless such an interest is created: (1) by the Due Process clause of its own force because the challenged
custody status is not "within the sentence imposed upon him" or is "otherwise violative of the Constitution," Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983), see also Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); or (2) by state law because the
challenged custody status "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Here, Appellant has no protected liberty interest in his custody status. Appellant's placement in Security Detention is "well
within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence," Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, so as not to
implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process clause of its own force. And, placement in Security Detention "does not
present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Sandin,
515 U.S. at 486. Thus, as Appellant has no constitutionally-recognized liberty interest affected by the Department's
decision to place him in Security Detention, he cannot challenge the procedure used by the Department to reach that
decision on due process grounds. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974).
Beyond the requirements of due process, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that an inmate may challenge his
custody status, even if he has no protected liberty interest at stake, if "prison officials have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
from personal bias" in determining his custody status. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 381, 527 S.E.2d at 756 (citing Crowe v.
Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 259 S.E.2d 614 (1979)). But, while review of these Crowe-based claims is not "improper or
unavailable," id., the level of scrutiny devoted to such claims is limited. Accordingly, where the record suggests that the
Department's decision to place an inmate in a particular custody status involved the "good faith exercise of the
discretionary power of the prison officials in the maintenance of order, discipline, and security among the prison
population," Crowe, 273 S.C. at 764, 259 S.E.2d at 615, the Department's decision will not be disturbed on appeal.
However, in the case at hand, the record presented is insufficient for this tribunal to determine whether the Department's
decision to place Appellant in Security Detention was made in good faith or not. The computerized print-out provided by
the Department does note that prison officials decided to place Appellant in Security Detention, but does not suggest how
this decision was reached. Consequently, this tribunal cannot determine whether that decision was made arbitrarily and
capriciously, from personal bias, or in good faith. Because the record in this matter does not afford this tribunal the
opportunity to conduct meaningful review of Appellant's claims, this case must be remanded to the Department to make
further findings in order to establish a reviewable record. See David E. Shipley, South Carolina Administrative Law 7-57
(2d ed. 1989); see also D&D Leasing Co. of S.C. v. Gentry, 298 S.C. 342, 380 S.E.2d 823 (1989) (stating that an appellate
court cannot address an issue where the supporting record is incomplete).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the Department to re-evaluate Appellant's custody
status within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order and to make a record of that decision sufficient for appellate review
by this tribunal. In the alternative, the Department may grant Appellant the relief requested in his grievance in lieu of re-evaluating his custody status.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
February 14, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina |