ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division)
pursuant to the appeal of Calvin Hankins, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of
Corrections (DOC or Department). Hankins was convicted of violating SCDC Disciplinary
Code § 1.08, Riot. As a result of his conviction, Hankins lost on hundred seventy (170) days of
“good-time” credit. Hankins filed a grievance with the Department and received the
Department’s final decision on November 13, 2001. On November 28, 2001, Hankins filed this
appeal with the Division.
BACKGROUND
On October 1, 2001, Associate Warden Dunlap, a DOC employee, was working in
Kershaw Correction Institution. Several inmates refused to leave the recreation yard, demanding
that they see the Warden. The Appellant specifically refused several directives to exit the yard
stating at one point the phrase “all the way” in support of the inmates’ actions. The Appellant
along with the other inmates later entered the A pod where they acquired objects such as, chairs
and mop sticks, to be used as weapons. Several other inmates began setting fires on the “pod”
and barricading themselves into the A pod. The Appellant helped other inmates shatter the glass
of the A pod recreation door. After the incident, Associate Warden Dunlap completed an
Incident Report. The Appellant was charged with violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.08,
Riot. He received written notice of the charges on October 3, 2001.
A Major Disciplinary Hearing was held on October 9, 2001, before a Disciplinary
Hearing Officer (DHO) concerning the Riot charge. At the Appellant’s request, he was provided
a counsel substitute. Additionally, the Appellant initially requested that Associate Warden
Dunlap be present at the hearing. However, at the hearing the Appellant requested that
Associate Warden Dunlap not be present at the hearing. During the hearing, the DHO read a
narrative of Associate Warden Dunlap’s Incident Report into the record as evidence. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the DHO found that the Appellant was guilty of Riot and sanctioned
him with the loss of 170 days of good time credit. After the hearing, the DHO completed a
Major Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record, which documented the DHO’s findings based on
the record.
The Appellant filed a grievance on October 12, 2001, appealing his conviction of
violating SCDC 1.08. After reviewing his allegation, the Warden denied the Appellant’s
grievance on October 19, 2001, finding that there were no procedural errors in the offense
charged or his hearing. After he appealed the Warden’s decision, the Department denied his
grievance, stating that the evidence supported the conviction and that the sanction imposed was
appropriate for the violation that the Appellant committed. This appeal followed.
In his Appeal Brief, the Appellant alleges that he was denied due process because there
was no evidence to support the DHO’s decision. The Appellant also contends that the evidence
did not support the finding of guilt.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Division’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). In
McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP (September 5,
2001), the Division issued an En Banc Order interpreting the breadth of its jurisdiction pursuant
to Al-Shabazz. The decision holds that the Division’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is
limited to two types of cases: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have
erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in
which the Department has taken an inmate’s created liberty interest as punishment in a major
disciplinary hearing.
In this case, the Appellant alleges that the Department excessively revoked one hundred
seventy (170) days of good time. Inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned
statutory good-time credits under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the
Department revokes an inmate’s good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary
hearing” involving “more serious rule violations,” prison officials must provide that inmate with
“minimal due process.” Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 370, 527 S.E.2d at 750. Consequently, specific
administrative procedures must be followed before depriving an inmate of statutorily granted
earned credit, including adequate advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a
hearing in which the inmate can present witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial
hearing officer who prepares a written statement of all the evidence presented and the reasons for
his decision. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 751, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72,
94 S. Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974).
In Al-Shabazz, the Court held that inmates may seek review before this Division to
ensure that the Department’s revocation of good-time credits as punishment in “major
disciplinary hearings” involving “more serious rule violations” comports with “minimal due
process.” The ALJD inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the
Department has granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional
rights are implicated. Id. When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance
matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz Consequently, the review in these
inmate grievance cases is limited to the record presented. Furthermore, an Administrative Law
Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency unless the agency’s determination is
arbitrary, affected by error of law, or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence in the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (1986 & Supp.
2000); Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 380, 527 S.E.2d at 756. “‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere
scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence
which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion
that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action.” Lark
v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981). Furthermore, the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding
from being supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 319 S.C.
348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally, in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 105 S. Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the relevant question is
whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.” Moreover, in Al-Shabazz the Court underscored that since prison officials
are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore this
Division adhere to a “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures
when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757;
see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off”
approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
DISCUSSION
I find that the Appellant was afforded all process due him pursuant to Al-Shabazz. The
record indicates that the Appellant received written notice of the charges against him in excess of
twenty-four (24) hours prior to a hearing that was held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing
Officer. At the hearing, the Appellant was given the opportunity to offer evidence, call
witnesses, and confront his accuser. In fact, his counsel substitute specifically questioned
Associate Warden Dunlap concerning her viewpoint and whether she needed and was wearing
her glasses. In addition, although not constitutionally required, the Appellant was afforded a
counsel substitute who assisted him in his defense. After the DHO determined that the Appellant
was guilty of the charged offense, he prepared a written report detailing the evidence he relied
upon and the penalty assessed in finding the Appellant guilty of the disciplinary infraction.
Finally, the Appellant was permitted to appeal the DHO’s decision through the inmate grievance
process.
Moreover, I find that there is substantial evidence to support the Appellant's conviction
of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.08, Riot. A Code § 1.08 violation is: “When an
inmate, with two or more persons, intentionally participates in conduct that creates danger of
damage or injury to property or persons and substantially obstructs the performance of unit
operations or institutional operations.” Associate Warden Dunlap’s version of what occurred
was vastly different from that of the Appellant. The record clearly supports the facts recited in
the “Background” portion of this Order. Those facts establish sufficient evidence to support the
Department’s determination that the Appellant participated with several inmates in actions that
violated SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.08. Furthermore, “[t]he fact finder is imbued with broad
discretion in determining credibility or believability of witnesses.” Small v. Pioneer Machinery,
Inc., 329 S.C. 448, 465, 494 S.E.2d 835, 843 (1998). Therefore, it was the DHO’s prerogative to
decide what part of each witness’ testimony he believed or disbelieved.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and
the Final Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph K. Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
March 31, 2003
Columbia, South Carolina |
