ORDERS:
ORDER OF REMAND
GRIEVANCE NO. LEE 9275-03
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
In
the above-captioned matter, Appellant Joseph Chestnut appeals the decision of
Respondent South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to revoke
785 days of his “good-time” credit and temporarily suspend his telephone privileges
as punishment for taking hostages in violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.11.
Having reviewed the record, the applicable law, and the briefs filed by the
parties in this matter, I conclude that this matter must be remanded to the
Department for a new evidentiary hearing.
BACKGROUND
On
October 29, 2003, two corrections officers at the Lee Correctional Institution
were taken hostage during an inmate riot. In a brief incident report filed on
October 30, 2003, Captain Arenda Thomas stated that Appellant was “observed and
videotaped” making threats and demands during the hostage situation. As a
result of this report, Appellant was charged with violating DOC Disciplinary
Code § 1.11, Hostage Taking.
Appellant
was notified of the charge against him on October 3, 2003, and a hearing on the
charge was held before a DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) on October 5,
2003. At the hearing, the incident report filed by Captain Thomas was read
into the record and Captain Thomas was present to confirm the details of her
report. However, the testimony of Captain Thomas at the hearing consisted only
of three words: “yes,” her report was true and correct; “yes,” she positively
identified Appellant as a participant in the hostage taking situation; and
“no,” she did not have any additional statements to make. In his testimony at
the hearing, Appellant acknowledged that he was caught up in the hostage
situation, but he further contended that the only actions he took were to
secure bandages, gauze, and other first aid items for, and at the request of,
the injured corrections officers who were held hostage by other inmates.
Appellant’s counsel substitute attempted to secure statements from the two
officers who were taken hostage to confirm Appellant’s testimony, but the two
officers were on leave as a result of the hostage incident, and thus were not
available to be interviewed or to testify at the disciplinary hearing.
At
the close of the hearing, the DHO found Appellant guilty of the charge against
him and prepared a written report containing his findings. As punishment for
the offense, the DHO revoked 785 days of Appellant’s good-time credit and
suspended his telephone privileges for 45 days. Appellant appealed his
disciplinary conviction to the Department and then to this Court. On appeal,
Appellant contends that his disciplinary conviction was obtained in violation
of his due process rights because he was not allowed to present exculpatory
testimony from the two officers who were taken hostage.
DISCUSSION
This
appeal is before this Court pursuant to Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C.
354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000), Sullivan v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, 355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124 (2003), and Slezak v. South
Carolina Department of Corrections, 361 S.C. 327, 605 S.E.2d 506 (2004).
Having carefully reviewed the record in this matter under the due process
standards set out in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), Al-Shabazz
v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000), and their progeny, I find
that Appellant’s disciplinary conviction must be reversed and this matter
remanded to the Department for a new evidentiary hearing. The evidence
presented at the disciplinary hearing is simply insufficient to support
Appellant’s conviction. The incident report and testimony provided by Captain
Thomas—the sole evidence presented against Appellant at the disciplinary
hearing—merely state, in conclusory terms, that Appellant was identified as
participating in the hostage situation. It does not appear from the terms of
the incident report or from the transcript of the hearing that Captain Thomas
actually heard Appellant making threats or demands or witnessed Appellant
taking actions of a threatening nature, nor does it appear that Captain Thomas
spoke to any individuals who heard such threats or witnessed such actions.
There are no specific facts or details provided in Captain Thomas’ brief
statements indicating what led her to conclude that Appellant was an active
participant in the hostage taking, rather than a bystander caught-up in the
incident, who was merely attempting to secure first aid supplies for the
injured officers. In short, while Captain Thomas, or other officers, may have
witnessed Appellant taking actions or making statements that would establish
his guilt in this matter, no statements or testimony to such an effect were
produced at Appellant’s disciplinary hearing.
Due
to the paucity of the facts articulated in the record to support Appellant’s
disciplinary conviction, this matter must be remanded to the Department for a
new evidentiary hearing. The disciplinary offense allegedly committed by
Appellant is one of great weight and magnitude that both Appellant and the
Department should have an interest in seeing accurately adjudicated. It is not
a matter that should be prosecuted lightly, nor is it a matter that should be
lightly reversed on appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to this Order, the
Department must conduct a new disciplinary hearing on the hostage taking charge
against Appellant, in which specific evidence of Appellant’s involvement in the
hostage situation, offered by relevant witnesses, is presented to the hearing
officer.
ORDER
For
the reasons set forth above,
IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant’s October 5, 2003 disciplinary conviction
for hostage taking is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED to the
Department for a new evidentiary hearing. This hearing must be held within
ninety (90) days of the date of this Order.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
JOHN D.
GEATHERS
Administrative
Law Judge
Post Office Box
11667
Columbia, South
Carolina 29211-1667
June 13, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina |
