STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court)
pursuant to the
appeal of Leroy Matthews, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections
(Department). Matthews was convicted of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code 2.09, Sexual
Misconduct. As a result of his conviction, Matthews lost thirty (30) days of “good-time” credit.
Matthews filed a grievance with the Department and received the Department’s final decision on
or about June 9, 2004. On June 10, 2004, Matthews filed this appeal.
BACKGROUND
On December 18, 2003, Deborah Parish, an employee of the Department, observed the
Appellant stroking his penis in a medical waiting room of Evans Correctional Institute. After the
incident, the Appellant was charged with violating SCDC Disciplinary Code 2.09, Sexual
Misconduct. The Appellant received written notice of the charges on December 22, 2003.
On December 30, 2003, a Major Disciplinary Hearing was held before a Department
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) concerning the Sexual Misconduct charge. The Appellant
denoted on the Department’s Disciplinary Report form that he did wish that his accuser, Deborah
Parish, be present at the hearing. Additionally, although the Appellant did not request a counsel
substitute, he was nevertheless provided one. At the beginning of the hearing, the DHO found
that the Appellant refused to attend the hearing and therefore entered a plea of not guilty on his
behalf and proceeded with the hearing. During the hearing, the DHO also read a narrative of Ms.
Parish’s report into the Record as evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the DHO found
the Appellant guilty of Sexual Misconduct and sanctioned him with the loss of thirty (30) days
of good-time credit. After the hearing, the DHO completed a Major Disciplinary Report and
Hearing Record which documented her findings.
The Appellant filed a grievance appealing his conviction of violating SCDC Disciplinary
Code 2.09. After reviewing his allegation, the Warden denied the Appellant’s grievance. He
appealed the Warden’s decision asking that the Department reverse his loss of “good-time”
credits. The Department denied his grievance, stating that the evidence supported the conviction
and that the sanction imposed was appropriate for the violation that the Appellant committed.
This appeal followed.
The Appellant argued in his Notice of Appeal that pursuant to SCDC Policy OP 22.14,
Form 1969 was not signed.
Additionally, in his Appeal Brief, the Appellant alleges that he did
not refuse to attend his disciplinary hearing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000).
The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is limited to state created liberty interests
typically involving: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which an
inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a result of a serious rule
violation. Id.
When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the Court sits
in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz at 756. Consequently, the review in these inmate grievance
cases is limited to the Record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his
judgment for that of an agency “as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code
Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2002). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not
reverse or modify an agency’s decision unless substantial rights of the Appellant have been
prejudiced because the decision is clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the
whole Record, arbitrary or affected by an error of law. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6);
See also Marietta Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 337 S.C. 133, 522
S.E.2d 605 (1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C.
162, 503 S.E.2d 490 (1998). “‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the
evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the
Record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative
agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action.” Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130,
135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Accordingly, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461
S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally, in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 105 S. Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the relevant question is
whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.” Moreover, in Al-Shabazz, the Court underscored that since prison officials
are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore this
tribunal adhere to a “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures
when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz at 757; See also Pruitt v. State, 274
S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina
courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
In this case, the Appellant alleges that the Department should not have revoked his thirty
(30) days of accrued good time. Inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned
statutory good-time credits under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the
Department revokes an inmate’s good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary
hearing” involving “more serious rule violations,” prison officials must provide that inmate with
“minimal due process.” Al-Shabazz at 750. Consequently, specific administrative procedures
must be followed before depriving an inmate of statutorily granted earned credit, including
adequate advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the inmate
can present witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing officer who prepares
a written statement of all the evidence presented and the reasons for his decision. Al-Shabazz at
751, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974).
DISCUSSION
Due Process
The Appellant argues that he did not refuse to attend his disciplinary hearing. SCDC
policy OP-22.14 provides that inmates generally have the right to be present at their disciplinary
hearing. However, “[i]f an inmate refuses to appear at the hearing . . . , the hearing may be
conducted in the inmate’s absence. In those instances, “[t]he Hearing Officer must provide
written reasons in the record for the accused inmate’s absence during any portion of the
hearing.” Here, the Record establishes that the Appellant received written notice of the charges
against him in excess of twenty-four (24) hours prior to a hearing that was held before an
impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. The Record also contains an incident report signed by
Officer McRae stating that he went to the Appellant’s cell and informed him to report to “multi
purpose” for his disciplinary hearing. Nevertheless, the Appellant refused to get out of his bed.
Based upon that evidence, the DHO determined that the Appellant waived his right to attend the
hearing. The Record also reflects that Appellant’s counsel substitute informed the Appellant of
his rights under the Department’s disciplinary procedures prior to the hearing.
Therefore, I find that the Appellant was given the opportunity to offer evidence and call
witnesses. However, rather than appear at the hearing and present his defense, the Appellant
choose not to appear at the hearing. In addition, although not constitutionally required, the
Appellant was afforded a counsel substitute who assisted him in his defense even in his absence.
Accordingly, the Appellant failed to establish that the DHO’s decision to proceed with the
hearing in his absence was arbitrary or capricious or that he was denied due process.
Substantial Evidence
I also find that there is substantial evidence to support the Appellant's conviction of
violating SCDC Disciplinary Code 2.09, Sexual Misconduct. A Code 2.09 violation is: “(1)
Engaging in sexual acts or intimate physical contact of a sexual nature alone or with others; or
(2) indecent and/or unnecessary exposure of private body parts; or (3) soliciting sexual acts from
others.” Here, the Record clearly supports the facts recited in the “Background” portion of this
Order. Those facts establish sufficient evidence that the Appellant was engaging in sexual
misconduct in public. Consequently, the Record establishes substantial evidence that the
Appellant violated SCDC Disciplinary Code 2.09.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and
the Final Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph K. Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
December 21, 2004
Columbia, South Carolina
