ORDERS:
Order
STATEMENT
OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court)
pursuant to the appeal of Mack Myers, an inmate incarcerated with the
Department of Corrections (Department or DOC). Myers was convicted of
violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.04 (Threatening to Inflict Harm on an
Employee or Member of the Public). As a result of his conviction, Myers lost ninety
(90) days of “good-time” credit. He filed a grievance with the Department and
the Department issued a final decision on August 23, 2005. Following the
Department’s denial of that grievance, Myers filed this appeal with the ALC.
BACKGROUND
On
June 23, 2005, while waiting to return to his cell, Appellant Myers asked
Officer Lawless about his property. Officer Lawless informed him that he would
have to wait for Lieutenant James. Appellant became agitated and demanded his
property. When Officer Lawless requested Appellant’s identification card, he
refused and told the officer that if he touched him he would knock him out. At
that point, Lieutenant Byrd told Appellant to go into the holding cell. As a
result, Appellant was charged with violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.04
(Threatening to Inflict Harm on an Employee or Member of the Public.
On
July 13, 2005, a Major Disciplinary Hearing was held before a DOC Disciplinary
Hearing Officer (DHO). At Appellant’s request, he was provided a counsel
substitute. Also, Appellant requested that his accuser be present at the
hearing. During the hearing, the DHO read a narrative of the Incident Report
into the Record and received testimony from Officer Lawless and his counsel
substitute read a statement from Chaplain Bryant into the Record. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the DHO found the Appellant guilty of the charge and
sanctioned him to the loss of ninety (90) days good time. After the hearing,
the DHO completed a Major Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record which
documented the DHO’s findings.
Appellant
Myers filed a grievance with the Department appealing his conviction of the
charge. After reviewing his contentions, the Warden denied Appellant’s
grievance. The Appellant then appealed the Warden’s decision and the
Department subsequently denied that grievance stating that the evidence supported
the conviction and that the sanction imposed was appropriate for the violation
that the Appellant committed. This appeal followed.
In his Appeal Brief, Appellant alleges that there is not
substantial enough evidence to support the charge against him.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The Court’s
jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527
S.E.2d 742 (2000). The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is
limited to state created liberty interests typically involving: (1) cases in
which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his
sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which
an inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a result
of a serious rule violation. Id.
As
set forth above, when reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance
matters, the Court sits in an appellate capacity. Id. at 756.
Consequently, the review in these inmate grievance cases is limited to the
Record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment
for that of an agency “as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”
S.C. Code Ann. § 1‑23‑380(A)(6) (Supp. 2005). Furthermore, an
Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or modify an agency’s decision unless
substantial rights of the Appellant have been prejudiced because the decision
is clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole Record,
arbitrary or affected by an error of law. See Section 1-23-380(A)(6); see also Marietta Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety,
337 S.C. 133, 522 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor,
Licensing and Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503 S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1998).
“ ‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence
viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering
the Record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion
that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify
its action.” Lark v. Bi‑Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306
(1981). Accordingly, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from
being supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally,
in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 455-456, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
“the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that
could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Moreover, in Al-Shabazz, the Court underscored that since prison officials are in the best position to
decide inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore this tribunal
adhere to a “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and
procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz at
757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d
779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina
courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
In this case, Appellant Myers alleges that the Department
should not have revoked his ninety (90) days of accrued good time. Inmates
have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the Department
revokes an inmate’s good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary
hearing” involving “more serious rule violations,” prison officials must
provide that inmate with “minimal due process.” Al-Shabazz at 750.
Consequently, specific administrative procedures must be followed before
depriving an inmate of statutorily granted earned credit, including adequate
advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the
inmate can present witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing
officer who prepares a written statement of all the evidence presented and the
reasons for his decision. Id. at 751 (citing Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974)).
DISCUSSION
Appellant claims that
the evidence presented was not sufficient to support a conviction in this
case. He furthermore alleges that the charges were fabricated and that he was
charged as retaliation for filing a grievance about an officer. Nevertheless,
the Record clearly supports the facts recited in the “Background” portion of
this Order. In evaluating the evidence presented at the hearing, “[t]he fact
finder is imbued with broad discretion in determining credibility or
believability of witnesses.” Small v. Pioneer Machinery, Inc., 329 S.C.
448, 465, 494 S.E.2d 835, 843 (Ct. App. 1997). Moreover, in Superintendent
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56, 457 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the revocation of good time must be supported by “some evidence in the
record.” However, “[a]scertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not
require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant
question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455. Thus, if
reasonable minds could arrive at the DHO’s conclusion based upon the evidence
presented, the Department’s decision must be upheld regardless of the
derivation of the evidence. See also Smith v. Samu, 54
F.3d 788 (10th Cir. 1995).
I find that there
is substantial evidence to support the Appellant's conviction of violating SCDC
Disciplinary Code § 1.04, Threatening to Inflict Harm on an Employee and/or
Member of the Public. A Code 1.04 violation is:
Communication, verbal or written, by an inmate to an
individual that s/he intends to injure that person or commit a violent or
unlawful act dangerous to human life, presently or in the future; or one who
commits a physical act of a threatening nature, and the probable result of such
threats or action is to place the individual in fear of bodily injury; or one
who causes evacuation of a building; or one who creates serious disruption or
alarm. Any unauthorized body contact of an employee or member of the public
which creates serious alarm, but does not result in bodily injury.
When
viewed in light of the DHO’s discretion, the Record sufficiently establishes
substantial evidence that the Appellant acted in a threatening manner. Accordingly,
I find that there is substantial evidence to support the Appellant's conviction
of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.04 (Threatening to Inflict Harm on an
Employee and/or Member of the Public).
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE
ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and the Final
Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO
ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph
King Anderson, III
Administrative
Law Judge
April 7, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court also found that
other conditions of confinement could potentially implicate a state created
liberty interest. However, those interests are “generally limited to freedom
from restraint which. . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sullivan v.
S.C. Department of Corrections 355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124 (2003) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). See also Slezak v. S.C. Department of Corrections , 361 S.C. 327, 605 S.E.2d 506 (2004).
|