ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) pursuant to S.C.
Code Ann. § 44-6-10 et seq. (Supp. 2003) and S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310 et seq. (1986 &
Supp. 2003). Appellant Peggy Troiano, seeks review of a decision of the South Carolina
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS or Department) that affirmed the denial of
Medicaid benefits for home oxygen therapy. Upon careful consideration of the record, the briefs
filed,
and the applicable law, I find that the Department’s decision to deny Appellant’s Medicaid
therapy must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Appellant has been diagnosed with toxic encephalopathy by Dr. Grace Ziem and
prescribed home hyperbaric oxygen therapy. Although Appellant had been prescribed this
treatment since 1999, the provider, American Health Services, had not been paid by DHHS. In
fact, the issue of whether American Health Services had been approved to be paid by DHHS was
never conclusively proven due to missing records on the part of both parties.
Following the denial of Appellant’s request that Medicaid cover her oxygen therapy and
equipment, Appellant made a request for a “fair hearing” before a DHHS hearing officer to
challenge the decision to deny her Medicaid therapy. The fair hearing was held on April 18,
2003, before DHHS hearing officer Barry W. Streeter. Appellant testified at the hearing on her
own behalf by telephone. Following the hearing, the hearing officer issued a decision on May
22, 2003, affirming the denial of Appellant’s Medicaid therapy. This decision was based upon
the hearing officer’s determination that, based on testimony and evidence presented, there was no
documented medical need for the home oxygen therapy as prescribed. By letter dated July 16,
2003, Appellant appealed that decision to the ALC.
The Medicaid Program is a joint venture between the states and the federal government to
provide medical assistance to individuals meeting certain financial and other criteria. The federal
government provides the majority of funding for Medicaid, although the states are required to
provide “matching funds” that contribute to meeting the costs of Medicaid.
The states furnish the primary administrative oversight for Medicaid, and each state has a
degree of flexibility in designing a program that can best meet the needs of its residents, given
the restrictions of the state's available resources. The federal government requires that certain
groups of individuals be covered by Medicaid, and a designated group of core services must be
offered by the program. However, beyond these required minimums, the states can pick and
choose among additional optional groups of people that may be covered and may also elect to
cover additional optional services. The federal and state laws and regulations for the various
programs must be complied with by the recipients.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When sitting in its appellate capacity, the ALC reviews agency decisions under the
standard of review set up in S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2003). Under that
standard, this court is not entitled to “substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” Id. However, this court may reverse or modify the
agency’s decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. Id.
“Substantial evidence” as used under this standard of review “is not a mere scintilla of
evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which,
considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the
administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action.” Lark v. Bi-Lo,
Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). This substantial evidence “is something
less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by
substantial evidence.” Id. at 136, 276 S.E.2d at 306. Accordingly, “[t]he findings of an
administrative agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by
substantial evidence.” Rodney v. Michelin Tire Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359
(1996). Finally, the party challenging an agency action has the burden of proving convincingly
that the agency's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters v. South Carolina Land
Resources Conservation Comm’n, 312 S.C. 219, 467 S.E.2d 913 (1996), citing Hamm v. AT&T,
302 S.C. 210, 394 S.E.2d 842 (1994).
DISCUSSION
The Appellant has failed to cite any specific errors committed by the DHHS hearing
officer. Instead, she has chosen to attempt to relitigate the issues which were heard by the
hearing officer below. In her brief the Appellant indicates that she would be willing to speak
with the court under oath. Appellant does not seem to understand the distinction between an
evidentiary hearing and an appellate one. Giving the Appellant the benefit of the doubt as a pro
se litigant, I will proceed to discuss the case as if the Appellant had raised valid errors of law.
In this appeal, Appellant argues that the therapy requested is medically necessary and was
prescribed by a physician as required. In response, DHHS argues that the medical test results
required by federal law were not supplied, and that the Department’s decision denying Appellant’s
therapy should be upheld. Although Appellant and her physician argue that the tests required by the
federal statute would not accurately measure the oxygen levels of the Appellant’s blood in the brain,
which is the source of her disability, the fact remains that an acceptable arterial oxygen partial
pressure or oxygen saturation percentage must be established to meet the Medicaid standards.
While this court, like the Department, is well aware of and greatly sympathetic to the difficult
financial situation faced by Appellant and the challenges that her affliction causes for daily living,
the Department’s decision to deny Appellant’s home oxygen therapy must be affirmed. The
eligibility standards for the Medicaid Durable Medical Equipment program simply do not allow for
different medical tests. The Appellant has not provided up to date test results that fall within these
guidelines. Therefore, the Department’s decision to deny Appellant’s home oxygen therapy must
be upheld.
ORDER
In the case at hand, the DHHS hearing officer applied the Medicaid guidelines accurately
and with an even hand, and his findings are supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of DHHS to approve the denial of Appellant’s
request for home oxygen therapy as Durable Medical Equipment provided by Medicaid is
AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________
Carolyn C. Matthews,
Administrative Law Judge
October 12, 2004
Columbia, SC |