ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. ACI-0542-00
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant
to the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d
742 (2000). Appellant Calvin Hankins appeals the decision of the South Carolina Department of
Corrections (DOC or Department) to reduce his custody level from Security Detention Level III to
Security Detention Level II due to a disciplinary conviction. Having reviewed the record, applicable law,
and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be
affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On July 18, 2000, Appellant filed a grievance with the Department challenging his reduction in
custody level. Appellant contends that the Department’s decision to place him in Security Detention is
not justified. The Department found that the Appellant had been convicted of two major disciplinary
offenses in the three months before his level review, and that the reduction in custody level was justified.
Appellant appealed that decision to this tribunal.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final
decisions of the Department in certain “non-collateral” or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in
which an inmate does not challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions
to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338
S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, a majority of
the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear inmate appeals under
Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the
Department has taken an inmate’s created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing.
McNeil v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law
Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand, Appellant contends that the Department has
improperly determined his custody status; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an
appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal’s
review of inmate appeals is confined to the record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is
primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has granted aggrieved inmates the process they
are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 (“[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the Department
granted ‘minimal due process’ in reaching [its] decisions . . . .”). Further, recognizing that prison
officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the
traditional “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and other internal prison affairs
when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see
also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach
of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this
deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department’s actions
to ensure that inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz,
338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.
“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Id. at 369, 527
S.E.2d at 750 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). An inmate does not have a
protected liberty interest in his custody status unless such an interest is created: (1) by the Due Process
clause of its own force because the challenged custody status is not “within the sentence imposed upon
him” or is “otherwise violative of the Constitution,” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983), see also
Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); or (2) by state law because the challenged custody status
“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Here, Appellant has no protected liberty interest in his custody status. Appellant’s reduction in
custody level is “well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence,”
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, so as not to implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process clause of its own
force. And, placement in Security Detention “does not present the type of atypical, significant
deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. Thus,
as Appellant has no constitutionally-recognized liberty interest affected by the Department’s decision
to reduce his custody level, he cannot challenge the procedure used by the Department to reach that
decision on due process grounds. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974).
Beyond the requirements of due process, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that an
inmate may challenge his custody status, even if he has no protected liberty interest at stake, if “prison
officials have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or from personal bias” in determining his custody status.
Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 381, 527 S.E.2d at 756 (citing Crowe v. Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 259 S.E.2d 614
(1979)). But, while review of these Crowe-based claims is not “improper or unavailable,” id., the level
of scrutiny devoted to such claims is limited. Accordingly, where, as here, the record suggests that the
Department’s decision to place an inmate in a particular custody status involved the “good faith exercise
of the discretionary power of the prison officials in the maintenance of order, discipline, and security
among the prison population,” Crowe, 273 S.C. at 764, 259 S.E.2d at 615, that decision will be
supported.
Appellant was provided appropriate due process by the Department. Further, there is no
evidence to suggest that the Department acted arbitrarily or from personal bias in reducing his custody
level. Accordingly, the Department’s decision to deny Appellant’s grievance is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department’s denial of Appellant’s grievance is
AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
MARVIN F. KITTRELL
Chief Administrative Law Judge
April 29, 2003
Columbia, South Carolina |
