ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
The
above-captioned case is before this Court pursuant to 25A S.C. Code Ann. Regs.
63-322(D) (Supp. 2005) upon the request of Petitioner Evelyn Allen for a
contested case hearing to challenge the decision of Respondent South Carolina
Department of Transportation (Department) to deny her certain relocation
assistance benefits. After timely notice to the parties, a hearing of this
matter was held on November 10, 2005, at the South Carolina Administrative Law
Court in Columbia, South Carolina. Based upon the evidence presented at that
hearing and upon the applicable law, I find that the Department properly denied
Petitioner’s request for additional relocation assistance benefits.
FINDINGS
OF FACT
Having
carefully considered all testimony, exhibits, and arguments presented at the
hearing of this matter, and taking into account the credibility and accuracy of
the evidence, I make the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the
evidence:
1. Prior
to mid-2004, Petitioner Evelyn Allen was the owner of real property located at
1364 Persimmon Ridge Road in North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. The property
was acquired by the Department pursuant to a condemnation action as part of a
highway improvement project to construct the North Myrtle Beach Connector. The
property in question had been improved with a mobile home that Petitioner used
seasonally as a vacation home.
2. In
acquiring the real property, the Department paid Petitioner just compensation
for the property in the amount of $25,650, by a check dated July 9, 2004.
3. Additionally,
the Department made two payments of relocation assistance benefits, totaling
$15,811, to Petitioner. First, on September 21, 2004, the Department paid
Petitioner $14,461 to purchase her single-wide mobile home pursuant to a pilot
program in which such payment was made in lieu of reimbursement for costs that
would be incurred in moving that mobile home to a new site. Second, on
November 30, 2004, the Department paid Petitioner $1,350 in relocation benefits
for the cost of moving Petitioner’s personal property from the mobile home.
4. The
pilot program used by the Department to purchase Petitioner’s mobile home was
approved by the Federal Highway Administration on March 29, 2004. The program
authorized the Department to purchase certain mobile homes that were required
to be moved as a result of the North Myrtle Beach Connector project. Under the
pilot program, in situations where a mobile home could not be relocated, the
mobile home could be purchased from the owner at its fair market value at the
option of the mobile home owner. See Resp’t Ex. #9.
5. Petitioner
did not occupy the mobile home at 1364 Persimmon Ridge Road as her primary
residence for the 180 days preceding January 2, 2004, the date on which the Department
initiated certain negotiations with Petitioner regarding the relocation of her
mobile home. Rather, her primary residence and domicile was, and continues to
be, in Smithfield, North Carolina, where she lives with her family and works in
the family mobile home business. Petitioner used the
mobile home seasonally as a weekend retreat and vacation destination and
planned to live there after she retired.
6. While
the Department paid Petitioner certain relocation assistance benefits, it did
not provide her with replacement housing benefits, because it concluded that
she was not a displaced “owner-occupant” of the mobile home and thus was not
eligible to receive replacement housing payments under the applicable federal
regulations. Accordingly, the Department did not conduct an analysis of the
comparable replacement housing for Petitioner’s mobile home available on the
market.
7. Petitioner
contends that a representative of the Department, Steven Imas, told her she was
entitled to, and would receive, relocation benefits to cover moving and set-up
costs related to moving a new mobile home she purchased in North Carolina to a
lot she purchased in North Myrtle Beach. And, Petitioner has submitted a claim
for $15,024 to the Department for those costs. The claim is derived from an
estimate prepared by her son-in-law, which lists the costs to move a
double-wide mobile home from Smithfield, North Carolina, to her lot in the
North Pointe development in Little River, South Carolina; to set up the mobile
home and hook up its utilities; and to construct a brick foundation, three
decks, and a cement driveway for the home.
8. Mr.
Imas was employed as a real estate representative for Earth Tech, Inc., a
contractor hired by the Department to provide relocation advisory services
related to the North Myrtle Beach Connector project. In providing these
services, Mr. Imas was responsible for advising Petitioner and other displaced
individuals as to what benefits were available to them under the federal
regulations and for assisting them in making claims for those benefits. In his
advisory role, Mr. Imas did not have the authority to grant or promise benefits
on behalf of the Department. And, in particular, he had no authority to bind
the Department to pay benefits beyond those that are authorized by state and
federal law. Further, it was apparent from the course of his dealings with
Petitioner, in which he requested approval for benefits from the Department and
awaited the Department’s decision on his requests, that he did not hold himself
out to Petitioner as possessing such authority. Therefore, Petitioner could
not have justifiably relied upon any statement made by Mr. Imas as an assurance
that the Department would pay Petitioner benefits for moving a new mobile from
North Carolina to Myrtle Beach and setting it up.
9. In
sum, while Mr. Imas did request benefits from the Department on behalf of
Petitioner for moving a new mobile home from North Carolina, it is evident from
both the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Sue Hart, and the contemporaneous
communication log kept by Mr. Imas that no affirmative decision concerning
those benefits was ever conveyed to Petitioner.
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
Based
upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of
law:
Jurisdiction
and General Principles
1. This
Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 25A S.C. Code Ann. Regs.
63-322(D) (Supp. 2005), S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(B) (Supp. 2005), and S.C.
Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310 et seq. (2005).
2. Under
S.C. Code Ann. § 28-11-10 (1991), the Department is required to make relocation
payments and assistance available to persons displaced by its projects pursuant
to the requirements for such benefits set forth in federal law. These federal
requirements for relocation assistance benefits are found at 49 C.F.R. Part 24
(2005).
3. In
this matter, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that she is entitled to the additional relocation assistance benefits
she seeks. See Leventis v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control,
340 S.C. 118, 132-33, 530 S.E.2d 643, 651 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the
burden of proof in administrative proceedings generally rests upon the party
asserting the affirmative of an issue); see also 73A C.J.S. Public
Administrative Law and Procedure § 128, at 35 (1983) (“In administrative
proceedings, the general rule is that an applicant for relief, benefits, or a
privilege has the burden of proof, and the burden of proof rests upon one who
files a claim with an administrative agency to establish that required
conditions of eligibility have been met.”).
4. The
weight and credibility assigned to evidence presented at the hearing of a
matter is within the province of the trier of fact. See S.C. Cable
Television Ass’n v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 222, 417
S.E.2d 586, 589 (1992); see also Doe v. Doe, 324 S.C. 492, 502,
478 S.E.2d 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a trial judge, when acting as
finder of fact, “has the authority to determine the weight and credibility of
the evidence before him”). Furthermore, a trial judge who observes a witness
is in the best position to judge the witness’s demeanor and veracity and to
evaluate the credibility of his testimony. See, e.g., Woodall v.
Woodall, 322 S.C. 7, 10, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1996); Wallace v. Milliken
& Co., 300 S.C. 553, 556, 389 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Ct. App. 1990).
Payments
for the Purchase and/or Relocation of Petitioner’s Mobile Home
5. Under
49 C.F.R. § 24.301(a)(2) (2005), a “non-occupant owner” of a mobile home that
is relocated is eligible for reimbursement for the actual costs of moving the
mobile home. Further, pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 24.301(c) (2005), a person who
is required to move personal property from a relocated mobile home is eligible
to be reimbursed for his or her “actual, reasonable and necessary moving
expenses” incurred in moving the personal property from the home.
6. In
the case at hand, the Department provided Petitioner with relocation assistance
benefits under both of these provisions. First, the Department paid Petitioner
$14,461 to acquire her mobile home. The payment was made pursuant to a pilot
program, which, as noted above, authorized the Department to purchase certain
mobile homes that could not easily be relocated, rather than merely providing
reimbursement for the costs incurred in moving such mobile homes to new
locations. Second, the Department paid Petitioner $1,350 to reimburse her for
the costs incurred in moving her personal property from the mobile home. Taken
together, these two payments satisfied the Department’s obligation to reimburse
Petitioner for certain moving and related expenses under 49 C.F.R. § 24.301.
Petitioner’s
Eligibility for Replacement Housing Benefits
7. While
Petitioner does not dispute that the Department’s payments adequately
compensated her for the value of the mobile home and for the cost of moving her
personal property, she further contends that she should receive additional
relocation benefits from the Department to compensate her for the cost of
moving a new mobile home to the Myrtle Beach area. In essence, Petitioner
seeks replacement housing benefits.
8. Pursuant
to 49 C.F.R. § 24.502(a) (2005), an “owner-occupant” that is displaced from a
mobile home by a project is entitled to a replacement housing payment if, among
other things, “[t]he person occupied the mobile home on the displacement
site for at least 180 days immediately before . . . [t]he initiation of
negotiations to acquire the mobile home site if the mobile home is personal
property, but the person owns the mobile home site.” Id. (emphasis
added). The general provisions related to replacement housing payments
similarly require that a displaced person can only receive a replacement
housing payment if the person “[h]as actually owned and occupied the
displacement dwelling for not less than 180 days prior to the initiation of
negotiations.” See 49 C.F.R. § 24.401(a)(1) (2005) (emphasis added). A
sharply reduced replacement housing payment is available under both the
mobile-home-specific regulations and the general replacement housing
provisions, but this reduced payment is still only available to persons who
have occupied the dwelling in question for at least 90 days prior to the
initiation of negotiations. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 24.402(a)(1) (2005),
24.503(a) (2005).
9. In
the case at hand, while Petitioner owned the mobile home during the relevant
period prior to the initiation of negotiations for the purchase of her
property, she did not actually occupy the home for either a 180-day
period or a 90-day period prior to those negotiations. That is, Petitioner did
not make her primary residence at her Myrtle Beach mobile home prior to the
institution of negotiations with the Department. Instead, she used the
home only occasionally, as a vacation retreat. Therefore, although Petitioner
is a “displaced person” entitled to certain relocation assistance benefits to
cover the costs of moving her personal property, see 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(9)
(2005), she is not a displaced “occupant” of property who has been dislocated
from her primary residence and who would be entitled to replacement housing
payments under the federal regulations, see 49 C.F.R. §§ 24.401, 24.402,
24.502, 24.503.
Promissory
Estoppel
10. Further,
Petitioner contends that the Department should compensate her for the costs of
relocating her new mobile home to Myrtle Beach, because Steve Imas, a
consultant providing relocation advisory services on behalf of the Department,
had promised her that she would receive such benefits. However, as noted
above, the evidence does not support Petitioner’s contention that such a
promise was made. Rather, at best, the evidence indicates that there was some
confusion or uncertainty as to whether any additional benefits could be paid to
Petitioner and that Mr. Imas merely sought to assist her in seeking any
benefits that might be available to her.
11. Moreover,
to the extent Petitioner’s contentions raise a promissory estoppel claim, it is
generally recognized that, while “a governmental body is not immune from the
estoppel doctrine where its officers or agents act within the proper scope of
their authority . . . [,] ‘[t]he public cannot be estopped . . . by the
unauthorized or erroneous conduct or statements of its officers or agents.” Serv.
Mgmt., Inc. v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 298 S.C. 234, 238,
379 S.E.2d 442, 444 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting S.C. Coastal Council v. Vogel,
292 S.C. 449, 453, 357 S.E.2d 187, 189 (Ct. App. 1987)) (second omission in
original). In the case at hand, Mr. Imas did not have the actual, or even
apparent, authority to bind the Department to pay Petitioner relocation
assistance benefits to move and set-up her new mobile home—benefits to which
she is not entitled under the applicable federal regulations. Accordingly,
Petitioner’s promissory estoppel claim must fail.
ORDER
Based
upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law stated above,
IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department’s decision to deny Petitioner’s
request for additional relocation assistance benefits beyond the $15,811
previously awarded by the Department is proper and must be SUSTAINED.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
JOHN D.
GEATHERS
Administrative
Law Judge
1205 Pendleton
Street, Suite 224
Columbia, South
Carolina 29201-3731
January 13, 2006
Columbia, South Carolina
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