ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This
matter comes before this Court pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-260 (Supp.
2005), S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(B) (Supp. 2005), and S.C. Code Ann. §§
1-23-310 et seq. (2005) for a contested case hearing. Petitioner South
Carolina Department of Revenue (Department) contends that Respondent Cherokee
Trail (Cherokee Trail) knowingly permitted an underage individual to purchase
beer from its convenience store, Cherokee Trail Outdoor Center, at 700 West
Greenwood Street in Abbeville, South Carolina, in violation of 23 S.C. Code
Ann. Regs. 7-200.4 (Supp. 2005). For this fourth violation against its
off-premises beer and wine permit within three years, the Department seeks to
revoke Cherokee Trail’s permit for the location in question. In response,
Cherokee Trail concedes that the alleged violation did occur, but further
contends that the proposed penalty for the violation is excessive in light of
its efforts to prevent such sales.
After
timely notice to the parties, a hearing of this matter was held on April 4,
2006, at the South Carolina Administrative Law Court in Columbia, South
Carolina. Based upon the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing, I
find that the appropriate penalty for Cherokee Trail’s violation is a
forty-five-day suspension of its off-premises beer and wine permit.
STIPULATED
FACTS
Pursuant
to ALC Rule 25(C), the parties submitted Stipulations of fact to the Court at
the hearing of this matter. These Stipulations were marked as Petitioner’s
Exhibit #1 and are hereby incorporated into this Order by reference. In the
seven Stipulations, the parties describe the circumstances giving rise to the
violation in question and acknowledge both the current and prior violations
committed by Cherokee Trail.
Specifically,
the parties stipulated that, on August 9, 2005, at the Cherokee Trail Outdoor
Center at 700 West Greenwood Street in Abbeville, South Carolina, Mary Boyd
Norman, an employee of Respondent Cherokee Trail, sold a beer to a
youthful-looking nineteen-year-old Underage Cooperating Individual (UCI), who
was working with agents of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED).
The parties further stipulated that Ms. Norman did not request identification
from the UCI prior to completing the sale of the beer. Beyond describing the
incident, the parties also agreed that, as a result of this sale, Cherokee
Trail, through its employee, Ms. Norman, permitted the sale of beer to an
underage individual in violation of 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-200.4, and that
this violation was Cherokee Trail’s fourth violation against its beer and wine
permit within the past three years. As stipulated by the parties, these prior
violations include: (1) a May 16, 2003 violation for selling beer to an
underage individual for which Cherokee Trail paid a $400 fine, (2) an August
28, 2003 violation for permitting gambling on the premises for which Cherokee
Trail paid an $800 fine, and (3) a January 30, 2004 violation for selling beer
to an underage individual for which Cherokee Trail’s permit was suspended for
forty-five days.
FINDINGS
OF FACT
Having
carefully considered all testimony, exhibits, and arguments presented at the
hearing of this matter, and taking into account the credibility and accuracy of
the evidence, I make the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the
evidence:
1. Cherokee
Trail is a partnership that operates the Cherokee Trail Outdoor Center, a
convenience store, grill, and hunting and fishing gear supply store located at
700 West Greenwood Street in Abbeville, South Carolina. Cherokee Trail holds a
permit to sell beer and wine for off-premises consumption from its store.
2. Cherokee
Trail has made good-faith efforts to prevent the sale of alcoholic beverages to
underage individuals. It provides training on the sale of alcoholic beverages
to its employees, both at the time of hire and in regular staff meetings, and
uses a “Ruby” cash register system that requires proof of age for all purchases
of beer and wine.
3. At
the hearing of this case, Robert Bowie, one of the owners of Cherokee Trail,
testified to the circumstances surrounding the instant violation. He explained
that the sale was completed by the store’s cook, who had not been trained as a
cashier and who had only made the sale in an attempt to assist the store’s
other employees, who were involved in restocking the store at the time of the
sale. The cook had not been trained in how to make alcohol sales and rang the
beer up as a grocery item, thereby bypassing the proof-of-age requirement on
the cash register. As a result of making the improper sale, the cook was fired
from Cherokee Trail.
4. Mr.
Bowie also testified that he would be willing secure alcoholic beverage
training for his employees under a Department-recognized training program.
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
Based
upon the foregoing Stipulated Facts and Findings of Fact, I conclude the
following as a matter of law:
1. The
Department is charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing
the laws and regulations governing alcoholic beverages, including beer and
wine. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-20 (Supp. 2005).
2. Regulation
7-200.4 prohibits holders of beer and wine permits from selling beer or wine to
persons under twenty-one years of age. The regulation provides that:
To
permit or knowingly allow a person under twenty-one year[s] of age to purchase
or possess or consume alcoholic liquors, beer or wine in or on a licensed place
of business which holds a license or permit issued by the Department is
prohibited and constitutes a violation against the license or permit. Such
violation shall be sufficient cause to suspend or revoke the license or permit
by the Department.
23 S.C. Code
Ann. Regs. 7-200.4 (Supp. 2005). Respondent Cherokee Trail concedes and
stipulates that it committed a violation of Regulation 7-200.4 as alleged by
the Department.
3. The
Department has jurisdiction to revoke or suspend permits authorizing the sale
of beer and wine. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-590 (Supp. 2005). Pursuant to such
authority, the Department may suspend or revoke a beer and wine permit if the
permittee has knowingly sold beer or wine to a person under twenty-one years of
age. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-580(1) (Supp. 2005); 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs.
7-200.4 (Supp. 2005); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-270 (Supp. 2005)
(authorizing the Department to “revoke the permit of a person failing to comply
with any requirements” in Chapter 4 of Title 61). Further, the Department may
exercise this authority to suspend or revoke a permit for a first violation of
the prohibition against selling beer and wine to minors. See S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 61-4-270, 61-4-580, 61-4-590; 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-200.4. In lieu
of such suspension or revocation, the Department may also impose a monetary
penalty upon a permittee for selling beer and wine to minors. S.C. Code Ann. §
61-4-250 (Supp. 2005). For retail beer and wine permittees, this monetary
penalty must be no less than $25 and no greater than $1,000. Id.
4. S.C.
Revenue Procedure 04-4 (2004) sets forth the Department’s penalty guidelines
for violations of the alcoholic beverage control laws. For retail beer and
wine permits, Revenue Procedure 04-4 provides for a $500 fine for the first
violation by a permittee, a $1000 fine for the second violation, a forty-five-day
suspension of the permit for the third violation, and revocation of the permit
for the fourth violation. However, this document does not set binding norms
for the Department, but rather only provides guidance to the Department in
assessing penalties for violations of the alcoholic beverage control laws. See Revenue Procedure 04-4, at 2 (“These are guidelines only and this advisory
opinion does not establish a binding norm.”). As such, Revenue Procedure 04-4
is not law and thus is not binding upon this Court. Cf. Home Health
Serv., Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 312 S.C. 324, 328, 440 S.E.2d 375, 378
(1994) (holding that “whether a particular agency proceeding announces a rule
or a general policy statement depends upon whether the agency action
establishes a binding norm”) (citing Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 716 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1983)).
5. The
weight and credibility assigned to evidence presented at the hearing of a
matter is within the province of the trier of fact. See S.C. Cable
Television Ass’n v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 222, 417
S.E.2d 586, 589 (1992); see also Doe v. Doe, 324 S.C. 492, 502,
478 S.E.2d 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a trial judge, when acting as
finder of fact, “has the authority to determine the weight and credibility of
the evidence before him”). Furthermore, a trial judge who observes a witness
is in the best position to judge the witness’s demeanor and veracity and to
evaluate the credibility of his testimony. See, e.g., Woodall v.
Woodall, 322 S.C. 7, 10, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1996); Wallace v. Milliken
& Co., 300 S.C. 553, 556, 389 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Ct. App. 1990).
6.
The facts in this case warrant a lesser penalty than that sought to be imposed
by the Department. It is a generally recognized principle of administrative
law that the fact finder has the authority to determine an appropriate
administrative penalty, within the statutory limits established by the
legislature, after the parties have had an opportunity for a hearing on the
issues. See, e.g., Walker v. S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n,
305 S.C. 209, 407 S.E.2d 633 (1991). Further, in assessing a penalty, the
finder of fact “should give effect to the major purpose of a civil
penalty–deterrence.” Midlands Utility, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Health &
Envtl. Control, 313 S.C. 210, 212, 437 S.E.2d 120, 121 (Ct. App. 1993).
7. However,
Respondent should be reminded that the purpose of the statutory prohibition
against selling alcohol to underage individuals is to protect both the underage
individuals and the public at large from the possible adverse consequences of
such sales. The sale of alcohol to an underage individual is a serious offense
and cannot be taken lightly. Further, it should be noted that a permit to sell
beer and wine is neither a contract nor a property right. Rather, it is merely
a permit to do what otherwise would be unlawful to do, and to be enjoyed only
so long as the restrictions and conditions governing its continuance are
complied with. Feldman v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22
(1943). Accordingly, beyond satisfying the penalty imposed in this matter,
Respondent is advised to make every effort to prevent such sales in the future,
as the failure to do so may subject it to more severe penalties in the event of
a future violation.
ORDER
Based
upon the Stipulated Facts, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law stated
above,
IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for Respondent’s fourth violation against its beer
and wine permit within three years, the Department shall SUSPEND Respondent’s off-premises beer and wine permit for its Cherokee Trail Outdoor
Center located at 700 West Greenwood Street in Abbeville, South Carolina, for a
period of forty-five (45) days.
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order,
Respondent must secure training for its employees in sales of alcoholic
beverages under one of the training programs recognized by the Department. See S.C. Information Letter 06-5 (2006) (listing five recognized training programs
for alcoholic beverage sales).
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
JOHN D.
GEATHERS
Administrative
Law Judge
1205 Pendleton
Street, Suite 224
Columbia, South
Carolina 29201-3731
April 17, 2006
Columbia, South Carolina |