ORDERS:
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
The above-captioned case came before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) on September 29, 1999,
pursuant to the Respondent's appeal of the Department of Insurance's (Department or DOI) revocation of her insurance
agent's license.
This matter was set for a contested case hearing pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310, et seq., (1986 and Supp. 1998)
and 38-43-130 (Supp. 1998). The Respondent and counsel for the Department were notified of the date, time and place of
the hearing in this matter by an Order and Amended Notice of Hearing mailed by my office on August 23, 1999. Because
she did not have any legal counsel of record, the Respondent was notified of the hearing by U.S. certified mail. My office
received the Respondent's signed return receipt on August 30, 1999.
Therefore, I find that Respondent was notified of the hearing by my Order dated August 23, 1999. However, after receiving
proper notice of the hearing, neither any counsel for the Respondent nor the Respondent herself appeared at the designated
time and place. Moreover, Respondent at no time contacted the ALJD to request a continuance or to inform the Division
that she would not appear at the hearing on this matter. The Respondent did contact this office at 10:45 a.m. on September
29, 1999, after this matter had been resolved on the record. However, she did not contact the ALJD prior to or during the
time in which this hearing was scheduled.
After waiting ten minutes beyond the scheduled time of the hearing for the Respondent to make an appearance, the hearing
was commenced. Counsel for DOI, who had brought witnesses prepared to testify in this matter, made a Motion to Dismiss.
Administrative Law Judge Division Rule 23 provides that a default occurs when a party fails to appear at a hearing without
the proper consent of the Judge. The Administrative Law Judge may adversely dispose of a case against a defaulting party
under those circumstances.
I find that the Petitioner is in default in this case. "There is a limit beyond which the court should not allow a litigant to
consume the time of the court...." Georganne Apparel, Inc. v. Todd, 303 S.C. 87, 92, 399 S.E.2d 16, 19 (Ct. App. 1990).
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal of the Respondent of the final determination of the Department in this matter
be dismissed.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
Ralph King Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
September 30, 1999
Columbia, South Carolina |
