ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
The
above-captioned case is before this Court pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 9-21-60
(Supp. 2004) for a contested case hearing. Petitioner Beverly Hargrow seeks
review of the November 29, 2004 Final Agency Determination of Respondent South
Carolina Budget and Control Board, South Carolina Retirement Systems (SCRS), in
which SCRS denied her application for state disability retirement benefits
under S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1540 (Supp. 2004). Petitioner contends that, as the
result of injuries she sustained in a serious car accident on May 12, 2004, she
is physically and mentally incapacitated from the further performance of her
job as an elementary school teacher such that she is entitled to disability
retirement benefits from the South Carolina Retirement System. While SCRS
recognizes that Petitioner suffers from certain physical and mental impairments
as a result of her accident, it further contends that these impairments do not
permanently incapacitate her from performing her previous job duties as a
teacher, and thus do not entitle her to disability retirement benefits under
Section 9-1-1540.
After
timely notice to the parties, a hearing of this matter was held on May 3, 2005,
at the South Carolina Administrative Law Court in Columbia, South Carolina.
Based upon the evidence presented at that hearing and upon the applicable legal
standards, I find that Petitioner is permanently, mentally incapacitated from
the further performance of her job as an elementary school teacher such that
she should receive disability retirement benefits from SCRS.
FINDINGS
OF FACT
Having
carefully considered all testimony, exhibits, and arguments presented at the
hearing of this case, and taking into account the credibility and accuracy of
the evidence, I make the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the
evidence:
1. Petitioner
Beverly Hargrow is a sixty-two-year-old woman who was employed as an elementary
school teacher in South Carolina for over twenty-eight years. Most recently,
Petitioner taught third grade at Lambs Elementary School in North Charleston,
South Carolina. Petitioner’s job duties at Lambs Elementary were the job
duties common to any classroom teacher at an elementary school. With regard to
the physical demands of her job, Petitioner was responsible for supervising the
activities of young students and setting up her classroom, a task which
included moving chairs, blackboards, desks, books, computers, and other
classroom supplies. However, Petitioner’s most fundamental job duties were
intellectual, rather than physical, in nature. In that regard, Petitioner was
responsible for the classroom education of elementary school students, which
included not only in-class instruction of the students, but also out-of-class
preparation of lesson plans, class materials, student report cards, and
state-required reports. Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 198, 204-05.
2. On
May 12, 2003, Petitioner was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident that
resulted in significant injuries to her right ankle. Petitioner was
hospitalized for approximately a week after the accident and underwent three
surgeries to repair her fractured ankle in May and June 2003.
In July 2003, Petitioner began physical therapy upon her surgically repaired
ankle, and by August 2003, the condition of her ankle had markedly improved,
although she still reported some swelling in the ankle upon prolonged
ambulation. Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 120, 154-58. During September 2003, Petitioner
began to report pain in her right knee in addition to some lingering pain and
swelling in her ankle. Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 150, 153. As a result of the
injuries she sustained in the accident, Petitioner did not return to work after
May 12, 2003, and was terminated from her employment with the Charleston County
School District on September 28, 2003. Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 190.
3. On
November 21, 2003, Petitioner filed an application for disability retirement
benefits with SCRS, in which she contends that the physical impairments to her
right leg resulting from her injuries in the May 12, 2003 car accident
permanently prevent her from resuming her job as an elementary school teacher.
Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 200-05. While Petitioner’s application and initial request
for reconsideration of her claim restricted her disability claim to her physical
impairments related to her ankle and leg injuries, Petitioner subsequently
raised certain mental impairments, specifically, a severe and debilitating
depression brought on as a result of the auto accident, as a basis for her
disability retirement. Petitioner raised her depression as ground for
disability retirement both in the appeal of her claim to the Director of SCRS
and in the proceedings before this Court, and her psychiatric condition was
considered both by the second disability examiner that reviewed her claim and
by the vocational rehabilitation expert appointed by the Director of SCRS to
review the appeal of the denial of her claim.
4. After
receiving Petitioner’s application, SCRS forwarded her file to the South
Carolina Department of Vocational Rehabilitation for review of her disability
claim. Disability Examiner
Martha Spangler gathered and reviewed Petitioner’s medical file, and, on
February 11, 2004, issued a recommendation to the SCRS Medical Board that
Petitioner’s disability retirement application be denied. In the
recommendation, Ms. Spangler concluded that, although Petitioner was still
recovering from her surgeries and could not work at the time of the review, the
impairments to her right leg were not permanent and she would be able to resume
her duties as a teacher within the year. Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 110-11. On
February 17, 2004, the Medical Board accepted Ms. Spangler’s recommendation and
disapproved Petitioner’s disability application.
5. Petitioner
requested a reconsideration of the Medical Board’s decision, and her file was
sent to a second Disability Examiner at the Department of Vocational
Rehabilitation for additional review. The second Disability Examiner, Jewel
Golden-Wright, collected additional medical documentation regarding
Petitioner’s conditions and ordered several additional tests concerning
Petitioner’s physical and psychiatric conditions.
6. During
this review, Peter Naylor, M.D., of Charleston Psychiatry in Charleston, South
Carolina, conducted an independent psychiatric consultative examination of
Petitioner on June 24, 2004. Dr. Naylor reported that Petitioner complained of
depression marked by sadness, tearfulness, low motivation, poor concentration,
anxiety, and a lack of energy. Based upon his examination, Dr. Naylor found
that Petitioner had a “Mood Disorder NOS” and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and
concluded that Petitioner’s “difficulties with her mood and anxiety would make
it difficult for her to keep up with the demands of being a teacher.” Resp’t
Ex. # 1, at 91. Dr. Naylor further concluded that Petitioner “would have
difficulty with task completion because of her anxiety and depression, as well
as poor concentration,” and recommended that Petitioner “engage in psychiatric
treatment for depression as well as anxiety.” Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 91.
7. The
Disability Examiner also requested a psychological assessment of Petitioner by
Jeffery J. Vidie, Ph.D. In his report filed on July 9, 2004, Dr. Vidie
concluded that Petitioner suffered from a mild affective mood disorder, namely
a “Depressive Dis[order] NOS,” and a mild case of posttraumatic stress disorder.
Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 66, 69, 71. Dr. Vidie further concluded that, while these
conditions did not limit Petitioner’s activities of daily living, Petitioner
did suffer from mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning and in
maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace as a result of her psychiatric
condition. Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 76.
8. As
an additional part of the Disability Examiner’s review of Petitioner’s claim,
Katrina B. Doig, M.D., was asked to conduct a physical residual functional capacity
evaluation of Petitioner. In her report dated July 8, 2004, Dr. Doig concluded
that Petitioner could occasionally lift or carry 20 pounds, frequently lift or
carry 10 pounds, stand or walk for approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour workday,
sit for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, and push or pull without
limitation. Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 81. Dr. Doig further concluded that, while
Petitioner could never climb a ladder, rope, or scaffold, she could
occasionally climb a ramp or stairs and could occasionally balance, stoop,
kneel, and crouch. Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 82.
9. Based
upon these various assessments and Petitioner’s existing medical file, Ms.
Golden-Wright determined that neither Petitioner’s physical impairments nor her
psychiatric problems were severe enough to prevent her from resuming her duties
as an elementary school teacher. Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 55. Accordingly, Ms.
Golden-Wright recommended that the Medical Board deny Petitioner’s application
for disability retirement benefits. Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 55. On July 20, 2004,
the Medical Board accepted Ms. Golden-Wright’s recommendation and again denied
Petitioner’s disability claim.
10. Petitioner
requested an administrative review of the Medical Board’s decision before the
Director of SCRS, Peggy G. Boykin. Ms. Boykin appointed Robert E. Brabham,
Ph.D., an independent vocational rehabilitation consultant, to review
Petitioner’s disability claim. In evaluating Petitioner’s claim, Dr. Brabham
conducted an administrative conference on November 3, 2004, at which Petitioner
and her counsel were present, and reviewed the entire file concerning
Petitioner’s claim, including the documents obtained by the disability
examiners and documents submitted by Petitioner and her counsel. On November
19, 2004, Dr. Brabham issued a report recommending that Petitioner’s request
for disability retirement benefits be denied. In the report, Dr. Brabham found
that, although Petitioner described a very restricted manner of living, “most
of her descriptions as to her limitations were subjective, and little
determinable medical evidence exists to support her allegations,” and thus he
questioned whether Petitioner’s restricted life style “represents a permanent
disability or is a deliberate choice associated with retirement after more than
30 years of teaching school.” Resp’t Ex. # 1, at 6-7. Based upon this report,
Ms. Boykin issued a Final Agency Determination denying Petitioner’s application
for disability retirement benefits from SCRS on November 29, 2004. Petitioner
now seeks review of that determination before this Court.
11. At
the hearing of this case, Petitioner presented statements from two physicians
obtained for her application for long-term disability insurance benefits as
further evidence of the disabling effect of her severe depression. On a report
dated February 14, 2005, Dr. James E. Jenkins, a psychiatrist, diagnosed
Petitioner with “Atypical Depressive Disorder” and concluded that Petitioner
was “unable to work” for the foreseeable future. Pet’r Ex. # 1. On a second
report dated March 16, 2005, Dr. Richard Rhodes, Petitioner’s physician at
Doctor’s Care, who had been treating her for depression, similarly diagnosed
Petitioner with depression and found that she was “totally permanently
disabled” such that she could “never” return to work. Pet’r Ex. # 2, at 2.
Jennie M. Jefferson, a friend and former co-worker of Petitioner, also
testified at the hearing regarding Petitioner’s depression. In her testimony,
Ms. Jefferson described how Petitioner’s accident transformed her from a
vibrant, energetic, and cheerful person to a severely depressed individual who
seems “out of it” and lacks the energy to perform the tasks of daily living.
12. Based
upon the medical evidence and other testimony presented at the hearing, I find
that Petitioner has suffered from serious depression from the time of her first
car accident, that she continues to suffer from such depression, and that this
depression is not likely to significantly improve in the foreseeable future.
Further, I find that the severity of Petitioner’s depression prevents her from
performing the intellectual and mental tasks necessary for her to fulfill the
duties of an elementary school teacher. Every physician that examined
Petitioner’s psychiatric condition determined that she suffered from a
depressive mood disorder that noticeably affected her cognitive functioning,
particularly her ability to concentrate and complete tasks. Consequently, one
psychiatrist, Dr. Naylor, concluded that it would be difficult for Petitioner
to meet the demands of being a teacher, and both Petitioner’s general
physician, Dr. Rhodes, and another psychiatrist, Dr. Jenkins, affirmatively
found that Petitioner was unable to work as a teacher as a result of her severe
depression. Further, during her testimony at the hearing of this case,
Petitioner clearly exhibited the depression-related cognitive and attitudinal
deficits described by the examining physicians. In observing Petitioner at the
hearing and reviewing the medical records in evidence, I find that Petitioner’s
cognitive abilities and concentration have been impaired by her serious
depression such that she is unable to maintain the focus and clarity of thought
necessary for classroom teaching.
13. After
the hearing in this matter, an administrative law judge with the federal Social
Security Administration issued a decision on May 16, 2005, finding that
Petitioner has been disabled since her car accident on May 12, 2003, and that
this disability entitles her to disability insurance benefits under the Social
Security Act.
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
Based
upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of
law:
1. This
tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 9-21-60
(Supp. 2004), S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(B) (Supp. 2004), and S.C. Code Ann. §§
1-23-310 et seq. (2005).
2. S.C.
Code Ann. § 9-1-1540 (Supp. 2004) provides that qualifying members of the South
Carolina Retirement System
may be retired by
the [State Budget and Control] [B]oard not less than thirty days and not more
than nine months next following the date of filing the application on a
disability retirement allowance if the medical board, after a medical
examination of the member, certifies that the member is mentally or
physically incapacitated for the further performance of duty, that the
incapacity is likely to be permanent, and that the member should be retired.
Id.
(emphasis added).
3. In
the case at hand, Petitioner claims that the permanent physical effects of the
injury to her right ankle and her severe and ongoing depression have rendered
her physically and mentally incapacitated for the further performance of her
duty as an elementary school teacher such that she should be entitled to
disability retirement benefits from SCRS.
4. The
weight and credibility assigned to evidence presented at the hearing of a
matter is within the province of the trier of fact. See S.C. Cable
Television Ass’n v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 222, 417
S.E.2d 586, 589 (1992); see also Doe v. Doe, 324 S.C. 492, 502,
478 S.E.2d 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a trial judge, when acting as
finder of fact, “has the authority to determine the weight and credibility of
the evidence before him”). Furthermore, a trial judge who observes a witness
is in the best position to judge the witness’s demeanor and veracity and to
evaluate the credibility of his testimony. See, e.g., Woodall v.
Woodall, 322 S.C. 7, 10, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1996); Wallace v. Milliken
& Co., 300 S.C. 553, 556, 389 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Ct. App. 1990).
5. In
general, “expert opinion evidence is to be considered or weighed by the triers
of the facts like any other testimony or evidence . . . [;] the triers of fact
cannot, and are not required to, arbitrarily or lightly disregard, or
capriciously reject, the testimony of experts or skilled witnesses, and make an
unsupported finding to the contrary of the opinion.” 32A C.J.S. Evidence
§ 727, at 82-83 (1996). However, the trier of fact may give an expert’s testimony
the weight he or she determines it deserves. Florence County Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. v. Ward, 310 S.C. 69, 72-73, 425 S.E.2d 61, 63 (Ct. App. 1992).
Further, the trier of fact may accept the testimony of one expert over that of
another. See S.C. Cable Television Ass’n v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 308 S.C. 216, 417 S.E.2d 586 (1992).
6. In
the case at hand, while Petitioner does have certain physical limitations as a
result of her ankle injury, this physical impairment alone does not prevent her
from performing her prior duties as an elementary school teacher. However,
Petitioner’s injuries have led to a mental impairment, i.e., depression, that
does affect her ability to resume her teaching position. The record reveals
the opinions of two medical doctors who unequivocally concluded that her
depressive mood disorder would preclude her from meeting the intellectual
demands of classroom teaching, and the opinion of a third physician who found
that it would be very difficult for Petitioner to meet such demands because of
her psychiatric condition. Further, Petitioner’s
depression and the resulting impairment to her cognitive abilities are likely
to be permanent. In fact, of the two physicians that opined as to the
potential duration of Petitioner’s condition, one concluded that she was
“totally, permanently disabled,” while the other found that duration of her
depression was “unknown . . . at this time.” Pet’r Ex. # 1, # 2. Moreover, the
conclusions of these medical professionals were confirmed by Petitioner’s
testimony at the hearing of this case, during which the depression and
cognitive deficits recognized by the physicians were evident and the ongoing,
unimproving nature of Petitioner’s depression was apparent.
7. As
the trier of fact in this matter, this tribunal is charged with weighing all of
the evidence presented in this case and with resolving the conflicts in that
evidence, including conflicting opinions between experts. Here, all the
medical and psychological experts who have evaluated Petitioner have concluded
that she suffers from diagnosable anxiety and depressive mood disorders. And,
while some of those experts disagree as to the severity and permanence of those
disorders, I find that the weight of the evidence in this case suggests that Petitioner’s
severe depression as the result of her car accident has mentally incapacitated
her from the further performance of her job duties as an elementary school
teacher and that Petitioner’s depression, which has persisted for the two years
since the accident, is likely to be permanent. See S.C. Code Ann. §
9-1-1540 (Supp. 2004) (not requiring an absolute finding that the applicant’s
disability is permanent, but rather only a finding that the “incapacity is likely
to be permanent” in order for the applicant to receive disability retirement
benefits) (emphasis added). Therefore, I further find that Petitioner’s
application for disability retirement benefits from SCRS should be granted.
ORDER
Based
upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law stated above,
IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that SCRS shall GRANT Petitioner’s application for
disability retirement benefits pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1540 (Supp.
2004).
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
JOHN D.
GEATHERS
Administrative
Law Judge
June 16, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina |
