ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC) pursuant to the appeal of
Carlos Dennison, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections (DOC or
Department). Appellant Dennison was convicted of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 2.01,
The Use, Possession, or Distilling and/or Brewing of any Alcoholic Beverage, after pleading not
guilty to the charge. As a result of his conviction, the Appellant lost sixty (60) days of “good-time” credit. Brown filed a grievance with the Department and received the Department’s final
decision on November 29, 2004. On December 17, 2004, the Appellant filed this appeal with the
Court.
BACKGROUND
On April 16, 2004, Lieutenant Lewis and Sergeant Jefferson searched Appellant’s room
and locker at Ridgeland Correctional Institution. During that search, they found a container in
two green duffle bags in the Appellant’s locker filled with approximately eight to ten gallons of
liquid that smelled like alcohol. Based upon the smell, Lieutenant Lewis and Sergeant Jefferson
determined that the liquid was “homemade wine.” Therefore, Lieutenant Lewis completed an
Incident Report charging the Appellant with violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 2.01. The
Appellant received written notice of the charges on April 20, 2004.
On April 27, 2004, a Major Disciplinary Hearing was held before a Department
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) concerning the Appellant's charge of The Use, Possession,
or Distilling and/or Brewing of any Alcoholic Beverage. At the Appellant’s request, he was
provided a counsel substitute. Additionally, at his request, Lieutenant Lewis was present at the
hearing. During the hearing, the DHO read a narrative of Lieutenant Lewis’ Incident Report into
the Record and received testimony from the Appellant and Lieutenant Lewis as evidence. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the DHO found the Appellant guilty of violating SCDC Disciplinary
Code § 2.01 and sanctioned him with the loss of sixty (60) days of good-time credit. After the
hearing, the DHO completed a Major Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record which
documented the DHO’s findings.
The Appellant filed a grievance appealing his conviction of violating Section 2.01. After
reviewing his allegation, the Warden denied the Appellant’s grievance. He appealed the
Warden’s decision asking that the Department reverse his loss of “good-time” credits. The
Department denied his grievance, stating that the evidence supported the conviction and that the
sanction imposed was appropriate for the violation that the Appellant committed. This
appeal followed. In his Appeal Brief, the Appellant argues that the evidence failed to establish
that he committed the above infraction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000).
The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is limited to state created liberty interests
typically involving: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which an
inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a result of a serious rule
violation. Id.
When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the Court sits
in an appellate capacity. Id. at 756. Consequently, the review in these inmate grievance cases is
limited to the Record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment
for that of an agency “as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2003). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or
modify an agency’s decision unless substantial rights of the Appellant have been prejudiced
because the decision is clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole
Record, arbitrary or affected by an error of law. See Section 1-23-380(A)(6); See also Marietta
Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 337 S.C. 133, 522 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App.
1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503
S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1998). “‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the
evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the
Record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative
agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action.” Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130,
135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Accordingly, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461
S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally, in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 456, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the relevant
question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached
by the disciplinary board.” Moreover, in Al-Shabazz, the Court underscored that since prison
officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore
this tribunal adhere to a “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and
procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz at 757; See also Pruitt
v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of
South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
In this case, the Appellant alleges that the Department should not have revoked his
accrued good time. Inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time
credits under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the Department revokes an
inmate’s good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary hearing” involving “more
serious rule violations,” prison officials must provide that inmate with “minimal due process.”
Al-Shabazz at 750. Consequently, specific administrative procedures must be followed before
depriving an inmate of statutorily granted earned credit, including adequate advance notice of
the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the inmate can present witnesses and
documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing officer who prepares a written statement of all
the evidence presented and the reasons for his decision. Id. at 751 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974)).
DISCUSSION
Due Process
I find that the Appellant was afforded all process due him pursuant to Al-Shabazz. The
Record indicates that the Appellant received written notice of the charges against him in excess
of twenty-four (24) hours prior to a hearing that was held before an impartial Disciplinary
Hearing Officer. At the hearing, the Appellant was given the opportunity to offer evidence, call
witnesses, and confront his accuser. In addition, although not constitutionally required, the
Appellant was afforded a counsel substitute who assisted him in his defense. After the DHO
determined that the Appellant was guilty of the charged offense, he prepared a written report
stating the evidence he relied upon and the penalty assessed in finding the Appellant guilty of the
disciplinary infraction. Finally, as evinced here, the Appellant was permitted to appeal the
DHO’s decision through the inmate grievance process.
Substantial Evidence
The Appellant contends that the evidence did not prove that the homemade wine found
by Lieutenant Lewis and Sergeant Jefferson was in his locker or duffel bag. He also vaguely
challenged whether the bucket could contain ten gallons of liquid. A Code 2.01 violation is:
“The Use, Possession, or Distilling and/or Brewing of any Alcoholic Beverage: Any inmate
acting under the influence, or in possession of alcohol or alcoholic beverage or other substance
which, when ingested, creates altered states of physical or mental activity.”
The Record clearly supports the facts recited in the “Background” portion of this Order.
Furthermore, though the Appellant challenged ownership of the homemade wine, Lieutenant
Lewis specifically testified that the bucket of wine was in the Appellant’s locker and that the
Appellant admitted to owning the bucket when it was found. He also explained that after
discovering the bucket in the Appellant’s locker, he went to the cafeteria and confirmed that the
bucket could contain between eight to ten gallons of liquid.
“The fact finder is imbued with broad discretion in determining credibility or
believability of witnesses.” Small v. Pioneer Machinery, Inc., 329 S.C. 448, 465, 494 S.E.2d
835, 843 (Ct. App. 1997). When viewed in light of the DHO’s discretion, the Record
sufficiently establishes that the Appellant possessed an alcoholic beverage. Accordingly, I find
that there is substantial evidence to support the Appellant's conviction of violating SCDC
Disciplinary Code § 2.01, The Use, Possession, or Distilling and/or Brewing of any Alcoholic
Beverage.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and
the Final Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph King Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
April 20, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina |
