ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. ECI 0496-01
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant
to the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d
742 (2000). Appellant Charles Walker appeals the decision of the South Carolina Department of
Corrections (DOC or Department) to revoke sixty days of his “good-time” credit as punishment for
refusing to take a random drug test in violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10. Having reviewed the
record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of
the Department must be reversed.
BACKGROUND
On May 10, 2001, in a multi-purpose room at the Evans Correctional Institution, Appellant was
selected for a random drug test by the Drug Interdiction Team. At some point after being selected for
testing, Appellant used a nearby restroom stall. Upon exiting the stall, Appellant was informed by
Corporal James Zarpentine, the officer administering the drug testing, that, because he had used the
restroom, his test would be terminated and he would be considered to have refused the test. Appellant
vigorous protested this decision and repeatedly offered to take the drug test as requested. Nevertheless,
the test was terminated and Appellant was charged with violating DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10, The
Use or Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana or Unauthorized Drugs, Including Prescription Drugs, for
his alleged refusal to take the drug test.
A hearing of the charge against Appellant was held before a DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer
(DHO) on May 16, 2001. At the close of the hearing, the DHO found Appellant guilty of violating DOC
Disciplinary Code § 1.10 and revoked sixty days of his “good-time” credits as punishment for the
offense. Appellant appealed this disciplinary conviction to the Department and then to this tribunal on
July 5, 2002. On appeal, Appellant contends that he neither refused to take the drug test nor took any
actions tantamount to a refusal of the test and that, therefore, his disciplinary conviction for refusing to
submit to the test should be overturned.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final
decisions of the Department in certain “non-collateral” or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in
which an inmate does not challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions
to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338
S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, a majority of
the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear inmate appeals under
Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the
Department has taken an inmate’s created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing.
McNeil v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law
Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand, Appellant contends that the Department
improperly revoked sixty days of his good-time credit as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing;
accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an
appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal’s
review of inmate appeals is confined to the record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is
primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has granted aggrieved inmates the process they
are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 (“[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the Department
granted ‘minimal due process’ in reaching [its] decisions . . . .”). Further, recognizing that prison
officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the
traditional “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing
inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State,
274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina
courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this deferential
standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department’s actions to ensure
that inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C.
at 383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department’s decision to revoke his good-time
credit was made in violation of his due process rights. Because inmates have a protected liberty interest
in their earned statutory good-time credits under the Fourteenth Amendment, they are entitled to
“minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process clause to
insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557
(1974). Thus, where, as here, an inmate faces the revocation of good-time credits as punishment in a
disciplinary hearing, prison officials must provide that inmate with certain procedural safeguards. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 370, 527 S.E.2d at 750.
These procedural safeguards include:
(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four
hours before the hearing; (2) that factfinders must prepare a written statement of the
evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the inmate should be
allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue
hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow
inmate or a prison employee) should be allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex
cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the matter, who
may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial.
Id. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (paraphrasing Wolff). Beyond these procedural requirements, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the revocation of an inmate’s good-time credits does not comport
with Due Process unless “there [is] some evidence from which the conclusion of the [prison official]
could be deduced.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Thus, if the
Department affords the inmate a Wolff-type hearing and has at least some evidence in the record to
support its decision, the Department’s revocation of an inmate’s good-time credits satisfies the
requirements of due process.
In the disciplinary proceedings underlying the instant appeal, Appellant was not afforded all the
process due him pursuant to Al-Shabazz. While the hearing conducted by the DHO did meet the basic
procedural requirements of Wolff, the conclusions reached by the DHO are not sufficiently supported
by the evidence in the record to satisfy the “some evidence” standard of Hill. The DHO found that
Appellant had refused the drug test in violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10 by leaving the testing
area and thereby causing his test to be voided. The sole evidentiary basis for this finding was the report
of the testing officer, Corporal Zarpentine, indicating that he observed Appellant coming out of a
restroom stall after the drug testing had started.
However, no policies were cited or facts developed
either in the record or in the Department’s brief to establish that Appellant’s use of the restroom
constituted an implicit refusal to take the drug test. For example, no testimony or documentary evidence
was produced at the hearing to define the “testing area” that Appellant allegedly exited; no testimony
or documentary evidence was produced to establish what directives Appellant was given with regard to
the testing, and in particular, with regard to where he could and could not go; and no testimony or
documentary evidence was produced to establish the Department’s policies regarding the “testing area”
for a drug test and the consequences of leaving that testing area. Without such evidence, there is nothing
in the record to suggest that Appellant’s use of the restroom while waiting to take a drug test is
tantamount to a refusal to take the test, either under the facts of the particular situation or as a matter
of Department policy.
It should further be noted that this is not a case where an inmate has taken actions such that he
cannot produce an adequate sample for testing. Rather, in the instant case, upon being told of his alleged
misconduct, Appellant vigorously protested to the officers and asked repeatedly to be allowed to take
the drug test. However, the officers refused his requests and voided his test without allowing him the
opportunity to produce a sample. Accordingly, without further evidence that Appellant’s actions were
in violation of a particular order from a corrections officer or a particular Departmental rule, nothing in
Appellant’s conduct during the testing suggests a refusal on his part to submit to the drug test.
In sum, there is not sufficient evidence in the record to support the DHO’s decision to find
Appellant guilty of refusing to take a required drug test, and therefore, the Department did not provide
Appellant with the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment before revoking his sentence-related credits as punishment in a disciplinary proceeding.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Appellant’s May 16, 2001 disciplinary conviction for
violating DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10 by refusing to submit to a random drug test is REVERSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department must restore to Appellant all good-time
credits taken from or not earned by Appellant as a result of that disciplinary conviction.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
June 2, 2003
Columbia, South Carolina |
