South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
DOR vs. Marlboro Stations, Inc

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Revenue

PARTIES:
Petitioner:
South Carolina Department of Revenue

Respondent:
Marlboro Stations, Inc
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
02-ALJ-17-0195-CC

APPEARANCES:
Carol I. McMahan, Esquire, for the Petitioner

James H. Harrison, Esquire, for the Respondent
 

ORDERS:

FINAL ORDER AND DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (Division) pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §§ 61-2-20 and 61-2-260 (Supp. 2001). The South Carolina Department of Revenue (Department) seeks revocation of the Respondent’s sale and consumption license and a fine of $500.00. The Department also seeks an $800.00 fine against the Respondent’s beer and wine permit. A hearing was held before me on December 18, 2002 at the offices of the Division in Columbia, South Carolina.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Having observed the witnesses and exhibits presented at the hearing and closely passed upon their credibility, taking into consideration the burden of persuasion by the parties, I make the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. Notice of the time, date, place and subject matter of the hearing was given to the Petitioner and the Respondent.

2. The Respondent, Marlboro Stations (Marlboro), is the holder of a beer and wine permit for a nonprofit organization and sale and consumption license of alcoholic liquors for its establishment located at 141 Marlboro Street, Aiken, South Carolina.


Sale and Consumption License

3. On June 14, 2001, agents of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) performed an undercover inspection of Marlboro. When Agent Green entered the location, the doorman asked if she was a member and Agent Green responded that she was not a member or the guest of a member. The doorman then charged her $8.00 to enter and stated that the charge was for a nonmember that evening. After entering Marlboro, Agent Green was allowed to purchase an alcoholic drink (a margarita).

The following evening, Agent Green returned to Marlboro. The doorman allowed her to purchase a membership for $5.00 that evening and immediately enter the nonprofit location. After entering, Agent Green was allowed to purchase an alcoholic drink (Bacardi Rum). Agent Green consumed a small portion of the drink and, upon exiting the location, turned over a sample of the drink to Agent Turner. Agent Turner issued a citation to Marlboro for “permitting consumption of liquor by a nonmember.”

Marlboro has two previous violations of the laws regulating its sale and consumption license as a nonprofit organization within three years of June 15, 2001. Both of those violations were for permitting consumption of liquor by a person who is neither a bona fide member or a bona fide guest of a member. Marlboro previously paid an $800.00 fine for the first violation and a $1,000.00 fine for the second violation. On May 3, 2002, the Department revoked Marlboro’s sale and consumption license for the June 15, 2001 violation, and imposed a $500.00 fine.

Beer and Wine Permit


4. On September 9, 2001, agents of SLED inspected the location. Nine individuals were in possession of and consuming beer in Marlboro at approximately 2:25 a.m.[1] Marlboro was issued an administrative citation for “permitting a criminal act, possession of beer during restricted hours” in violation S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-580 (Supp. 2001). Marlboro has one previous violation of the laws regulating its beer and wine permit within three years of September 9, 2001. That violation was also for permitting a person to possess beer or wine in an open container upon its premises during restricted hours. Marlboro paid a $400.00 fine for that violation. On May 3, 2002, the Department imposed an $800.00 fine for Marlboro’s violation on September 9, 2001.

Mitigating Evidence

5. Eric Kitchens, who now manages Marlboro, also operates three other on-premise businesses that sell beer, wine and alcohol. Two of the businesses are restaurants with on-premise beer and wine permits and sale and consumption licenses. The restaurants have been open three and five years, respectively. The other location is a night club which has been open for approximately nine years and holds both an on-premise beer and wine permit and a private sale and consumption license. Only one violation has occurred at any of these locations. That violation was the sale of alcohol to a nonmember at the club.

Additionally, after the first violation at Marlboro, Mr. Kitchens fired the doorman/bartender who permitted the violation. After the second violation, Mr. Kitchens again fired the doorman/bartender who permitted that violation. Mr. Kitchens contends that he has since learned that the problems at Marlboro were attributable to the manager that was operating the location. That manager has since been fired and there have been no violations during the eighteen months that the new manager has been operating Marlboro.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the above Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:

General Conclusions

1. The Department is vested with the authority to administer the provisions of Title 61 governing alcoholic beverages, beer and wine. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-20 (Supp. 2001). S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (1986 & Supp. 2001) grants jurisdiction to the Division to hear contested cases under the Administrative Procedures Act. Specifically, S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-260 (Supp. 2001) grants the Division the authority to hear contested case hearings in matters governing alcoholic beverages, beer and wine.


2. Permits and licenses issued by this State for the sale of liquor, beer and wine are privileges to be used and enjoyed only so long as the holder complies with the restrictions and conditions governing them. See Feldman v. S.C. Tax Commission, 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E. 2d 22 (1943).

Beer and Wine Permit

3. A holder of a permit to sell beer or wine may not allow any act which constitutes a crime under the laws of this State. See S.C. Code Ann. § 61‑4‑580 (5) (Supp. 2001). “A person who drinks beer or wine or possesses beer or wine in an open container between the hours of twelve o'clock Saturday night and sunrise Monday morning at a place licensed to sell beer or wine is considered guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .” S.C. Code Ann. § 61‑4‑140 (Supp. 2001). Since the Respondent permitted that act to occur upon its premises, Marlboro violated Section 61-4-580.

A beer and wine permittee may be fined not less than twenty‑five dollars nor more than one thousand dollars for an infraction against the laws regulating the sale of beer and wine in lieu of suspension or revocation. S.C. Code Ann § 61-4-250 (Supp. 2001). Here, the Respondent was previously fined $400.00 for its first violation. I find that the imposition of the $800.00 penalty in this case is appropriate.

Sale and Consumption License


4. Marlboro holds a sale and consumption license as a “nonprofit organization.” S.C. Code Ann § 61‑6‑20 (6) (Supp. 2001) provides that a “nonprofit organization” is “an organization not open to the general public, but with a limited membership and established for social, benevolent, patriotic, recreational, or fraternal purposes.” Nonprofit organizations which are licensed by the department under this article may sell alcoholic liquors in minibottles. Furthermore, only “bona fide members” or “bona fide guests of members of [nonprofit] organizations may consume alcoholic beverages sold in sealed containers of two ounces or less upon the licensed premises.” 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7‑17 (J) (Supp. 2001). Here, the Respondent permitted Agent Green, who was neither a “bona fide member” nor a “bona fide guest of a member,” to consume an alcoholic beverage upon its premises in violation of Regulation 7-17(J).

The Department contends that a sale and consumption license must be revoked upon conviction of a third offense within three years. The Respondent contends that this tribunal has the discretion to impose a monetary penalty in lieu of revocation if it finds that the evidence supports that determination. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-6-2600 (Supp. 2001) provides that “a person licensed to sell alcoholic liquors pursuant to the provisions of this article who . . . violates any . . . provision of this article must:

* * *

(3) for a third offense within three years of the first offense be fined not less than five hundred dollars and have his license revoked permanently . . . .”

On the other hand, S.C. Code Ann. § 61-6-4270 (Supp. 2001) provides that a monetary penalty may be imposed as an alternative to revocation or suspension in all cases in which revocation or suspension is authorized. However, the primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Green v. Thornton, 265 S.C. 436, 219 S.E.2d


827 (1975). In ascertaining the legislature's intent, statutes that are part of the same act must be read together. Burns v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 297 S.C. 520, 377 S.E.2d 569 (1989). Furthermore, “[e]ach part of a statute should be given effect and each word given its plain meaning if this can be accomplished by any reasonable construction.” Sea Island Scenic Parkway Coalition v. Beaufort County Bd. of Adjustments and Appeals, 316 S.C. 231, 236, 449 S.E. 2d 254, 257 (Ct. App. 1994). Moreover, this tribunal must reconcile conflicts if possible and is obligated to avoid a construction that would read a provision out of a statute. Steinke v. South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 520 S.E.2d 142 (1999); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 61-6-4000 (Supp. 2001) (providing that Article 13 of Title 61, which includes § 61-6-4270, is complementary to and not in conflict with existing laws governing the sale of “beer, wines, and other vinous, fermented, or malt liquors”). Though penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the Respondent,[2] I find that in applying the above rules of statutory construction to Sections 61-6-2600 and 61-6-4270, the only reading of the two statutes which gives full effect to both is that this tribunal has discretion to impose a monetary penalty, except when the statutes call for a mandatory revocation. In those instances, such as in Section 61-6-2600(3), no discretion exists and revocation would be required.

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent’s sale and consumption license is revoked and that the Respondent pay an $800.00 fine for violation of its beer and wine permit to the Department within thirty (30) days from the date of this Decision.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

___________________________

Ralph King Anderson, III

Administrative Law Judge

May 5, 2003

Columbia, South Carolina



[1] The agents charged those individuals with “possession of beer during restricted hours” in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-140 (Supp. 2001). The nine individuals later pled “nolo contendere” to that criminal charge and paid the fines imposed.

[2] See Feldman v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22 (1943).


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