South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
Edgar A. Brown building 1205 Pendleton St., Suite 224 Columbia, SC 29201 Voice: (803) 734-0550

SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
Brenda Hinson-Austin vs. SCBCB

AGENCY:
South Carolina Budget and Control Board

PARTIES:
Appellant:
Brenda Hinson-Austin

Respondents:
South Carolina Budget and Control Board, Employee Insurance Program
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
07-ALJ-30-0210-AP

APPEARANCES:
Nathan Bax, Esq.
For Appellant

James T. Hedgepath, Esq.
For Respondent
 

ORDERS:

ORDER

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The above-captioned matter was heard by this Court on appeal pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-11-710(C) (2008). In this matter, Appellant Brenda Hinson-Austin (“Hinson-Austin”) seeks review of a decision by Respondent South Carolina Budget and Control Board, Employee Insurance Program (“EIP”) denying her claim for long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits under the State of South Carolina Basic Long Term Disability Income Benefit Plan (the “Plan”). Specifically, by letter dated December 19, 2006, EIP’s Long Term Disability Appeals Committee informed Hinson-Austin that her medical conditions did not qualify for LTD benefits under the terms and conditions of the Plan.

In this appeal, Hinson-Austin challenges EIP’s decision by contending that she is unable to perform her occupation as an elementary school teacher. Hinson-Austin argues that the evidence in the Record on Appeal demonstrates that her depression and arthritic pain prevent her from performing her occupation. In support of this argument, Hinson-Austin asserts that EIP’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because EIP failed to consider the effects of the combination of her mental and physical conditions.[1]

EIP argues that the substantial evidence in the Record on Appeal, including the records of Hinson-Austin’s treating physicians and the independent medical opinions of Dr. Beeson and Dr. Gwinnell demonstrate that Hinson-Austin’s conditions, alone or in combination, do not prevent her from performing the material duties of her occupation as an elementary school teacher.

Based upon the Record on Appeal, the parties’ briefs and oral arguments and the applicable law, I affirm EIP’s decision to deny Hinson-Austin’s claim for LTD benefits as there is substantial evidence in the record to support EIP’s determination that Hinson-Austin is not disabled from performing her occupation.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL HISTORY

I. Definition of Disability

The Plan contains the following relevant provisions:

A. Own Occupation Definition of Disability

During the Benefit Waiting Period and the Own Occupation Period you are required to be Disabled only from your Own Occupation.

You are Disabled from your Own Occupation if, as a result of Physical Disease, Injury, Pregnancy or Mental Disorder, you are unable to perform with reasonable continuity the Material Duties of your Own Occupation.

Own Occupation means any employment, business, trade, profession, calling or vocation that involves Material Duties of the same general character as your regular and ordinary employment with the Employer. Your Own Occupation is not limited to your job with your Employer.

Thus, to qualify for LTD benefits under the Plan, Hinson-Austin’s condition had to satisfy the Own Occupation Definition of Disability for the Plan’s entire 90-day Benefit Waiting Period and beyond.

II. Hinson-Austin’s Medical Records

A. Dr. Oehme

Dr. Oehme, Hinson-Austin’s family doctor, provided general medical care to Hinson-Austin prior to and during the relevant time period. Dr. Oehme’s October 13, 2004 chart note states that Hinson-Austin had no lower back pain and was mentally alert. Dr. Oehme’s December 7, 2004 chart note had a completely different tone and noted that Hinson-Austin “finds it increasingly difficult to do things. Is getting more and more depressed.” He then stated he would “[s]ee her back in three months. I am going to write a letter. Need to stabilize her medications. Follow-up with Dr. Paulson.”

On December 13, 2004, Dr. Oehme wrote a To Whom It May Concern letter in which he stated Hinson-Austin needed to take a year off work to “stabilize her medical conditions as well as her medications.” Dr. Oehme did not explain what specific limitations or restrictions Hinson-Austin’s medical conditions were causing nor did he specify what problems her medications were causing. He also gave no explanation for the one year period he stated Hinson-Austin needed to adjust to stabilize her condition. Dr. Oehme did not see Hinson-Austin again until April 27, 2005.

The chart notes in the Record on Appeal indicate that Dr. Oehme continued to treat Hinson-Austin periodically through February 8, 2006. However, his records do not provide any description of limitations or restrictions that would have prevented Hinson-Austin from working in her occupation.

B. Dr. Wilson

Dr. Wilson, a rheumatologist, treated Hinson-Austin for osteoporosis, back pain, and low-grade arthritis. From July 23, 2002 through March 29, 2005, Dr. Wilson saw Hinson-Austin at least 10 times. During that time, Dr. Wilson noted that Hinson-Austin’s arthritis was “grossly stable” that her osteoporosis was stable; and that her physical condition was stable with medication.

On December 28, 2004, Dr. Wilson stated that he did not believe the conditions he was treating Hinson-Austin for were disabling:

[I] would agree that the arthritis does not seem to be bad enough, certainly not by itself, to apply for disability. She is basing this upon other features . ... Recheck in 3-4 months.

C. Dr. Mandell

Dr. Mandell, a neurologist, also treated Hinson-Austin. Dr. Mandell’s records demonstrate that he saw Hinson-Austin every 5-6 months. On November 22, 2004, Dr. Mandell observed that Hinson-Austin had not been doing well over the last four weeks. This downturn in Hinson-Austin’s condition appeared to be directly related to Hinson-Austin no longer being able to take Vioxx because it was removed from the market. Dr. Mandell advised Hinson-Austin to see a psychiatrist and to continue seeing Dr. Wells, a psychologist. Dr. Mandell prescribed Wellbutrin and noted that Wellbutrin had helped Hinson-Austin in the past.

On February 25, 2005, Dr. Mandell noted Hinson-Austin “is doing better now that she has stopped work. There is a great degree of stress in her life which really contributes to her symptomatology. Wellbutrin has once again proven itself to be a helpful medication for her. I will see her again in 3-6 months (emphasis added).” Notably, with the exception of a non-contemporaneous conclusory affidavit, Dr. Mandell never opined that Hinson-Austin was unable to perform her occupation.

D. Dr. Paulson

Hinson-Austin began seeing Dr. Paulson, a psychiatrist, on November 30, 2004. Dr. Paulson noted that Hinson-Austin “felt reasonably well until Vioxx went off [the] market.” After going off Vioxx, Hinson-Austin reported increased pain, decreased mobility, decreased energy and concentration, and decreased ability to perform her teaching duties. Dr. Paulson also noted Hinson-Austin has had episodic depression most of her adult life, usually triggered by stress. Dr. Paulson agreed with Dr. Mandell and prescribed Wellbutrin.

On May 3, 2005, Dr. Paulson noted an episode of increased depressive symptoms due to stressors, but concluded that the “[c]urrent symptoms should resolve without need for medication adjustment.” On August 3, 2005, Dr. Paulson noted that Hinson-Austin had been stable since her last visit and that she had been able to reduce her medications. He also observed that Hinson-Austin “has had no significant side effects with her current medication regimen.”

Hinson-Austin’s mental condition was stable from September through March 2006. Dr. Paulson has offered no opinion regarding whether Hinson-Austin can perform the duties of her Own Occupation and has not set forth any limitations or restrictions that would support a finding that Hinson-Austin was unable to perform her occupation after February 25, 2005.

E. Dr. Wells

Dr. Wells, a psychologist, provided counseling to Hinson-Austin. Dr. Wells’ records date back to September 2001 and demonstrate that Hinson-Austin has a long history of episodic depression for most of her adult life. Dr. Wells’ counseling notes do not support the assertion that Hinson-Austin was unable to work after February 25, 2005.

On October 26, 2004, Dr. Wells noted that Hinson-Austin was “now much better able to take care of herself and prioritize her time. She is certainly more self-confident.” Dr. Wells noted a GAF score of 65.[2]

Hinson-Austin next saw Dr. Wells on November 10, 2004. Dr. Wells’ notes record a common theme of Hinson-Austin’s wanting to move away from her husband and quit working. During the time Dr. Wells treated Hinson-Austin, she consistently complained about her husband’s behavior and treatment of her, about being attracted to a man other than her husband, and about her desire for a divorce. During the November 10 session, Dr. Wells noted as follows:

She has decided that she wants to move to Pensacola, Florida within one year. She has family there and needs the resilience of the family provides. She also feels much more comfortable near the water. She recognizes the problems she is beginning to have with her arthritic condition. She is trying to plan for her future. She wants to be sending her writings to a publisher in one year and expects to have a publisher in two years.

On December 17, 2004, Dr. Wells noted that Hinson-Austin appeared “extremely tired and lethargic today,” and that she and her husband were selling their house due to financial difficulties. Dr. Wells recorded a GAF score of 55.

On January 31, 2005, Dr. Wells noted Hinson-Austin “has gained insight into her behavior and has gained her power (inner) from the recent group she has been attending.” Dr. Wells suggested that she “consider getting a Master’s Degree.” . Such a suggestion certainly does not reflect a concern that Hinson-Austin would struggle with a stressful and difficult environment.

On February 22, 2005, Hinson-Austin reported that she had been assisting her daughter in-law with getting custody of a child. Dr. Wells reported no significant symptoms or limitations during this visit. Dr. Wells’ notes continue through June 3, 2005. The post February notes reflect issues such as Hinson-Austin’s marital problems and financial issues, but do not contain any limitations or restrictions regarding Hinson-Austin’s ability to work. On April 25, 2005, Dr. Wells noted a GAF score of 65, the same score Hinson-Austin had in October 2004 before she ceased working.

Dr. Wells also completed a psychiatric report in support of Hinson-Austin’s LTD claim. The report, dated March 16, 2005, states that Hinson-Austin is not working due to stress. In the report, Dr. Wells concluded that Hinson-Austin was moderately impaired and that he was “unable to say” whether she was “capable of working for the current employer.” Dr. Wells further stated that he expected Hinson-Austin’s condition to improve.

. Dr. Wells also signed an affidavit dated May 5, 2006, which was submitted to support Hinson-Austin’s claim. Dr. Wells’ affidavit provided no new information, but rather briefly summarized Hinson-Austin’s subjective complaints and concluded that Hinson-Austin “is and has been completely and totally disabled consistent with the [Plan’s] definition of disability.” This conclusion is completely inconsistent with Dr. Wells’ contemporaneous statement in March 2005 that he was “unable to say” whether Hinson-Austin was unable to perform her own occupation. These inconsistent statements by Dr. Wells certainly call into question the accuracy of his affidavit, and EIP did not err by giving little weight to the affidavit.

III. Dr. Beeson and Dr. Gwinnell

As part of its review of Hinson-Austin’s claim for benefits, Standard Insurance Company, the third-party claims administrator for the Plan, obtained independent medical opinions from two board-certified physicians, Dr. Beeson, board-certified in internal medicine, and Dr. Gwinnell, board-certified in psychiatry. Specifically, on several occasions, Standard requested that Dr. Beeson and Dr. Gwinnell review all of Hinson-Austin’s medical records, which were submitted at various times, and opine as to whether her conditions precluded her from working in her occupation as an elementary school teacher.

In her initial opinion, Dr. Gwinnell noted that Hinson-Austin had experienced “a substantial deterioration in terms of depression subsequent to stopping Vioxx, which she had been taking for arthritis.” However, Dr. Gwinnell also noted Hinson-Austin’s improvement with Wellbutrin and an episode of depression in mid-April. Dr. Gwinnell summarized her review of the medical records as follows:

The presentation to all of her physicians was quite consistent in November and December, that she was extremely depressed, with marked decrease in energy, hopelessness, a sense of being unable to continue. There was some passive suicidal ideation.

However, by February 25, 2005, she appears improved. Dr. Mandell notes improvement and Dr. Wells notes improvement. Although Ms. Hinson-Austin continues to complain of tiredness, she does not otherwise appear to have significant symptoms.

On April 19, 2005, she has another period of depression in response to a situational stressor, but this appears to have resolved in terms of the more significant symptoms by the time she returns to see her psychologist. My impression is that the episode was brief in terms of worsening symptoms.

Dr. Gwinnell concluded that Hinson-Austin’s psychiatric condition would have prevented her from performing her occupation of elementary school teacher from November 29, 2004 through February 25, 2005.[3] She also concluded that Hinson-Austin’s condition did not preclude her from performing her occupation after February 25, 2005, and that the medical records did not demonstrate that the April episode of depression lasted beyond “one day to four weeks.” Following his initial review of Hinson-Austin’s medical records, Dr. Beeson concluded as follows:

From the point of view of the patient’s asthma and allergic rhinitis, I can find no restrictions or limitations whatsoever. It is clear from the notes that from the point of view of her osteoarthritis and low-grade inflammatory arthritis that this would not be a disabling condition. I believe she could continue to work in a sedentary or light work occupation.

After Standard initially denied Hinson-Austin’s claim, Standard’s Administrative Review Unit conducted an independent review of her claim. During this independent review process, Hinson-Austin’s counsel submitted additional medical records and the affidavits of Dr. Mandell, Dr. Wells, and Hinson-Austin.

Dr. Beeson reviewed the additional documents and opined that the “new information in no way changes my previous opinion. From a physical point of view, I can find no evidence that this patient could not continue to work in a sedentary or light work occupation . . .. This is not the picture of a severe, disabling arthritis.”

After additional documents were submitted by Hinson-Austin’s counsel, Dr. Beeson provided a third report in which he concluded: “I continue to find a lack of evidence in the medical record that would indicate this patient could not continue to work in a sedentary or light work occupation.”

Dr. Gwinnell also provided an additional report and summarized her review of all of Hinson-Austin’s medical records and her opinion as follows:

[N]otes from Dr. Paulson do tend to support that she is psychiatrically stable, and though she has ongoing complaints, she has not acutely deteriorated. Since Ms. Hinson-Austin has a very long history of the various diagnoses she carries psychiatrically, and yet has for the most part been able to continue working, the fact of ongoing residual symptoms does not in and of itself support psychiatric limitations and restrictions.

Therefore, though this newly acquired information on the one hand suggests that Ms. Hinson-Austin has been continuously impaired since 2004, Dr. Wells does not submit concurrently maintained progress notes. Rather, his [affidavit] describes Ms. Hinson-Austin without specifically identifying when exactly she had those specific complaints and fulfilled those criteria. Indeed, his own progress notes document the presence of very similar complaints for many years during which Ms. Austin was apparently successfully working.

In the absence of concurrently maintained progress notes from Dr. Wells showing otherwise, and in the presence of notes from Dr. Paulson showing that Ms. Hinson-Austin had, in fact, been psychiatrically stable for long periods of time during her time off work, I am not finding the [affidavit] from Dr. Wells particularly useful in terms of supporting Ms. Hinson-Austin’s psychiatric limitations and restrictions. In fact, this new information does not change my opinion from my previous file review.

IV. EIP’s Decision to Deny Hinson-Austin’s Claim

After Standard affirmed the denial of Hinson-Austin’s claim, the EIP Long Term Disability Appeals Committee met on September 27, 2006 to consider Hinson-Austin’s appeal. After its initial review of the administrative record, the Committee asked Dr. Gwinnell to clarify whether she believed Hinson-Austin’s medical records supported a finding of disability from February 25, 2005 through April 2005 due to the episode of increased depression symptoms Hinson-Austin experienced in April 2005.

In response, Dr. Gwinnell opined that the progress notes did not support that Hinson-Austin experienced significant depression continuously from February through April. Dr. Gwinnell observed that post-April “progress notes supported long periods of psychiatric stability” and concluded that “the documentation does not support after February 25, 2005, that she has ongoing impairment.”

The Committee met again on November 17, 2006 to consider Hinson-Austin’s appeal. HI 1. The Committee’s decision letter summarizes the significant medical records in the administrative record, including those of Dr. Wells, Dr. Mandell, Dr. Paulson, Dr. Oehme, and Dr. Wilson, and the opinions of Dr. Gwinnell and Dr. Beeson.

The Committee determined Hinson-Austin’s condition may have prevented her from performing her Own Occupation at the time she stopped working on November 29, 2004, but that “the January and February 2005 medical information from Dr. Wells and Dr. Mandell documented that [Hinson-Austin’s] symptoms improved while taking Wellbutrin and attending psychotherapy.” HI 6. The Committee concluded “that by February 25, 2005, her psychiatric conditions were not sufficiently severe to preclude her from performing her Own Occupation throughout and beyond the 90-day Benefit Waiting Period.”

The Committee also credited and agreed with the opinion of Dr. Gwinnell that Hinson-Austin “had been psychiatrically stable . . . since ceasing work.” Further, “the Committee found that [Hinson-Austin’s] medical records did not support physical conditions that would result in limitations that would preclude her performance of her Own Occupation as a school teacher” after February 25, 2005. Based upon these conclusions, EIP denied Hinson-Austin’s claim, finding that her condition did not satisfy the Plan’s Definition of Disability.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-11-710(C) (2008), this Court’s appellate review of EIP’s final decision is governed by the standards provided in S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (2008). Section 1-23-380(A)(5) provides as follows:

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

Under Section 1-23-380, “substantial evidence” is the standard for judicial review of agency decisions. Hendley v. S.C. State Budget & Control Bd., 333 S.C. 455, 510 S.E.2d 421 (1999). “Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, but evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached.” Tiller v. National Health Care Center, 334 S.C. 333, 338, 513 S.E.2d 843, 845 (1999). Under the substantial evidence rule, a final agency decision must be upheld unless it was clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence in the record. See Central Transp., Inc. v. S.C. Public Service Comm'n, 289 S.C. 267, 346 S.E.2d 25 (1986) (reversing the Circuit Court when it exceeded the scope of review and substituted its own judicial discretion for that of the Commission).

DISCUSSION

I. Substantial Evidence Supports EIP’s Decision to Deny Hinson-Austin’s Claim for LTD Benefits.

The issue before the Court is whether substantial evidence in the Record on Appeal supports EIP’s decision. As set forth in the Plan, to qualify for benefits, the objective medical information submitted by Hinson-Austin must demonstrate that she was unable to perform with reasonable continuity the material duties of her occupation throughout and beyond the 90-day Benefit Waiting Period. If a reasonable mind can reach a conclusion that Hinson-Austin’s condition does not satisfy the Plan’s Definition of Disability, then the Court must uphold EIP’s decision. Although Hinson-Austin received treatment for depression and pain and fatigue related to arthritis, the medical records and opinions of her treating physicians and the opinions of Dr. Beeson and Dr. Gwinnell clearly allow a reasonable mind to conclude that her conditions, individually or as a whole, did not cause her to be unable to perform the material duties of her occupation.

At oral argument, Hinson-Austin asserted that EIP failed to consider the effect of the combination of her mental and physical conditions. However, Hinson-Austin could not identify any medical record in the Record on Appeal that supports her underlying assertion that her physical condition and mental condition, in combination, cause her to be unable to perform her occupation. Moreover none of Hinson-Austin’s medical records offer any evidence that the combination of her physical and mental condition caused impairment. Even further, the records of the physicians who treated Hinson-Austin’s physical ailments expressly state that her physical condition provides no basis for disability. Thus, there is no support in the Record on Appeal for Hinson-Austin’s assertions, and her argument is without merit.

On the other hand, the evidence in the Record on Appeal provides substantial evidence to support EIP’s decision. Although Hinson-Austin had an episode of depression in late 2004 when she stopped taking Vioxx, the records of Dr. Mandell and Dr. Paulson demonstrate that her condition improved once she began taking Wellbutrin.

The evidence in Dr. Wells’ notes also supports EIP’s decision. With the exception of the November 29, 2004 through February 25, 2005 timeframe, Hinson-Austin’s GAF scores were consistently in the 60-65 range, which indicates only mild symptoms. And, with the exception of a conclusory affidavit, Dr. Wells never opined that Hinson-Austin’s condition was severe or disabling. To the contrary, during the relevant timeframe, he recommended that Hinson-Austin consider pursuing a master’ degree, an undertaking wholly inconsistent with attempting to minimize stress.

In addition, the opinions of Dr. Gwinnell and Dr. Beeson support EIP’s decision. Dr. Gwinnell opined that Hinson-Austin improved with Wellbutrin and was able to return to work by February 25, 2005. More specifically, Dr. Gwinnell concluded that Hinson-Austin’s long history of working through episodic depression demonstrated that “ongoing residual symptoms [do] not in and of [themselves] support psychiatric limitations and restrictions.” Dr. Beeson concluded that Hinson-Austin’s osteoarthritis and low-grade arthritis would not prevent her from performing the physical requirements of her own occupation.

Because the medical records and opinions of Hinson-Austin’s treating physicians and Dr. Gwinnell and Dr. Beeson provide significant evidence to support EIP’s decision, the Court finds that EIP did not abuse its discretion in denying Hinson-Austin’s LTD claim.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that EIP’s final agency determination denying Hinson-Austin’s claim for LTD benefits is affirmed.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

__________________________

Carolyn C. Matthews

Administrative Law Judge

June 12, 2008

Columbia, South Carolina



[1] At oral argument, Hinson-Austin’s counsel submitted several Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) cases involving disputed disability claims. As an initial matter, the Court notes that these cases are not controlling. In addition, as set forth below, the Court’s review of EIP’s decision is controlled by the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (2008) and South Carolina precedent applying Section 1-23-380, both of which impress upon this Court the importance of not substituting the Court’s judgment for that of EIP. Further, in the present case, EIP did properly consider the total effect of Hinson-Austin’s conditions; thus, the Court does not find the cases submitted by Hinson-Austin to have any value in this case.

[2] According to the website http://www.gpc.edu/~bbrown/psyc2621/ch3/gaf.htm, a GAF (global assessment of functioning) score in the 61-70 range represents “Mild symptoms in one area OR difficulty in one of the following: social, occupational, or school functioning. BUT, the person is generally functioning pretty well and has some meaningful interpersonal relationships.” A score in the 51-60 range represents “Moderate symptoms OR moderate difficulty in one of the following: social, occupational, or school functioning.”

[3] Under the terms of the Plan, a claimant must be disabled for the entire 90-day Benefit Waiting Period and beyond in order to qualify for LTD benefits. Dr. Gwinnell opined Hinson-Austin was disabled a total of 89 days, which does not satisfy the 90-day Benefit Waiting Period.


~/pdf/070210.pdf
PDF

Brown Bldg.

 

 

 

 

 

Copyright © 2024 South Carolina Administrative Law Court