ORDERS:
ORDER
Grievance No. TYRCI 1365-06
INTRODUCTION
This
matter is before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (“ALC”) pursuant
to the Notice of Appeal filed February 6, 2007, by Appellant Tyrikus Perry (“Perry”),
an inmate incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections
(“Department”). On October 5, 2006, Perry was convicted of violating Department
Disciplinary Code 814, Inciting/Creating a Disturbance.
As a result of his conviction, Perry lost 30 days of good time credit; had
visitation suspended for 270 days; had canteen and phone privileges suspended
for 270 days; and received 90 days of disciplinary detention. Perry filed a
grievance with the Department and received a final agency decision on or about January
23, 2007. On February 6, 2007, Perry filed this appeal. After a careful
review of the record and the arguments, the court affirms the decision of the
Department.
BACKGROUND
On
September 25, 2006, Sergeant Smith charged Perry with Inciting/Creating a
Disturbance because Perry was banging on his door. Sergeant Smith reported
that, while conducting a security check, she directed Perry to stop banging on
his door three separate times. When Perry did not stop, Sergeant Smith sprayed
Perry with mace. During his disciplinary hearing, Perry was given the
opportunity to ask questions of his accuser, Sergeant Smith. The disciplinary
hearing officer (“DHO”) found Perry guilty based on Sergeant Smith’s report and
testimony.
JURISDICTION
AND REVIEW
The
ALC has appellate jurisdiction over any properly perfected appeal. Slezak
v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 361 S.C. 327, 331, 605 S.E.2d 506, 507 (2004). The
ALC has subject matter jurisdiction when the Department disciplines an inmate
and imposes a punishment that deprives
the inmate of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Sullivan
v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 355 S.C. 437, 441-42, 586 S.E.2d 124, 126 (2003); Al-Shabazz
v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 369, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750 (2000); Skipper v. S.C.
Dep’t of Corr., 370 S.C. 267, 273-74, 633 S.E.2d
910, 914 (Ct. App.).
In
this case, Perry has been disciplined for Inciting/Creating a Disturbance, and
as a result, has been deprived of 30 days of his good time credits.
Accordingly, the court finds that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate this
appeal. See Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 369-70, 527 S.E.2d at 750
(stating the statutory right to sentence-related credits is a protected liberty
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment).
The
ALC reviews decisions of the Department in an appellate capacity and is “restricted
to reviewing the decision below.” Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 354, 527
S.E.2d at 742. When acting in an appellate capacity, the ALJ must apply the
criteria of S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007). See S.C. Code
Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2007) (directing Administrative Law Judges to conduct
a review “in the same manner prescribed in [§1-23-380] (A)”). This section
provides:
The court may not
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency
or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify
the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(a) in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in
excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made
upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected
by other error of law;
(e) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007).
DISCUSSION
If
an inmate properly alleges a deprivation of a liberty or property interest, the
court must determine whether the Department afforded the inmate due process of
law in accordance with Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and Al-Shabazz
v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000), before depriving him of that
protected interest. These requirements include:
(1) that advance written notice of the
charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing;
(2) that factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on
and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the inmate should be allowed
to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue
hazard to institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel
substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be allowed to help
illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5)
that the persons hearing the matter, who may be prison officials or employees,
must be impartial.
Al-Shabazz,
338 S.C. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-72).
Perry
alleges his due process rights were violated because of the Department’s failure
to follow its own policy. Specifically, Perry alleges the following policies
were not followed: (1) the supervisor will decide whether to refer the inmate
to the “Major/Responsible Authority,” South Carolina
Department of Corrections Manual for Operations, Inmate Disciplinary
System, No. OP-22.14. (hereinafter “Department Manual”), at ¶ 3.5;
(2) a full statement of the facts underlying the offense, including witnesses
and evidence, must be included in the incident report, id.; and (3) the
name and inmate number of the charged inmate must be included in the incident report, id. However, these are issues that were not raised in the hearing, nor
in Perry’s Step 1 or Step 2 Grievance. In reviewing
the DHO’s decision, the court “has a
limited scope of review, and cannot ordinarily consider issues that were not
raised to and ruled on by the administrative agency.” Kiawah
Resort Assocs., 318 S.C.
at 505, 458 S.E.2d at 544. For this reason, Perry did not properly preserve
this issue for appeal.
Even if Perry had properly preserved this issue,
these arguments are without merit. “A prison official’s failure to follow the
prison’s own policies, procedures or regulations does not constitute a
violation of due process, if constitutional minima are nevertheless met.” Myers
v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996); see also S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-10 (2005) (the term “regulation” does not include “orders of the supervisory or administrative agency of a
penal . . . institution, in respect to the institutional supervision, custody,
control, care, or treatment of inmates, prisoners, or patients”).
Perry also claims that he should not have been convicted of Inciting/Creating a Disturbance because another
inmate that testified at Perry’s hearing admitted to banging on the door; in
other words, Perry was convicted even though another inmate confessed to having
created the disturbance.
Nevertheless, the court finds that there
is substantial evidence to support Perry’s conviction. Sergeant Smith prepared
a written report detailing her observations. In addition, Sergeant Smith testified
during the hearing that she had observed Perry banging on the door. When asked
by the DHO if she was sure it was Perry, Sergeant Smith answered affirmatively.
Considering the testimony and incident report, there was
sufficient evidence to allow the DHO reasonably to reach the conclusion that
Perry is guilty of Inciting/Creating a Disturbance.
Furthermore,
it is for the fact finder—the DHO, in the disciplinary proceeding—to determine
the weight and credibility to place on each witness’s testimony. See Small
v. Pioneer Machinery, Inc., 329 S.C. 448, 465, 494 S.E.2d 835, 843 (Ct.
App. 1997) (“The fact finder is imbued with broad discretion in determining credibility or believability of witnesses.”); cf. Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 171 (Md. 1961) (“To what extent a confession or admission of a third party
is free of collusion and bears the indicia of trustworthiness is a question
which we think should be entrusted in the first instance to the sound
discretion of the trial judge.”). The fact that reasonable minds could
reach differing conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the Department’s
conclusion from being drawn from substantial evidence. Lee v. Harborside
Café, 350 S.C. 74, 564 S.E.2d 354 (Ct. App. 2002); Jennings v.
Chambers Dev. Co., 335 S.C. 249, 516 S.E.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1999).
CONCLUSION
Having
fully considered the briefs and documents filed by Perry and the Department and
viewing the record as a whole, under the standards set out in § 1-23-380(A) and (B), Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C.
354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000), the court finds that Perry’s disciplinary
conviction must be affirmed. Perry has not shown that the disciplinary hearing
conducted by the DHO was procedurally unsound. The DHO’s conclusions are
sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record. Further,
there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Department’s decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or the result of personal bias or prejudice. See Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 381, 527 S.E.2d at 757
(citing Brown v. Evatt, 322 S.C. 189, 194, 470 S.E.2d 848, 854 (1996); Crowe
v. Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 764, 259 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1979)). Accordingly, Perry’s
conviction must stand. It is therefore
ORDERED that the Department’s decision is AFFIRMED.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________
PAIGE
J. GOSSETT
Administrative
Law Judge
June 9, 2008
Columbia, South Carolina
Perry was also convicted of two other charges on
October 5, 2006: SCDC Disciplinary Code 811, Possession of a Weapon, and 828,
Out of Place. Although Perry wrote one Appellant’s Brief addressing all three
convictions, each conviction was appealed separately, and is thus considered a
separate case before the ALC. Perry’s appeal for his conviction for Possession
of a Weapon is addressed in docket number 07-ALJ-04-00109-AP, and Perry’s
appeal for his conviction for Out of Place is addressed in docket number
07-ALJ-04-00108-AP.
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