South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
Edgar A. Brown building 1205 Pendleton St., Suite 224 Columbia, SC 29201 Voice: (803) 734-0550

SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
Allen Johnson vs. SCDCA

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs

PARTIES:
Petitioners:
Allen Johnson

Respondents:
South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
06-ALJ-30-0069-CC

APPEARANCES:
For Petitioner: Allen Johnson, Pro Se

For Respondent: Charles M. Knight, Esquire
 

ORDERS:

FINAL ORDER AND DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a contested case brought by Petitioner Allen Johnson challenging the decision of the South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs (“Department”) which denied Petitioner’s Originator License for Mortgage Broker Company Originators based on Petitioner’s application and the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division’s (“SLED”) criminal records check. A hearing was held before me on June 28, 2006 at the offices of the Administrative Law Court (“ALC” or “Court”) in Columbia, South Carolina. Based on the evidence before me, I find and order that the Respondent’s decision to deny the Petitioner this license shall stand.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Having observed the witnesses and exhibits presented at the hearing and closely passed upon their credibility, taking into consideration the burden of persuasion of parties, I make the following findings of fact by a preponderance of evidence:

1. Notice of the time, date, place and subject matter of the hearing was given to Petitioner and Respondent.

2. When the Petitioner completed his application, Supplemental Form O for an originator’s license, he submitted a sworn statement that all information contained in the application was true, current and correct. Petitioner answered “No” to the question on the form, “Have you ever been convicted of a felony or an offense involving breach of trust, moral turpitude or dishonest dealings within the last ten years?”

3. In spite of that assertion, Petitioner’s arrest record, Respondent’s Exhibit #2, shows numerous convictions for Fraudulent Checks in 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004.

4. The Petitioner testified that he had spoken with his manager about the question on the form and was told that he could answer “no” because he had no felony convictions. The Petitioner testified that there was no definition of “moral turpitude” or a list of crimes involving fraud on the application he completed. He was not aware that a “bad check” was a crime of moral turpitude. Finally, he testified that he feels he has paid his debt to society

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the above findings of fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:

1. S.C. Code Ann. 37-6-414 (2005), S. C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-600, et seq. (2005) and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (2005) grant jurisdiction to the Administrative Law Court to hear this contested case.

2. S.C. Code Ann. § 40-58-50(C) (2005) sets forth:

The application for an originator license must designate the employing mortgage broker and must include descriptions of the business activities, educational background, and general character and fitness of the applicant as required by this chapter, including consent to a criminal records check…

3. S.C. Code Ann. § 40-58-55 (2005) sets forth:

(A) The department may refuse to license an applicant or refuse to renew a license if it finds, after notice and a hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, that the applicant or his agent has:

(1) violated a provision of this chapter or an order of the department;

(2) withheld material information in connection with an application for a license or its renewal, or made a material misstatement in connection with the application;

(3) been convicted of a felony or of an offense involving breach of trust, moral turpitude, fraud, or dishonest dealing within the past ten years.

(B) A person who was in business as a mortgage broker or is an agent of a broker before October 1, 1998, and who has been convicted of a felony or an offense involving breach of trust, moral turpitude, fraud, or dishonest dealing within the past ten years may continue in business as a mortgage broker or agent, but if a mortgage broker or an agent of a broker is convicted of an offense enumerated in item (3) of subsection (A) on or after October 1, 1998, that person is subject to the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis added.)

4. The record shows Petitioner’s arrest record has fraudulent check charges from 2000 through 2004, which is are offenses specifically included in S.C. Code Ann. § 40-58-55(A)(3) (2005). The Petitioner’s convictions were within the last ten years, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 40-58-55 (2005), and appear to show a pattern of disregard for the courts and financial institutions. Although, S.C. Code Ann. § 40-58-55 is a permissive, not mandatory, statute in that the Department “may refuse to license an applicant,” in this case, that denial appears proper. The Petitioner argued that he is in a position of trust in his current job and that he has done nothing to violate that trust. His past convictions, however, show that he has a repeated pattern of violating trust.

"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent whenever possible." Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Comm'n, 332 S.C. 54, 62, 504 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1998). "All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that the legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute." Kiriakides v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 275, 440 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1994). The words of the statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Hitatchi Data Sys. Corp. v. Leatherman, 309 S.C. 174, 178, 420 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1992). Marlboro Park Hospital v. SCDHEC, 257 S.C. ____, 595 S.E. 2d 851 (SC Ct. App. 2004). Here the use of the permissive “may” versus the mandatory “shall” indicates that the Legislature intended that the application of this statute is discretionary.

In this matter, I find that the statute should be strictly construed against the Petitioner.


ORDER

Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner Allen Johnson is not entitled to an Originator License for Mortgage Broker Company Originators and that the denial of the South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs shall stand.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________________________

Carolyn C. Matthews

SC Administrative Law Judge

August 8, 2006

Columbia, South Carolina


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