ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF
THE CASE
This
contested case is brought by Petitioners Bobby E. and Norma R. Danzie (Taxpayers)
claiming a refund based upon their 2002 State Income Tax Return. Jurisdiction
is granted to the Administrative Law Court (ALC) by S.C. Code Ann. §
12-60-470(F) (Supp. 2007). After timely notice to the parties, this matter was
heard on April 16, 2008. The issue is whether the Taxpayer filed a timely
request for a refund. Upon review of the evidence submitted and the testimony proffered,
this court concludes that the Taxpayers’ claim for a refund was untimely filed
and therefore must be denied.
FINDINGS
OF FACT
Having
carefully considered all testimony, exhibits and arguments presented at the
hearing of this matter, and taking into account the credibility and accuracy of
the evidence, I make the following findings of fact by a preponderance of
evidence:
1. In
2002, the Taxpayers had taxable income, $2,938 of which was withheld for income
tax purposes while Mrs. Danzie was employed at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and
remitted to the South Carolina Department of Revenue (Department). Mrs. Danzie
worked in South Carolina, although the couple resided out of state in Georgia near Augusta at the time of filing.
2. The
Taxpayers did not file their 2002 State Income Tax Return by the due date,
April 15, 2003. Mrs. Danzie engaged an accountant in 2003. The filing of
their 2002 tax return was delayed due to issues with someone else using their
son’s social security number and other issues on their federal tax return. On December
13, 2006, the Taxpayers filed their 2002 State Income Tax Return, claiming a
refund of $1,587. It is undisputed that the Taxpayers did not file any request
for extension with the Department.
3. The
Department issued a Final Agency Determination on June 18, 2007, that the
Taxpayers’ 2002 refund claim must be rejected as untimely filed because it was
filed beyond the three-year period provided in S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-85(F)
(Supp. 2007). The Taxpayers protested the Department's denial of the refund
claim on July 3, 2007.
4. The
Taxpayers contend they are entitled to the refund because Mrs. Danzie was
transferred from Germany in military service in 2002 and it was their first
time filing in the United States. As such, they could not claim losses until
the matter had been settled with the IRS, after appropriately obtained
extensions. Mr. Danzie argues that deadline problems were not encountered in
the state of Georgia and that they did not realize they had to file and pay South Carolina income taxes when they resided in Georgia and Mrs. Danzie simply worked in South Carolina. Therefore, they were unaware of the necessity of filing requests for
extension to preserve their refund claim. The Taxpayers contend that the
lateness of their filing should be excused based on ignorance of the law. It
is undisputed that the Taxpayers’ late filing was not deliberate.
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
Based
upon the above Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:
1. In
examining the Taxpayers’ claim for a refund, the applicable statutory provision
pertaining to the time limitation for refund claims is S.C. Code Ann. §
12-60-470(A) (Supp. 2007). This statutory provision provides:
A taxpayer may seek
a refund of a state tax by filing a written claim for refund with the
department. A claim for refund is timely filed if filed within the period
specified in Section 12-54-85. . . .
S.C. Code Ann. §
12-54-85(F)(1) (Supp. 2007) provides as follows:
Except as provided
in subsection (D), claims for credit or refund must be filed within three years
of the time the return was filed, or two years from the date the tax was paid,
whichever is later. If no return was filed, a claim for credit or refund must
be filed within two years from the date the tax was paid.
S.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-54-85(F)(1) (Supp. 2007). The statute was revised in 1997 to clarify that
the return must be timely filed. The Taxpayers have not met the requirements
of S.C. Code Ann. §12-54-85(F)(1) (Supp. 2007). To avail themselves of the
three-year limitation period for a claim for refund, the Taxpayers must have
filed a timely return. Thus, the three-year limitation period applies only to
amended returns, not to delinquent returns.
2. A
similar proposition may be found in the language of the Internal Revenue Code §
6511(a), which is almost identical to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-85(F)(1) (Supp. 2007).
There is substantial federal case law interpreting section 6511(a), which is
instructive in interpreting S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-85(F)(1) (Supp. 2007). In
the case of Arnzen v. I.R.S., 91-1 U.S.T.C. P50, 020, the taxpayers
filed their 1984 federal income tax return in April 1988 requesting a refund of
overpaid tax. The U.S. District Court held as follows:
Section 6511(a) must
be read to refer to a "timely" filed return. Thus, if the taxpayer
files a timely return, he has three years from the date the return was filed or
two years from when the tax was paid in which to file a claim for a refund. If
no return is timely filed, the second part of the sentence applies and the
taxpayer has two years from the date the tax was paid to file a claim for
refund. (citations omitted).
3. In
the instant case, the Taxpayers should have filed their refund claim no later
than April 15, 2005, in order to receive a refund of the amount claimed. That
is, the two-year limitation of Section 12-54-85(F)(1) would apply, rather than
the three-year limitation. Since the Taxpayers failed to timely file their
return initially, they had two years from the date their taxes were “paid” in
which to file a refund claim. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-85(F)(5)(a) (Supp. 2007)
provides that:
Payment of any
portion of the tax made before the last day prescribed for the payment of the
tax is considered made on the last day. The last day prescribed for filing the
return or paying the tax must be determined without regard to any extension of
time.
Inasmuch as their
2002 taxes were deemed paid on April 15, 2003, the Taxpayers’ refund claim had
to be submitted no later than April 15, 2005. The Taxpayers’ return and refund
request was not filed until December 13, 2006.
4. Alternatively,
the Taxpayers would have 180 days to request a refund resulting from adjustment
of their federal income taxes and resultant taxable income under S.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-54-85 (D)(3) & (4) (Supp. 2007). Their federal taxes were partially
refunded on June 5, 2006. Thus, the request for state tax refund on that basis
would have to be submitted by December 5, 2006. It is undisputed that the
Taxpayers’ request for refund was filed on December 13, 2006, eight days too
late even under this alternate method. Arguably, the date would be even
earlier under subsection (D)(4)(a)—when the IRS determined the refund was due.
As Jan Crangle of the Department testified, even if the Taxpayers had met that
deadline, they would be entitled only to that portion of their refund
attributable to adjustments in their federal taxes and federal taxable income,
not the entire refund.
5. Jan
Crangle testified that there are no reciprocal provisions between Georgia and South Carolina, such that the filing of Georgia taxes would toll the South Carolina time
limits. She also testified that there is no exemption for military personnel,
except those serving in a combat zone, which in any event would not be
applicable here. It is undisputed that Mrs. Danzie was not serving in a combat
zone and would not benefit from this exemption. Rather, this case is subject
to the ordinary refund time limits.
6. When
considering a refund statute, this court is guided by settled rules of
statutory construction. In South Carolina, the right to recover improperly
paid taxes is statutory in nature. C.W. Matthews v. S.C. Tax Comm’n,
267 S.C. 548, 230 S.E.2d 223, 226 (1976). Accordingly, taxpayers claiming a
refund of taxes must do so pursuant to the statute authorizing the refund. Guar.
Bank & Trust v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 254 S.C. 82, 173 S.E.2d 367, 370
(1970). In Asmer v. Livingston, 225 S.C. 341, 82 S.E.2d 465, 466
(1954), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that:
A refund of taxes is solely a matter of
governmental grace, . . . and any person seeking such relief must bring himself
clearly within the terms of the statute authorizing the same. . . .
The Taxpayers
have not met this burden and are not entitled to a refund pursuant to S.C. Code
Ann. § 12-54-85(F)(1) (Supp. 2007). S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-85 (Supp. 2007)
does not provide for any exceptions for individuals. This result may be
harsh, but the right to apply for a refund is purely statutory, and it is
incumbent upon those seeking relief to proceed according to the statute
affording such relief. Commonwealth of Va. v. Cross, 196 Va. 375, 83 S.E.2d 722 (1954).
7. “The
legislature is responsible for enacting a statutory scheme of taxation but each
taxpayer has certain definite responsibilities, also. Taxpayer responsibility
is stressed in court decisions as well as in statutes.” The statutory requirements cannot be waived by the Department or this court.
“[T]he jurisdictional requirement of a timely claim for refund stands paramount.
The I.R.S. may not waive this requirement.”
8. Furthermore,
reviewing courts have no legislative powers. A court’s responsibility is to
determine and give effect to the intention of the legislature. “To do
otherwise is to legislate, not interpret. The responsibility for the justice
or wisdom of legislation rests exclusively with the legislature, whether or not
we agree with the laws it enacts.” Smith v. Wallace, 295 S.C. 448, 452,
369 S.E.2d 657, 659 (Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted). In enacting S.C. Code
Ann. § 12-54-85 (Supp. 2007), the General Assembly protected the rights of
taxpayers against erroneous assessments. At the same time, in not providing
exceptions for untimely refund claims, the legislature virtually ensured that
the Department would not be inundated with requests for refunds after the
statutory period to create a workable tax administration.
9. The
U.S. Supreme Court has expressly recognized the administrative problem
government would encounter if there were equitable exceptions to statutorily
mandated time limits for requesting refunds of erroneously paid or assessed
taxes. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Breyer stated:
Tax law, after all,
is not normally characterized by case-specific exceptions reflecting
individualized equities. . . . [A]n “equitable tolling” exception. . . could
create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and
perhaps litigate, large numbers of late claims, accompanied by requests for
“equitable tolling” which, upon close inspection, might turn out to lack
sufficient equitable justification. . . . The nature and potential magnitude of
the administrative problem suggest that Congress decided to pay the price of
occasional unfairness in individual cases (penalizing a taxpayer whose claim is
unavoidably delayed) in order to maintain a more workable tax enforcement
system. At the least it tells us that Congress would likely have wanted to
decide explicitly whether, or just where and when, to expand the statute’s
limitations periods, rather than delegate to the courts a generalized power to
do so wherever a court concludes that equity so requires.
U.S. v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 351, 117 Sup. Ct. 849, 852 (1997). At the end of the
cut-off period, the government has to be able to depend on its budgeted amount
of money and bring closure to older claims. Timely claims for refund or
requests for extension equitably provide relief for Taxpayers and afford the
government notice that those claims are still outstanding to be paid. No
timely claim for refund or extension was filed in the instant case.
10. While
this situation is unfortunate for the Taxpayers and this court takes no joy in
its decision, the State must be able to carry out its duties and bring closure
to these matters. While I am sensitive to the concerns raised by the
Taxpayers, I do not possess unfettered discretion such that I can, by judicial
fiat, decide that the late filing should be allowed and the refund issued.
Rather, in reaching a decision in this matter, I am constrained by the
evidentiary record presented through the conduct of the trial in this case and
by the applicable law. In particular, it must be emphasized that the South
Carolina General Assembly has chosen to provide a very limited window for
filing for state tax refunds. Under that statute, the conclusion is
inescapable that there is no statutory exception to the filing deadlines for
individual tax returns or other legal basis to grant the Taxpayers’ request for
a refund.
ORDER
For
the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Taxpayers’ request
for a refund of $1,587 is denied.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
April 21, 2008 JOHN
D. GEATHERS
Columbia, South Carolina Administrative
Law Judge
1205 Pendleton Street, Suite 224
Columbia, South Carolina 29201-3731
Stineff v. Dep’t of Revenue, 8 Or. Tax 456 (1980).
Bryan v. U.S., 566 F.2d 1190 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
(unpublished opinion) (citing U.S. v. Garbutt Oil Co., 302 U.S. 528, 534, 535 (1938) (officer of the government has no power to waive statute of
limitations and Commissioner cannot consider untimely filed claims)).
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