ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This
matter is before the Court upon a request for a contested case hearing filed by
Petitioner (Taxpayer) pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-460 (Supp. 2004).
There are two issues presented in this matter. The first issue is whether
certain monies received by Taxpayer in 1999 are subject to state income taxes.
The second issue is whether Taxpayer should be compelled to pay a monetary
penalty to Respondent South Carolina Department of Revenue (Department)
pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-43(J) (2000) because his objections to his
1999 income tax liability are frivolous. After timely notice to the parties, a
hearing of this case was held at the South Carolina Administrative Law Court in
Columbia, South Carolina, on May 17, 2005. Based upon the evidence presented
and arguments made at that hearing, and upon the applicable law, I find that
certain monies received by Taxpayer in 1999 are income subject to state income
taxes and that Taxpayer must pay a monetary penalty to the Department because
he has taken a frivolous position in this matter.
FINDINGS
OF FACT
Having
carefully considered all testimony, exhibits, and arguments presented at the
hearing of this case, and taking into account the credibility and accuracy of
the evidence, I make the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the
evidence:
1. Taxpayer
filed a timely 1999 South Carolina income tax return. The return indicated
that Taxpayer had zero federal taxable income, zero South Carolina taxable
income, zero South Carolina withholdings, and zero South Carolina tax liability.
2. After
Taxpayer filed his South Carolina return, the Department received a Revenue Agent
Report (RAR) from the federal Internal Revenue Service (IRS). That report
stated that Taxpayer received the following monies from the following sources
during the 1999 tax year:
Rollings
Leasing Corporation $ 3,617
Ruan
Leasing Company $ 4,985
Fruehauf
Trailer Service $ 6,671
UPS
Truck Leasing $ 3,007
Thomas
& Howard Company $ 1,374
Gambling
Winnings $ 8,000
Total: $27,654
3. The
Department issued a proposed income tax assessment to Taxpayer for the 1999 tax
year based on the amounts reported in the RAR. The amount of the proposed
assessment was as follows:
Tax $1,009.00
Interest $
284.40
Total: $1,293.40
The interest
identified in the proposed assessment has continued to accrue since the
issuance of the proposed assessment, and will accrue until the proposed
assessment is paid.
4. Taxpayer
timely protested the proposed assessment. While pursuing his protest with the
Department, Taxpayer did not deny that he received the amounts specified in the
RAR. Rather, he raised a number of objections to the taxation of any amounts
of money he received during 1999. The gravamen of these objections is that the
federal government lacks the constitutional and statutory authority to impose a
tax upon his income.
5. On
September 8, 2004, the Department issued a Final Agency Determination in which
it affirmed the proposed assessment and additionally assessed a $500 penalty
upon Taxpayer on the ground that his “zero return” was a frivolous filing.
Taxpayer timely filed a request for a contested case before this Court to challenge
the Department’s Final Agency Determination.
6. On
December 21, 2004, the Department propounded Requests for Admissions to
Taxpayer pursuant to ALC Rule 21 and Rule 36, SCRCP. These requests asked
Taxpayer to admit or deny that he received the monetary amounts identified in
the IRS Revenue Agent Report. The requests did not deem the amounts received
as taxable income, but rather simply asked whether Taxpayer had received the
specific dollar amounts from the various identified entities. However, as
Taxpayer’s response to the requests failed to admit or deny whether he received
such amounts, but instead challenged the taxability of his income, this Court
deemed the Department’s Requests for Admissions to be admitted pursuant to Rule
36(a), SCRCP, by an Order dated April 6, 2005. See Resp’t Ex. #1, #2.
7. In
the proceedings before this Court, Taxpayer primarily focused his objections to
the state taxation of his 1999 income on three arguments: first, that the
federal government does not have the authority to impose a direct,
non-apportioned income tax upon individuals; second, that the term “income” as
used in the Internal Revenue Code does not apply the monies he received during
1999; and third, that the Department’s proposed assessment is invalid because
it was based upon information fraudulently provided by an IRS agent. See
Pet’r Preliminary Tax Statement (filed Dec. 21, 2004); Pet’r First Exchange of
Evidence and Foundation for Documents (filed Jan. 18, 2005).
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
Based
upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of
law:
Taxability of
Taxpayer’s Income
As
noted above, Taxpayer essentially raises three arguments to support his
contention that the Department is prohibited from assessing an income tax upon
the monies he received in 1999. These arguments center around the authority of
the federal government to impose an income tax upon individuals. However, as
discussed below, these arguments are without merit, and Taxpayer’s 1999 income
is subject to taxation in South Carolina.
The
South Carolina Income Tax Act (Act), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-6-10 et seq.
(2000 & Supp. 2004), imposes a tax upon the income of individuals residing
in or having certain connections with the State of South Carolina. See
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-510(A) (2000). The Act directly and plainly states that
[f]or taxable years
beginning after 1994, a tax is imposed on the South Carolina taxable income
of individuals, estates, and trusts and any other entity except those taxed
or exempted from taxation under Sections 12-6-530 through 12-6-550 . . . .
Id.
(emphasis added). In order to compute a resident individual’s taxable South
Carolina income, as well as the gross income and adjusted gross income used to
arrive at that taxable income figure, the Act adopts, with certain
modifications, the mechanisms for making such calculations set forth in the
federal Internal Revenue Code. See S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-560 (2000) (“A
resident individual’s South Carolina gross income, adjusted gross income, and
taxable income is computed as determined under the Internal Revenue Code with
the modifications provided in Article 9 of this chapter and subject to
allocation and apportionment as provided in Article 17 of this chapter.”); S.C.
Code Ann. § 12-6-1110 (2000) (same). Under the Internal Revenue Code, an
individual’s “gross income” includes “all income from whatever source derived,”
I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000), and his or her “taxable income” is simply the amount
remaining after certain specified deductions have been subtracted from that
gross income, I.R.C. § 63(a) (2000).
In
the case at hand, the compensation for services and gambling winnings received
by Taxpayer in 1999 fall within the definition of gross income provided in the
Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (defining “gross income”
as including “[c]ompensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe
benefits, and similar items”); McClanahan v. United States, 292 F.2d
630, 631 (5th Cir. 1961) (“This Court has long since held that gambling
winnings of the type here involved are includable in gross income and that
gambling losses, to the extent permitted by statute, are deductions.”)
(citation omitted); Lutz v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1446, ____ (2002)
(“Gross income includes all income from whatever source derived, including
gambling.”). And, as these amounts are not, on their face, subject to
deduction from that gross income, these monies constitute taxable income under
the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 63(a). Accordingly, these funds also
constitute Taxpayer’s 1999 taxable income for the purpose of South Carolina’s
income taxes. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-6-560, 12-6-1110. Therefore, based upon
the definitions of gross and taxable income provided in the Internal Revenue
Code and incorporated into the South Carolina Income Tax Act, the funds
received by Taxpayer in tax year 1999, as itemized in Finding of Fact # 2, are
taxable South Carolina income upon which Taxpayer must pay the appropriate
income tax. The Department has calculated that tax to be $1,009.00, plus
interest.
In
his objections to these taxes, Taxpayer does not contest the accuracy of the
Department’s calculations, but rather, he challenges the Department’s authority
to assess income taxes upon him in the first instance. These objections are,
however, essentially groundless. First, a number of Taxpayer’s objections
relate to the power of the federal government under the Sixteenth Amendment to
impose a direct, non-apportioned income tax upon individuals. These arguments
are not only baseless, but are also irrelevant to the case at hand, in which
the taxation power of the State of South Carolina, not the federal government,
is at issue. Regardless of whether the federal government has the authority to
impose an income tax upon the income received by Taxpayer in 1999, the state
clearly has such power, which it has validly exercised through the South
Carolina Income Tax Act. See, e.g., State v. Charron, 351 S.C.
319, 323, 569 S.E.2d 388, 390 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that “the General
Assembly may enact any law not expressly or by clear implication, prohibited by
the State or Federal Constitution” and that “there is no state or federal
constitutional provision prohibiting the South Carolina General Assembly from
levying an income tax”). That is, while the state has adopted portions of the
Internal Revenue Code for definitional and computational purposes, the state’s
power to impose an income tax is not dependent upon the authority of the
federal government to impose such a tax and the taxes imposed by the state are
not derivative of the taxes imposed by the federal government.
Second,
Taxpayer contends that the monies he received in 1999 are not “income” under
the Internal Revenue Code, because that term can only be properly construed as
applying to corporate income. As discussed above, the income received by
Taxpayer in 1999 falls squarely within the definitions of “gross income” and
“taxable income” set forth in the Internal Revenue Code and adopted as the
mechanism for computing South Carolina taxable income. Moreover, a number of
courts have flatly rejected as frivolous the argument that term “income” as
used in the Internal Revenue Code does not include the income of individuals. See,
e.g., Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir.
1990) (characterizing such arguments as “completely lacking in legal merit and
patently frivolous”); Biermann v. Comm’r, 769 F.2d 707, 708 (11th Cir.
1985) (stating that arguments like that made by Taxpayer “are patently frivolous,
have been rejected by courts at all levels of the judiciary, and, therefore,
warrant no further discussion”).
Finally,
Taxpayer contends that the Department’s proposed assessment of an income tax
upon his 1999 income was improper because it was based upon information from an
IRS Revenue Agent Report, which he contends was a fraud perpetrated by an IRS
Agent. This argument is misplaced. Regardless of how the Department learned
of the income Taxpayer received in 1999, the fact remains that Taxpayer has
South Carolina income tax liability for that income and the Department is
entitled to issue a proposed assessment for that liability. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 12-60-410 et seq. (Supp. 2004). In short, while there is no
evidence to suggest that the Revenue Agent Report was fraudulent, even if that
report were improperly issued, Taxpayer would not escape liability for income
tax upon the income he actually received in 1999. As noted above, the state’s
authority to impose and collect income taxes is not dependent upon the taxation
authority or collection actions of the federal government.
In
sum, I find that the income received by Taxpayer as payment for services
rendered and as gambling winnings during the 1999 tax year is subject to income
taxation by the State of South Carolina for that year.
Frivolous
Filing Penalty
Because
Taxpayer’s position in these proceedings is wholly without merit, I further
find that a frivolous filing penalty should be assessed against Taxpayer
pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-43(J) (2000). That section provides that
[w]henever it
appears to an administrative law judge that proceedings before him have been
instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay or that the
taxpayer’s position is frivolous or groundless, damages in an amount not to
exceed five thousand dollars must be awarded to the State in the administrative
law judge’s decision. These damages must be assessed at the same time as the
deficiency, paid upon notice and demand from the department, and collected as a
part of the tax.
Id. A
“frivolous” argument is one that entirely lacks a legal basis or legal merit. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 677-78 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “frivolous,” “frivolous
appeal,” and “frivolous suit”); cf. Kahn v. United States, 753
F.2d 1208, 1214 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a claim that no federal income tax
is owed is frivolous if “there is no argument on either the law or the facts to
support it”).
In
the instant case, Taxpayer’s position that his 1999 income is not subject to
taxation by the State of South Carolina is wholly without legal merit and,
thus, frivolous. Taxpayer’s arguments are primarily based upon citations to
and quotations from a number of federal court decisions. However, most of the
cited cases are outdated and irrelevant to the issues in the instant matter and
most of the quotations used by Taxpayer are taken out of context and
misconstrue the holdings of those cases. Further, on cross examination,
Taxpayer admitted that he had not, in fact, read any of the cases he cited in
support of his position. Moreover, other courts that have addressed arguments
similar to those made by Taxpayer have noted that those arguments “are patently
frivolous, have been rejected by courts at all levels of the judiciary, and,
therefore, warrant no further discussion.” Biermann, 769 F.2d at 708.
However, despite the frivolous and groundless nature of Taxpayer’s position in
this matter, this Court declines to award the Department the entirety of its
costs and expenses in this case, a total of some $2,118.07. Rather, this
tribunal recognizes that Taxpayer may not have the legal sophistication to
appreciate the full extent of the complexities of this tax matter,
and therefore limits the monetary penalty imposed upon Taxpayer to the
Department’s customary $500 penalty for frivolous filings.
ORDER
Based
upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law stated above,
IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department’s proposed assessment of an income
tax upon Taxpayer for the income he received in the 1999 tax year is SUSTAINED.
Taxpayer is therefore liable to the Department for income taxes of $1,009.00,
plus applicable interest, for tax year 1999.
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as Taxpayer’s position in this contested case
matter is frivolous, Taxpayer is additionally liable to the Department for a
$500 monetary penalty pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-43(J) (2000).
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
JOHN D.
GEATHERS
Administrative
Law Judge
Post Office Box
11667
Columbia, South
Carolina 29211-1667
June 22, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina |