ORDERS:
ORDER
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("Division") pursuant to the appeal of Raymond Pyatt, an inmate
incarcerated with the Department of Corrections ("Department") since 1989. On September 9, 1999, Inmate Pyatt filed a grievance
with the Department, essentially alleging that his maxout date had been miscalculated. On March 28, 2000, Inmate Pyatt filed this
appeal with the Division. Inmate Pyatt received the Department's final decision on June 23, 2000.II. BACKGROUND
In 1989, Inmate Pyatt was sentenced to twenty-five years after he was convicted of Grand Larceny, Resisting an Officer, and Second
Degree Burglary. After inquiring about the calculation of his sentence and receiving no response from his caseworker, Inmate Pyatt
filed a grievance on September 9, 1999, in which he asked for his projected maxout date as calculated in 1989 when he began serving
his twenty-five year sentence. In addition, Inmate Pyatt requested the projected maxout date on a twenty-five year sentence with no
applied work credits. On September 24, 1999, Inmate Pyatt was informed that, because he did not earn work credits during periods
that he did not work, Inmate Pyatt's maxout date had increased from the projected maxout date he had been given when he was
initially confined. Inmate Pyatt then filed a "Step 2" grievance in which he alleged he had been employed the entire time he was
incarcerated. On June 23, 2000, the Department informed Inmate Pyatt that his earned work credit ("EWC") history indicated he had
not worked the entire time he was incarcerated and that he had been convicted of disciplinary infractions, resulting in the loss of good
time. This appeal followed.
III. ANALYSIS
The Division's jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). In Al- Shabazz, the Supreme Court created a new avenue by which inmates
could seek review of final decisions of the Department of Corrections in "non-collateral" matters, i.e., matters in which an inmate
does not challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence, by appealing those decisions to the Division and ultimately to the circuit
court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. 338 S.C. at 373, 376, 527 S.E.2d at 752, 754. These matters typically arise in
two ways: (1) when an inmate is disciplined and punishment is imposed; and (2) when an inmate believes that his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status have been calculated incorrectly. 338 S.C. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750.
As in all cases subject to appellate review by the Division, the standard of review in these inmate grievance cases is limited to the
record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency unless the agency's
determination is affected by error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the
whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 1999); Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 380, 527 S.E.2d at 756; Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc.,
276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981). Moreover, to afford "meaningful judicial review," the Administrative Law Judge must
"adequately explain" his decision by "documenting the findings of fact" and basing his decision on "reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence on the whole record." Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 380, 527 S.E.2d at 756. In a miscalculated sentence case, the
grievance procedure established by the Department, in which an inmate has the opportunity to raise the matter to prison officials and
in which a reviewable record is created, satisfies the requirements of due process. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 375, 527 S.E.2d at 753. I
find that the Department afforded Inmate Pyatt all process that was due in these circumstances. Inmate Pyatt raised the issue of his
sentence calculation by filing a grievance, in which he stated his belief that he should be serving twelve and one half years of his 25
year sentence. After verifying Inmate Pyatt's sentence calculation, the Warden responded by explaining that Inmate Pyatt's maxout
date was a projected date only, and that he had failed to earn work credits for periods of time during which he was unemployed.
Inmate Pyatt was then permitted to appeal the Warden's decision to the Department level. In response to Inmate Pyatt's appeal, the
Department stated that Inmate Pyatt's EWC history indicated that he had not worked continuously during his incarceration and that
Inmate Pyatt had lost good time as the result of disciplinary infractions. The Department then informed Inmate Pyatt that he could
appeal the Department's final decision to the Division. As such, I find that the Department complied with the minimal due process
required in this case.
Moreover, I find that there is substantial evidence that the Department correctly calculated Inmate Pyatt's sentence. Although Inmate
Pyatt alleges that he has been employed the entire time he has been incarcerated, the Record indicates that Inmate Pyatt has had a
number of gaps in his employment, which negatively affect his ability to earn work credits. In addition, the Record indicates that
Inmate Pyatt has lost earned good time for disciplinary infractions. As a result, Inmate Pyatt's maxout date is further in the future
than had been predicted when he first arrived in the custody of the Department. Because the Department's Final Decision is
supported by "evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that [the
Department] reached," see Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 304 (1981), I affirm the Department's Final Decision.
V. ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Final Decision of the Department be AFFIRMED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Inmate Pyatt's appeal be dismissed.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
November 9, 2000
Columbia, South Carolina |
