ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or
Court) pursuant to the appeal of Jesse Strickland, an inmate incarcerated with
the Department of Corrections (Department). Strickland was convicted of
violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.10, Use or Possession of Narcotics,
Marijuana or Unauthorized Drugs, Including Prescription Drugs, after pleading
not guilty to the charge. As a result of his conviction, Strickland lost
ninety (90) days of “good-time” credit. Strickland
filed a grievance with the Department and received the Department’s final
decision on June 18, 2004. On July 8, 2004, the Appellant filed this appeal
with the Court.
BACKGROUND
On
January 20, 2004, the Appellant was administered a drug test while housed at
the Kirkland Correctional Institution by Sergeant Floyd base upon reasonable
suspicion. The Appellant tested positive for marijuana or “THC.” Sergeant Floyd
then performed a confirmation test which further corroborated the existence of
marijuana in the Appellant. Thereafter, Sergeant Floyd completed an Incident
Report charging the Appellant with violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.10, Use
or Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana or Unauthorized Drugs. On January 27,
2004, the Appellant was given written notice of the charge of violating SCDC
Code § 1.10 based upon the above incident.
A
hearing was held on January 29, 2004, before a Disciplinary Hearing Officer
(DHO). At the Appellant’s request, he was provided a counsel substitute.
Additionally, the Appellant requested that his accuser, Sergeant Floyd, be
present at the hearing. During the hearing, the DHO read a narrative of
Sergeant Floyd’s Incident Report into the Record and received testimony from
the Appellant and Sergeant Floyd as evidence. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the DHO found the Appellant guilty of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code
§ 1.10 and sanctioned the Appellant with the loss of ninety (90) days of “good
time” credit. After the hearing, the DHO completed a Major Disciplinary Report
and Hearing Record, which documented the DHO’s findings based on the Record.
The
Appellant filed a grievance appealing his conviction of violating SCDC Disciplinary
Code § 1.10. The Warden denied the Appellant’s grievance. After he appealed
the Warden’s decision, the Department denied his grievance. This appeal
followed. In his Appeal Brief, the Appellant alleges that there was
insufficient evidence presented at the hearing to find him guilty of this
charge. In his Appeal Brief, the Appellant alleges that:
1. The
results of the drug test were improperly used against him;
2. He was placed in pre-hearing
detention for thirteen (13) days prior to the hearing in violation of
Department policy; and
3. He
was placed in pre-hearing detention using an out-of-date form.
Though the
Department failed to specifically identify and brief any of these issues, I
nevertheless issue this Order based on the Record and the law.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The Court’s
jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527
S.E.2d 742 (2000). The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is
limited to state created liberty interests typically involving: (1) cases in
which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his
sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which
an inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a result
of a serious rule violation. Id.
When
reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the Court
sits in an appellate capacity. Id. at 756. Consequently, the review in
these inmate grievance cases is limited to the Record presented. An
Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency
“as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1‑23‑380(A)(6)
(Supp. 2003). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or
modify an agency’s decision unless substantial rights of the appellant have
been prejudiced because the decision is clearly erroneous in view of the
substantial evidence on the whole record, arbitrary or affected by an error of
law. See Section 1-23-380(A)(6); See also Marietta
Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 337 S.C. 133, 522
S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing and
Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503 S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1998). “‘Substantial
evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly
from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a
whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the
administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its
action.” Lark v. Bi‑Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306
(1981). Accordingly, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from
being supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally,
in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the
relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Moreover, in Al-Shabazz,
the Court underscored that since prison officials are in the best position to
decide inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore this tribunal adhere
to a “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and
procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz at
757; See also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d
779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina
courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
In this case, the Appellant alleges that the Department
should not have revoked ninety (90) days of his accrued good time. Inmates
have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the Department
revokes an inmate’s good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary
hearing” involving “more serious rule violations,” prison officials must
provide that inmate with “minimal due process.” Al-Shabazz at 750.
Consequently, specific administrative procedures must be followed before
depriving an inmate of statutorily granted earned credit, including adequate
advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the
inmate can present witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing
officer who prepares a written statement of all the evidence presented and the
reasons for his decision. Id. at 751 (citing Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974)).
DISCUSSION
I
find that the Appellant was afforded all process due him pursuant to Al-Shabazz.
The Record indicates that the Appellant received written notice of the charges
against him in excess of twenty-four (24) hours prior to a hearing that was
held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. At the hearing, the
Appellant was given the opportunity to offer evidence, call witnesses, and
confront his accuser. In addition, although not constitutionally required, the
Appellant was afforded a counsel substitute who assisted him in his defense.
After the DHO determined that the Appellant was guilty of the charged offense,
he prepared a written report detailing the evidence he relied upon and the
penalty assessed in finding the Appellant guilty of the disciplinary
infraction. Finally, the Appellant was permitted to appeal the DHO’s decision
through the inmate grievance process.
Pre-hearing
Detention
The
Appellant contends that he was improperly placed in pre-hearing detention for thirteen
(13) days prior to the hearing in violation of the Department’s policies. He
also argues that his pre-hearing detention was pursuant to an out-of-date form
of the Department. However, the evidence submitted by the Department verifies
that an inmate charged with violating the drug policy may be held in
“pre-hearing detention” in keeping with the Department’s policy. Furthermore,
the Appellant cited no policy or law that the Department violated. Moreover,
“a prison official's failure to follow the prison's own policies, procedures or
regulations does not constitute a violation of due process, if constitutional
minima are nevertheless met.” Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th
Cir. 1996). As set forth above, the “constitutional minima” circumscribed by Al-Shabazz
and Wolff, supra, was met by the Department in this case.
Therefore, the Appellant failed to establish that the above actions violated
those due process rights.
Drug
Test
The
Appellant also contends that he was unable to adequately defend himself in the
disciplinary proceedings because the drug “test stick” was discarded prior to
the hearing. However, the “minimum requirements of procedural due process” set
forth in Wolff requires only that the prisoner be provided with written
notice of the charges prior to the hearing. Id. at 559. Here, the
Appellant was not only given notice of the charges but was also provided a copy
of the drug test reports prior to his hearing.
Furthermore,
the Appellant’s allegations go to the sufficiency of the evidence. In Superintendent,
Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105
S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the revocation of good time
must be supported by “some evidence in the record.” However, “[a]scertaining
whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire
record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of
the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence
in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary
board.” Id. at 455. Moreover, “[t]he fact finder is imbued with broad
discretion in determining credibility or believability of witnesses.” Small
v. Pioneer Machinery, Inc., 329 S.C. 448, 465, 494 S.E.2d 835, 843 (Ct.
App. 1997). Therefore, it was the DHO’s prerogative to decide what part of
each witness’ testimony he believed or disbelieved.
A Disciplinary Code § 1.10 violation is, in part: “Any inmate
testing positive for any unauthorized drug, refusing to submit to a drug test,
or failing to produce a specimen within three (3) hours as specified in SCDC
Policy/Procedure GA-03.03. . . .” I find that the Record clearly supports the
facts recited in the “Background” portion of this Order. Those facts establish
substantial evidence that the Appellant tested positive for an unauthorized
drug. Accordingly, I find that there is substantial evidence to support the
Appellant's conviction of SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.10.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE
ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and the Final
Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;
AND IT IS SO
ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph
King Anderson, III
Administrative
Law Judge
March 23, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina |