ORDERS:
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
GRIEVANCE NO. KerCI-0074-99
Upon its own motion, this tribunal has determined that the above-captioned appeal must be dismissed on the grounds of
mootness. The underlying controversy involves Appellant's claims that the Department retaliated against him for filing
complaints against the Department. Subsequently, he was transferred from prison to prison and subject to harassment.
On the question of mootness, the S.C. Supreme Court has stated that:
This Court will not pass on moot and academic questions or make an adjudication where there remains no actual
controversy. [citation omitted]. A case becomes moot when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect upon
[the] existing controversy. This is true when some event occurs making it impossible for [a] reviewing [c]ourt to grant
effectual relief. [citation omitted].
Jones v. Dillon-Marion Human Resources Development Comm'n, 277 S.C. 533, 291 S.E.2d 195 (1982); Dodge v. Dodge,
332 S.C. 401, 505 S.E.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Jones). The S.C. Court of Appeals has stated that "State appellate
courts will not issue advisory opinions on questions for which no meaningful relief can be granted." Jones v. Dillon-Marion
Human Resources Development Comm'n, 277 S.C. 533, 291 S.E.2d 195 (1982), citing Gainey v. Gainey, 279 S.C. 68, 301
S.E.2d 763, 764 (1998).
Nevertheless, "if the issue presented is 'capable of repetition but evading review,' [the court] will address it." In the interest
of Kaundra C., 318 S.C. 484, 458 S.E.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1995), citing In the Matter of Angela Suzanne C., 286 S.C. 186,
332 S.E.2d 542 (Ct. App. 1985). The court also stated that the 'capable of repetition but evading review' doctrine is limited
to situations where (1) the challenged action was too short in its duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation, and (2)
there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again. Id. at 189, 332
S.E.2d at 544, citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
In this matter, Appellant essentially claims that he was retaliated against by the Department for filing complaints, and then he
transferred from prison to prison and harrassed by prison officials. Since filing this appeal, however, the prisoner was
released from prison. Accordingly, there is no reasonable expectation that Appellant will be subjected to the same
discriminatory conduct. See id. Consequently, any decision by this tribunal would "have no practical legal effect upon [the]
existing controversy." See Jones v. Dillon-Marion Human Resources Development Comm'n, 277 S.C. 533, 291 S.E.2d 195
(1982). This tribunal can "not issue advisory opinions on questions for which no meaningful relief can be granted." Id., citing Gainey v. Gainey, 279 S.C. 68, 301 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1998). Therefore, this case is rendered moot by the release of
Appellant from prison.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
Post Office Box 11667
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1667
August 15, 2000
Columbia, South Carolina |
