ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This
matter is before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court)
pursuant to the Notice of Appeal filed, by Appellant (Inmate) above named, who
is incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC).
Inmate
appeals a denial of his Step 2 Grievance in which he asserted that his present custody
status is incorrect because of an escape charge in 1973 in Rutherford County,
N.C. which SCDC is classifying as a Class I Escape instead of the less serious
Class II Escape (Walk Off).
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The
Court's jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision
of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C.
354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). The Court's appellate jurisdiction in inmate
appeals is limited to state created liberty interests typically involving: (1)
cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2)
cases in which an inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary
hearing as a result of a serious rule violation. Id.
When
reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the Court
sits in an appellate capacity. Id., 527 S.E.2d at 756. Consequently, the
review in these inmate grievance cases is limited to the Record presented.
An
Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency
"as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." S.C. Code
Ann. § 1- 23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2005). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge
may not reverse or modify an agency's decision unless substantial rights of the
Appellant have been prejudiced because the decision is clearly erroneous in view
of the substantial evidence on the whole Record, arbitrary or affected by an
error of law. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2005); See also Marietta Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep’t of Public Safety,
337 S.C. 133, 522 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1999); South Carolina Dep’t of Labor,
Licensing and Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503 S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App.
1998).
"'Substantial
evidence' is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly
from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the Record as a
whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the
administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its
action." Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306
(1981). Accordingly, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from
being supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally,
in Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S. Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the relevant question is
whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached
by the disciplinary board." Moreover, in Al-Shabazz, the Court
underscored that since prison officials are in the best position to decide
inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore this tribunal adhere to a
"hands off" approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and
procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 527
S.E.2d at 757; See also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266
S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off" approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
DISCUSSION
Judicial
review must be available to determine whether the challenged degree of
confinement is within the sentence imposed and is not otherwise violative of
the Constitution, or whether prison officials have acted arbitrarily,
capriciously, or from personal bias. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 756. The
process due an inmate - as well as the level of judicial scrutiny - in a
custody status case is further limited by the fact that this matter is not a protected
liberty interest within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Al-Shabazz,
527 S.E.2d at 757.
There
is nothing in the record to indicate that the restricted custody status complained
of will affect the duration of Inmate Motts’ sentence or is beyond the sentence
imposed; nor is there any indication of any decision of prison officials that
is arbitrary, capricious, or resulting from personal bias or prejudice. I find nothing in the record to
indicate that there has been an infringement that reaches Constitutional
dimensions.
Inmate
has been assigned a restrictive custody status at least in part because of an
escape charge that is more than thirty years old and concerning which, evidence
has evaporated. Moreover, by statute this Court cannot substitute its judgment
for that of the Department as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (A)(6) (Supp. 2005). It is obvious
that SCDC chose not to believe Inmate’s self-serving affidavit. This is
clearly a case in which the Court must adhere to the “hands off” policy
enunciated by Pruitt.
ORDER
Based
on the foregoing,
IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department’s decision in this matter classifying
Inmate Motts’ escape charge as a Class I Escape is AFFIRMED.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________
John D. McLeod
Administrative
Law Judge
July 27, 2006
Columbia, South Carolina |