ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or
Court) pursuant to the appeal of McClinton Bass, an inmate incarcerated with
the Department of Corrections (Department or DOC). Bass was convicted of
violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.04, Threatening to Inflict Harm on an
Employee and/or Member of the Public. As a result of his conviction, the
Appellant lost sixty (60) days of “good-time” credit. Inmate Bass filed a
grievance with the Department and received the Department’s final decision on
or about May 11, 2004. On September
2, 2004, Bass filed this appeal with the Court.
BACKGROUND
On
April 8, 2004, Captain Sainyo, a DOC employee, was taking the names of inmates in
a holding cell at Kershaw Correctional Institution. While he was taking those
names, the Appellant told Sergeant Mackey that “if you ever put your
motherf****ing hands on me when I get on the yard you’re a** is completely history.”
Captain Sainyo then asked the Appellant if he had just threatened Sergeant
Mackey and the Appellant responded, “I don’t give a motherf****ing s**t about
what you hear. . . .” Appellant then stated to Captain Sainyo: “Your a** is
gone. When I get on the yard, I will f*** you up.”
Following
the incident, Captain Sainyo completed an Incident Report and submitted it to
his supervisor, Sergeant Fleming. The Appellant was charged with violating
SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.04, Threatening to Inflict Harm on an Employee
and/or Member of the Public. He received written notice of the charges on April
9, 2004.
On
April 14, 2004, a Major Disciplinary Hearing was held before a DOC Disciplinary
Hearing Officer (DHO) concerning the above charges. At the Appellant’s
request, he was provided a counsel substitute during the hearing. Also, the
Appellant requested that his accuser be present at the hearing. During the
hearing, the DHO read a narrative of Captain Sainyo’s Incident Report into the
Record and received testimony from the Appellant and Captain Sainyo. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the DHO found the Appellant guilty of violating SCDC
Disciplinary Code § 1.04, Threatening to Inflict Harm on an Employee and/or
Member of the Public, and sanctioned him with the loss of sixty (60) days of
good time credit. After the hearing, the DHO completed a Major Disciplinary
Report and Hearing Record which documented the DHO’s findings.
The
Appellant filed a grievance with the Department appealing his conviction of
violating Disciplinary Code § 1.04. After reviewing his contentions, the
Warden denied the Appellant’s grievance. The Appellant then appealed the
Warden’s decision and the Department subsequently denied that grievance,
stating that the evidence supported the conviction and that the sanction
imposed was appropriate for the violation that the Appellant committed. This
appeal followed.
In his Appeal
Brief, the Appellant alleges that:
1. His
due process rights were violated because his name was misspelled; and
2. There was not enough evidence
to convict him of Threatening to Inflict Harm on an Employee and/or Member of
the Public.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The
Court’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision
of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C.
354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate
appeals is limited to state created liberty interests typically involving: (1)
cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2)
cases in which an inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary
hearing as a result of a serious rule violation. Id.
When
reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the Court
sits in an appellate capacity. Id. at 756. Consequently, the review in
these inmate grievance cases is limited to the Record presented. An
Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency
“as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1‑23‑380(A)(6)
(Supp. 2003). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or
modify an agency’s decision unless substantial rights of the Appellant have
been prejudiced because the decision is clearly erroneous in view of the
substantial evidence on the whole Record, arbitrary or affected by an error of
law. See Section 1-23-380(A)(6); See also Marietta
Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 337 S.C. 133, 522
S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing and
Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503 S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1998).
“‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence
viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering
the Record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion
that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify
its action.” Lark v. Bi‑Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306
(1981). Accordingly, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from
being supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally,
in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 456, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the
relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Moreover, in Al-Shabazz,
the Court underscored that since prison officials are in the best position to
decide inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore this tribunal
adhere to a “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and
procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz at
757; See also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d
779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina
courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
In this case, the Appellant alleges that the Department
should not have revoked his sixty (60) days of accrued good time. Inmates have
a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the Department revokes an
inmate’s good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary hearing”
involving “more serious rule violations,” prison officials must provide that
inmate with “minimal due process.” Al-Shabazz at 750. Consequently,
specific administrative procedures must be followed before depriving an inmate
of statutorily granted earned credit, including adequate advance notice of the
charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the inmate can present
witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing officer who
prepares a written statement of all the evidence presented and the reasons for
his decision. Id. at 751 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974)).
DISCUSSION
Appellant
argues that his due process rights were violated because his name was
misspelled. The Appellant’s due process rights in this proceeding are
summarized in Al-Shabazz, supra. I find that the Appellant was
afforded all process due him pursuant to Al-Shabazz. The Record
indicates that the Appellant received written notice of the charges against him
in excess of twenty-four (24) hours prior to a hearing that was held before an
impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. At the hearing, the Appellant was
given the opportunity to offer evidence, call witnesses, and confront his
accuser. In addition, although not constitutionally required, the Appellant
was afforded a counsel substitute who assisted him in his defense. After the
DHO determined that the Appellant was guilty of the charged offense, he
prepared a written report detailing the evidence he relied upon and the penalty
assessed in finding the Appellant guilty of the disciplinary infraction. The
Appellant was also permitted to appeal the DHO’s decision through the inmate
grievance process. Finally, the Appellant did not establish that he was
adversely affected by the Department’s incorrect spelling of his name.
I
also find that there is substantial evidence to support the Appellant's
conviction of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.04, Threatening to Inflict
Harm on an Employee and/or Member of the Public. A Code 1.04 violation is:
Communication, verbal or written, by an inmate to an
individual that s/he intends to injure that person or commit a violent or
unlawful act dangerous to human life, presently or in the future; or one who
commits a physical act of a threatening nature, and the probable result of such
threats or action is to place the individual in fear of bodily injury; or one
who causes evacuation of a building; or one who creates serious disruption or
alarm. Any unauthorized body contact of an employee or member of the public
which creates serious alarm, but does not result in bodily injury.
Appellant’s
defense was primarily that he didn’t “recall” what he said to the officers but
that he did not threaten them. Nevertheless, the Record clearly supports the
facts recited in the “Background” portion of this Order. Those facts establish
substantial evidence that the Appellant acting in a threatening manner.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE
ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and the Final
Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;
AND IT IS SO
ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph
K. Anderson, III
Administrative
Law Judge
March 23, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina |