South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
James K. Goddard vs. SLED

AGENCY:
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division

PARTIES:
Petitioner:
James K. Goddard

Respondent:
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
02-ALJ-20-0454-CC

APPEARANCES:
For the Petitioner: James K. Goddard, Pro Se

For the Respondent: W. Rutledge Martin, Esquire
 

ORDERS:

FINAL ORDER AND DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD) pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 23-31-215(D) (Supp. 2002) and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310 et seq. (1986 & Supp. 2002). The Petitioner appeals the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division’s (SLED) denial of his renewal of a concealed weapon permit. After timely notice to the parties, a hearing was held at the offices of the ALJD in Columbia, South Carolina on March 6, 2003.


FINDINGS OF FACT

Having carefully considered all testimony, exhibits, and arguments presented at the hearing in this case and taking into account the credibility and accuracy of the evidence, I find the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence:

1.Notice of the date, time, place and subject-matter of the hearing was properly given to all the parties.

2.The Petitioner was issued a concealed weapon permit in August 1998. On July 2, 2002, he applied for a renewal of his permit. A question on the permit application asked, “Have you ever been convicted of a crime?” The Petitioner checked “No” to that question on the renewal application as he had done in the original application. A subsequent investigation of the Petitioner’s renewal application revealed the following traffic convictions:

a.Speeding 10 miles per hour (mph) or less in 1993;

b.Speeding 95 mph in a 65 mph zone in 1993;

c.Speeding 10 mph or less (three counts) in 1994;

d.Speeding 10 mph or less (two counts) in 1995;

e.Speeding 71 mph in a 55 mph zone in 1996;

f.Speeding 10 mph or less (two counts) in 1996;

g.Speeding 10 mph or less (two counts) in 1997;

h.Speeding 10 mph or less in 1998;

i.Speeding 10 mph or less (two counts) in 1999;

j.Speeding 76 mph in a 55 mph zone in 1999;

k.Speeding 10 mph or less (two counts) in 2000; and

l.Speeding 10 mph or less in 2001. Footnote

SLED must determine if an applicant has a favorable background and it considers all criminal convictions, including traffic convictions, in making that determination. SLED reasons that numerous violations of the traffic laws reflect poor judgment, a propensity to place the public at risk, and a wilfulness to violate the law. Therefore, SLED found that the applicant’s background was not sufficiently favorable to renew his permit based upon the false statement on the renewal application concerning his convictions and the above traffic convictions.

However, though the Petitioner failed to report the speeding tickets he had received on his application, he was not informed that those tickets were considered reportable offenses. Moreover, after the Petitioner’s initial application and acceptance, SLED amended its policy which established the type of criminal convictions it considered in determining whether an applicant has a favorable background. The revised policy added traffic convictions as a consideration in SLED’s determination. Consequently, Agent Dorton testified that the false statement is explainable. I therefore find that the Petitioner’s statement that he had not been convicted of a crime was not an attempt to mislead SLED concerning his past violations but rather a simple misunderstanding of the reporting requirements. Accordingly, those misstatements do not unfavorably reflect upon his character.

Furthermore, though the Petitioner has had numerous traffic violations in the last ten years, only three of those violations would be considered severe -- one violation in 1993 for driving 30 mph over the speed limit, another violation in 1996 for driving 16 mph over the speed limit, and a final violation in 1999 for driving 21 mph over the speed limit. Additionally, since learning that traffic violations are considered in determining whether to issue a concealed weapon permit, the Petitioner has not had any traffic violations. His last violation was on November 9, 2001. Finally, the Petitioner has not had any infractions relating to his possession of a concealed weapon and his local Sheriff recommended that he receive the permit.


CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the above Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:

1.S.C. Code Ann. § 23-31-215(D) (Supp. 2002) and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (1986 & Supp. 2002) grant jurisdiction to the ALJD to hear this contested case.

2.The standard of proof in administrative proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence, absent an allegation of fraud, or a statute or court rule requiring a higher standard. Anonymous v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 329 S.C. 371, 496 S.E.2d 17 (1998). Furthermore, in civil cases, generally, the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 127 (1994); Alex Sanders, et al., South Carolina Trial Handbook § 9:3 Party With Burden, Civil Cases (2000). Therefore, the Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that SLED abused its discretion in denying him a concealed weapon permit.

3.SLED is required to conduct a background check of an applicant for a concealed weapon permit upon submission of required information and proof of training. S.C. Code Ann.

§ 23-31-215(B) (Supp. 2002). If an applicant’s fingerprint and background checks are favorable, SLED must issue a concealed weapon permit to the applicant. Id. However, if SLED determines that an applicant’s background is unfavorable, SLED may deny the concealed weapon permit.

4.S.C. Code Ann. § 23-31-215(F)(4) requires that the applicant certify that “all information contained in his application is true and correct to the best of his knowledge.” Though the applicant’s statements were false, the change in policy making traffic violations a consideration is mitigating evidence concerning his misstatement.

5.The remaining issue for consideration in this case is whether the Petitioner’s renewal application should be denied because he has had numerous traffic violations over the last ten years.

The authorization of a person to carry a concealed weapon on his person is the extension of a very serious privilege. Moreover, numerous violations of the traffic laws can reflect poor judgment, a propensity to place the public at risk, and a wilfulness to violate the law. Accordingly, because the Petitioner’s background is questionable based on his past convictions for traffic violations, I find that his renewal application for a concealed weapon permit was properly denied. Nevertheless, in light of the fact that:

The Petitioner has recently corrected his behavior concerning traffic violations;

Only three of his traffic violations were considered serious (and the most serious of those occurred approximately ten years ago);

He has never had any infractions relating to his possession of a concealed weapon; and

The local Sheriff recommends that his permit be renewed,

I limit the finding that the Petitioner’s background is not favorable to November 1, 2004. In other words, if the Petitioner continues to display “favorable” behavior during the period from the date of this Final Decision until November 1, 2004, the Findings in this Decision would not support a denial of another application for a concealed weapon permit.


ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the renewal of Petitioner’s concealed weapon permit is DENIED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.


___________________________

Ralph King Anderson, III

Administrative Law Judge


May 27, 2003

Columbia, South Carolina


Brown Bldg.

 

 

 

 

 

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