I. Statement of the Case
This matter is an appeal by Ricky Edwards, #191721 (Edwards) of a final decision in a non-collateral
or administrative matter issued by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC). Thus,
appellate review jurisdiction vests in the Administrative Law Court (ALC). Slezak v. South
Carolina Department of Corrections, 361 S.C. 327, 605 S.E.2d 506 (2004).
Appeals that do not implicate an inmate's state-created liberty or property interest may be summarily
decided. Id.("We hold that the [ALC] has jurisdiction over all properly perfected inmate appeals, but
clarify that it may summarily decide those appeals that do not implicate an inmate's state-created
liberty or property interest."). Such is the case here.
II. Analysis
Here, Edwards presents a claim that amounts to a complaint challenging custody status. When
reviewing a DOC custody decision, the Court sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at
377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Thus, the review is confined to the record Id. 527 S.E.2d at 750. In making
the review, the ALJ must be mindful that a traditional "hands off" approach exists on discretionary
decisions resulting from internal prison policies. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see
also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off"
approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison policy).
However, such a deferential standard of review does not preclude a reversal of the DOC
determination. Rather, the ALJ conducts a review of DOC's actions to ensure the inmate grievance
is addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at
757. Primarily, two potential grounds exist warranting an alteration to a custody classification: due
process and arbitrary action
A. Due Process
An inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in his custody status under the Due Process
clause of its own force. Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994). However, a state-created
liberty interest can exist in a custody status if the status "imposes atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995).
Here, Edwards has no protected liberty interest as to a custody status since the custody assigned
"does not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably
create a liberty interest." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486. Rather, advancement and classification of custody
status is a common practice within a prison setting.
B. Arbitrary Decision
However, even if a protected liberty interest is not implicated, our Supreme Court has held that an
inmate may challenge a custody status if "prison officials have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or from
personal bias" in determining his custody status. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 381, 527 S.E.2d at 756
(citing Crowe v. Leeks, 273 S.C. 763, 259 S.E.2d 614 (1979)).
Here, DOC has restricted the custody status of Edwards since Edwards has a record of a Class 1
Escape. The basis for that decision is that Edwards jumped from a Horry County Detention Center
van while the van was in route to a DOC facility. However, due to Edwards' mental problems, he was
deemed not culpable for disciplinary charges. But, the fact that the event occurred cannot be
dismissed. Thus, a custody status consistent with the escape event has caused DOC to reach its
custody classification. Therefore, the DOC decision involves a "good faith exercise of the
discretionary power of the prison officials in the maintenance of order, discipline, and security
among the prison population." Crowe, 273 S.C. at 764, 259 S.E.2d at 615. Accordingly, the DOC
decision will not be disturbed on appeal.
III. Conclusion
The decision entered below by DOC against Ricky Edwards, #191721 is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: January 18, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina