ORDERS:
ORDER ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter was before me originally on the Motion of Petitioner INS for Summary Judgment
on the basis that the remaining petitioners (Challenging Petitioners) had no standing to object to the
issuance of a permit under the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. §13-7-40 and 24A S.C. Code Regs. 61-63. An Order Granting Summary Judgment and dismissing the Challenging Petitioners was issued
on October 22, 1997. Thereafter, the Challenging Petitioners requested reconsideration of the order
on three bases: (1) inadequate and improper consideration of documentary evidence and supporting
affidavits; (2) erroneous legal analysis; and (3) poor public policy. For the reasons set forth herein,
the Order Granting Summary Judgment is VACATED and this Order denying the motion for
summary judgment is issued.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD) has subject matter jurisdiction over
contested cases pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-600, et seq.(Supp. 1996) and 1-23-310, et seq. (1986 and Supp. 1996). This case is before me pursuant to a challenge to a renewal of South Carolina
Radioactive Materials License (No. 135) (the "License") issued by the Bureau of Radiological
Health, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC") to Interstate
Nuclear Services Corporation ("INS") on December 16, 1996. On December 23, 1996, INS filed a
Petition for Administrative Review appealing certain conditions contained in the License.
Subsequently, Environmentalists, Inc., Rosewood Development Association, Sierra Club, Edisto
Court Community Council, Isaac McClinton, and Lula Brown ("Challenging Petitioners") petitioned
for administrative review challenging DHEC's reissuance of the License.
On July 18, 1997, INS filed a SCRCP Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to
ALJD Rules 19(A) and 52, seeking the dismissal of the Challenging Petitioners from this contested
case hearing due to their alleged lack of standing. On August 4, 1997, the Challenging Petitioners
filed a Response, and a hearing was held on October 10, 1997 after the completion of all discovery.
The original order granting summary judgment was based upon the interpretation of relevant case
law regarding standing and the requirement that a petitioner suffer an injury in fact prior to bringing
an action. A more current review of the law demonstrates that in those instances in which the injury
alleged impacts the individual's health through exposure to hazardous substances a different
application of injury in fact is required to meet the test for standing.
FINDINGS OF FACT
For purposes of summary judgment, the evidence as well as the inferences that can be drawn
from such evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cafe
Associates, Ltd. v. Gerngross, 305 S.C. 6, 406 S.E.2d 162 (1991). Summary judgment is appropriate
only when the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, admissions, and affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact. Bravis v. Dunbar, 316 S.C. 263, 449 S.E.2d 495, 496 (Ct.
App. 1994). For purposes of summary judgment, the facts regarding standing are as follows:
1. INS operates a facility at 811 S. Edisto Avenue in the city of Columbia, South
Carolina which cleans and decontaminates garments used at nuclear enterprises and government
facilities. The residual radioactive waste is stored at the facility and subsequently shipped off for
disposal.
2. On December 16, 1996, DHEC renewed INS's Radioactive Material License (No.
135) pursuant to DHEC's authority under S.C. Code Ann. § 13-7-40, et seq. (Supp. 1996) and 25
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. § 61-63 (Supp. 1996) subject to certain conditions listed in the License.
3. On December 23, 1996, INS filed a Petition for Administrative Review appealing the
conditions contained in the License. Challenging Petitioners subsequently filed separate Petitions
for Administrative Review challenging the reissuance of the license itself. On January 8, 1997, these
separate Petitions were consolidated into one contested case by order of this tribunal.
4. Environmentalists, Inc. is a non-profit membership organization. At least two
members own businesses at least one mile from the INS facility. Three other members live at least
one mile from the facility, and two members live approximately five or six blocks from the facility.
They all alleged in the petition that they breathe the air, partake of outdoor activities, eat the food
grown in the vicinity, drink the water and travel the roads near the facility.
5. Ruth Thomas, President of Environmentalists, Inc., represented the organization
during discovery as its SCRCP Rule 30(b)(6) witness. Ms. Thomas testified that several members
of Environmentalists, Inc. resided or worked in the vicinity of the INS facility. Ms. Thomas
indicated a concern about the potential health risks placed on those members due to INS's handling
of radioactive materials at its facility. Upon specific questioning, the particular harm or injury
suffered by these members, including herself, resulting from INS's operations was the potential harm
from just living in the neighborhood. Thomas Dep. at 18-25. She also expressed psychological
concerns or fear associated with the proximity of the plant and the risk of exposure to radiation. See
Thomas Dep. at 21, 22, 23, 24.
6. The goal of the Environmentalists, Inc. is to raise questions about the facility. The
organization did not express a desire to close the facility or to relocate it.
7. Sierra Club is a non-profit membership organization devoted to the "wise use and
conservation of natural resources." Sierra Club alleges that its members own or use property, work,
travel, and recreate in the vicinity of the INS facility and regularly breathe the air, drink the water,
and use and enjoy natural resources of the Columbia area.
8. Thomas Perlic, Director of the South Carolina Sierra Club, represented the
organization during discovery as its SCRCP Rule 30(b)(6) witness. Mr. Perlic's testimony indicated
that several members of the S.C. Sierra Club, not including himself, reside near the INS facility. No
member has come forward to indicate any particularized harm or injury relating to the facility. Perlic
Dep. at 17. Mr. Perlic could not identify any individual members nor any particular harm or injury
suffered by these members, including himself and his wife, resulting from the INS's operations.
Perlic Dep. at 18. Sierra Club's concerns were the wastewater discharge from the facility, the use
of sludge from the facility as a fertilizer, and the possibility of airborne contaminants. The sole issue
for Sierra Club, as expressed by Mr. Perlic, was the location of the facility in a residential area.
9. In its Prehearing Statement filed with the Division, Sierra Club states that the release
of radioactive wastes into the environment poses a danger to human health and the environment.
Its members will suffer injury in fact from the degradation of the environment if INS continues to
operate under the DHEC permit.
10. Rosewood Development Association is a not-for-profit membership association. As
alleged in its petition, its members live, own property, work, travel, recreate, breathe air, drink and
use water, and eat foodstuffs grown in proximity to the INS facility.
11. Melvin E. Jenkins, Rosewood Development Association's coordinator, represented
the organization during discovery as its SCRCP Rule 30(b)(6) witness. Mr. Jenkins lives at least one
mile from the INS facility. The members of the Rosewood Development Association live near the
INS facility. In addition to expressing concerns about the potential health risks to those living in
close proximity to the INS facility, Mr. Jenkins specifically pointed to the risk of soil and water
contamination, the likelihood of property devaluation in the area, and the long term effects of
exposure to radiation especially if there is a release of elements into the air. Jenkins Dep. at 13, 14.
Mr. Jenkins provided no factual data to indicate that such contamination has occurred in the area
surrounding the INS facility, nor was any data provided showing INS's operations were the cause
of any past or present contamination. Jenkins Dep. at 18-19, 23. Additionally, Mr. Jenkins provided
no statistical support for the allegation that property values had decreased due to the presence of the
INS facility. Instead Mr. Jenkins relies on his expertise as a real estate agent to support his
contention that industrial development adversely affects property values. Jenkins Dep. at 27-28, 30-31.
12. Edisto Court Community Council is also a not-for-profit membership association.
Its petition contains the exact same allegations as those of Rosewood Development Association.
Members of Edisto Court Community Council include Isaac McClinton and Lula Brown.
13. Isaac McClinton lives approximately one-half mile from the facility. His allegations
are the same as those of Edisto Court and Rosewood Development.
14. Isaac McClinton testified during discovery as Edisto Court Community Council's
SCRCP Rule 30(b)(6) witness as well as on his own behalf as an individual. Mr. McClinton resides
less than two blocks from the INS facility. Mr. McClinton expressed concerns about health risks,
property devaluation, and fire hazards as a result of INS's operations in his community. Specific
health concerns are about the vapors and air quality for those persons living closely to the facility.
McClinton Dep. at 13-15, 20-23. Edisto Court Community encompasses approximately six streets
near the facility.
15. Lula Brown testified during discovery on her own behalf as an individual. She is also
a member of the Edisto Court Community Council. Ms. Brown lives directly adjacent to the INS
facility and her property is surrounded on three sides by the facility. The allegations in her petition
are the same as those listed for Rosewood Development Association. She also alleges that INS
discharges airborne contaminants onto her property. The only particular harm or injury, according
to Ms. Brown, was the presence of discomforting odors emanating from the INS facility. No
associated health problems could be linked to these odors by her. Like the other deposed witnesses
presented by the Challenging Petitioners, Ms. Brown's testimony expressed a concern and fear of
the potential risks associated with the handling and possible exposure to radioactive materials
resulting from operations at the INS facility.
16. A joint Prehearing Statement was filed by all Challenging Petitioners (except Sierra
Club) stating that the storage of radioactive wastes poses a hazard to human health and that
Petitioners are threatened by direct and personal harm to their interests from the continued operation
of the INS facility. The prehearing statement alleges that INS discharges airborne contaminants onto
Ms. Brown's property and that the facility will be discharging radioactive contaminants into the
environment exposing nearby residents and other persons to danger from radioactive contamination.
17. All of the petitions filed by the Challenging Petitioners state that DHEC has failed
to assure that INS is qualified by reason of training and experience and has adequate facilities,
equipment, and procedures to protect the public health. In addition, Petitioners allege that DHEC
has failed to assure that an adequate assessment had been made of the environmental impacts.
18. The affidavit of Dr. Duncan B. Howe, the expert witness for Challenging Petitioners,
states that exposure to radiation poses a risk of harm to human health and safety. High levels of
exposure are known to cause cancers, heredity defects and defects in fetal development. Exposures
to low levels of radiation "are thought to have the potential" to cause tumors and leukemias.
Research organizations and commissions have recommended that the annual dose of persons
exposed to radiation be reduced. The recommended annual radiation dose to the general public
should be reduced from 0.5 rem to 0.1 rem. This recommendation was adopted by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Finally, Dr. Howe states that the cancers associated with exposure to low
level radiation have long latency periods (from 8 to 20 years for leukemias and 12 to 40 years for
solid cancers or tumors).
19. The facility located at 811 S. Edisto Avenue has been in operation for over 20 years.
Interstate Nuclear Services began its operation of the facility in the 1980s.
20. The facility sought renewal of its license to receive, acquire, possess and transfer
radioactive material listed in the license and to use the radioactive material for the purposes and at
the place designated in the license. Condition 18 of the license states that the facility shall be
operated such that the dose from external sources does not exceed 0.05 rem in a year at any property
boundary. This condition represents a decrease from previous licenses which allowed a limit of 0.1
rem in a year.
21. Documents of INS reveal that through self monitoring of the location at the property
lines, the facility has measured levels of radiation approaching or exceeding 0.1 rem.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Summary judgment is proper where it is clear there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kreutner v. David, 320 S.C.
283, 285, 465 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1995). In deciding a SCRCP Rule 56 motion for summary judgment,
the evidence as well as the inferences that can be drawn from such evidence should be viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cafe Associates, Ltd. v. Gerngross, 305 S.C. 6, 406
S.E.2d 162 (1991). The issue here is whether each of the Challenging Petitioners has standing to
challenge DHEC's December 16, 1996 reissuance of INS's License. Viewing the evidence and
inferences in the light most favorable to each of the Challenging Petitioners, as a matter of law, the
Challenging Petitioners have standing.
2. In a dispute with DHEC, "[s]tanding shall be determined on the basis of applicable
statutes, regulations, case law and Board orders." S.C. Code Ann. Regs. § 61-72.401 (Supp. 1996).
The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act defines a proper party to a contested case as any
"person... properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(4) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
3. The test utilized to determine who is "entitled as of right" to be a party to a contested
case (i.e., the test to determine standing), is the "injury-in-fact" test established in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), refined in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and
consistently applied in previous Board and ALJD decisions. See, e.g., Environmentalists, Inc. v.
SCDHEC, Order No. 96-ALJ-07-0030 (June 18, 1996) (Stevens, A.L.J.) [hereinafter Giant Cement]; League of Women Voters of Georgetown County v. Wachesaw Plantation, Order No. 91-9-B (1991); Moss Creek Development Corp. v. SCDHEC, Order No. 87-18-B (1987); and In re Savannah River
Plant NPDES Permit, Order No. 85-6-B (1985).
4. An "injury-in-fact" is "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized... and (b) 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 560 (citations omitted); see Giant Cement; Savannah River Plant. "[T]he 'injury in fact' test
requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be
himself among the injured." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35).
5. Once a particularized injury is recognized, a party must show that such injury was (1)
caused by the other party (Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560) and (2) within the zone of interests protected by
the statute or regulation in question (Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 733; Savannah River Plant) in order
to meet the requirements of standing. Failure to meet the injury-in-fact test renders these additional
criteria moot and results in a lack of standing.
6. A party may not obtain standing solely by asserting the rights of a third party. Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975). An organization or association, acting as a party, may not
establish standing on the basis of general interest common to all members of the organization or the
public. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 736; Giant Cement. In order for an organization or association
to establish standing, it must demonstrate that at least one identified member has suffered an injury-in-fact. See Maryland Highway Contractors Ass'n v. State of Maryland, 933 F.2d 1246, 1251 (4th
Cir. 1991).
7. The issue in this case is whether the harm alleged by the Challenging Petitioners
constitutes injury in fact which is fairly traceable to INS. The United States Supreme Court has
announced repeatedly and has clearly stated in environmental cases that environmental and aesthetic
injury was the type of harmful effect adequate to satisfy the "injury in fact" standard. These types
of cases include those in which there is a non-economic injury encompassing the use and enjoyment
of natural resources or harm to the environment. These cases most often include those referred to
by the Challenging Petitioners on use and enjoyment of the beaches of this State, use and enjoyment
of the rivers, lakes, wetlands, or environmental impact on wildlife and marine life. See, e.g., South
Carolina Wildlife Federation v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 296 S.C. 187, 371 S.E.2d 521
(1988); S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. S.C. DHEC: In re Laurel Hill Plantation, DHEC Order
94-3-B; Geronimo et al. v. S.C. DHEC and Kiawah Resort Associates, DHEC Order 92-4-B. In
those cases, the harm resulting from the issuance of a permit affecting those areas was direct and
present as well as imminent. Challenging Petitioners and INS failed to cite any cases in which the
courts have addressed the issue of specific harm to an individual's personal health, particularly from
permitted nuclear activities. Few cases have addressed this specific injury.
8. The U.S. Supreme Court dealt specifically with standing in this area in Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595
(1978). In Duke Power, the Court held that the plaintiffs' allegations of environmental and health
injuries caused by the construction of two nuclear plants were sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact
requirement for standing. Specifically, the Court addressed whether exposure to a toxin is sufficient
to confer standing. The plaintiffs claimed that the future exposure to radiation from two nuclear
power plants under construction constituted injury in fact entitling them to challenge a statute
limiting liability for accidents at nuclear power plants. At the time of the suit, the plants were still
under construction, and therefore, plaintiffs had not sustained any radiation-related diseases as a
result of future emissions.
The lower court made several findings of fact regarding immediate effects on plaintiffs.
These included: (1) "the production of small quantities of non-natural radiation which would invade
the air and water; [2] a 'sharp increase' in the temperature of two lakes presently used for
recreational purposes resulting from the use of the lake waters to produce steam and to cool the
reactor; [3] interference with the normal use of the waters of the Catawba River; [4] threatened
reduction in property values of land neighboring the power plants; [5] 'objectively reasonable'
present fear and apprehension regarding the 'effect of the increased radioactivity in air, land and
water upon [appellees] and their property, and the genetic effects upon their descendants'; and [6]
the continual threat of 'an accident resulting in uncontrolled release of large or even small quantities
of radioactive material' with no assurance of adequate compensation for the resultant damage." Id.,
438 U.S. at 73. The Supreme Court held "[i]t is enough that several of the 'immediate adverse
effects were found to harm appellees. Certainly the environmental and aesthetic consequences of
the thermal pollution of the two lakes in the vicinity of the disputed power plants is the type of
harmful effect which has been deemed adequate in prior cases to satisfy the 'injury in fact' standard.
[Citations omitted]. And the emission of non-natural radiation into appellees' environment would
also seem a direct and present injury, given our generalized concern about exposure to radiation and
the apprehension flowing from the uncertainty about the health and genetic consequences of even
small emissions like those concededly emitted by nuclear power plants." Id., 438 U.S. at 73-74.
9. In this case, the Challenging Petitioners presented no evidence or facts to demonstrate
any type of harm to the natural resources (ponds, lakes, rivers, or other waters) in the vicinity of the
facility. There was no evidence of any immediate injury to these resources. However, evidence was
presented that the facility emits non-natural radiation into the air around the facility. In addition,
Challenging Petitioners also presented evidence about potential reduction in property values of land
neighboring the power plants, fear and apprehension regarding the effect of increased radioactivity
in the air, and the continual threat of an accident resulting in the uncontrolled release of quantities
of radioactive material into the environment.
10. A subsequent case interpreting Duke Power and applying the injury in fact test to
determine standing for health related injuries has found that exposure to toxins which are known to
cause injury to health even though manifested at a later date constituted direct and present injury. Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc., et al., 834 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1993). In Carlough,
plaintiffs who were exposed to asbestos but had not developed asbestos-related conditions brought
suit to recover damages for injuries. Their standing was challenged by the defendants. The court
held that "the exposure-only plaintiffs have already been exposed to a toxin" and that exposure
constitutes sufficient injury in fact to give the plaintiffs standing to sue. The "available medical data
on the health consequences of exposure to asbestos also require a conclusion that the exposure-only
plaintiffs have alleged a demonstrable physical injury which satisfies the ... injury in fact
requirement." Id., 834 F. Supp. at 1454.
11. Petitioners Lula Brown and Isaac McClinton have demonstrated a risk of exposure
due to their close proximity to the facility. Because Lula Brown and Isaac McClinton are members
of Edisto Court Community Council and its members are residents most likely to have been exposed
to the discharges into the air, Edisto Court also has demonstrated injury in fact.
12. The allegations and evidence of the remaining Challenging Petitioners, viewed in a
light most favorable to them, have demonstrated a fear of exposure to radioactive material and the
accompanying psychological effects from such fear. Members of the Sierra Club and
Environmentalists, Inc., have demonstrated an injury from the risk of exposure to their members.
These organizations seek to challenge the license because of their concern for the residents in the
neighborhood that may be exposed to airborne contaminants. These residents include Sierra Club
and Environmentalists, Inc. members. Rosewood Development Association has alleged the same
fear of exposure, but also threatened reduction in property values, and harm from long term exposure
to radiation. There has been no evidence of pollution of natural resources and no evidence to
connect the facility with any pollution of the drinking water, "foodstuffs", or natural resources
located in the vicinity. There is evidence of past and future emissions by INS into the environment.
13. Challenging Petitioners rely on Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. v. Watkins,
954 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1992) in which the Fourth Circuit determined that members of environmental
organizations could show injury in fact from allegations or evidence of discharge from a nuclear
reactor which contributed to pollution interfering with use of a river by its members. The Fourth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to have standing to redress environmental
injury. The injury was the pollution which interfered with the recreational use of the river by the
organization's members. Here, although neither Sierra Club nor Environmentalists, Inc., nor
Rosewood Development Association have testified to any facts to support their allegations that INS
contributes to pollution or harms the drinking water or natural waters used by their members, all of
the petitioners have expressed concern over the discharge of pollutants into the air.
14. Based upon the analysis of Duke Power and Carlough, these organizations have
demonstrated an injury in fact.
15. The question now turns to whether the injury is caused by the other party and whether
it is within the zone of interests protected by the statute or regulation in question. Whether the injury
is caused by INS is without question. The type of injury alleged and demonstrated by the
Challenging Petitioners is directly related to the activity occurring at the facility operated by INS.
The type of contaminant that may affect the air and the health of the petitioners is emitted by INS.
16. Finally, the injury occurring to Challenging Petitioners is within the zone of interests
protected by the statutes and regulations at issue. S.C. Code Ann. § 13-7-40 (Supp. 1996) provides
that DHEC is designated as the state agency responsible for the control and regulation of radiation
sources. It also provides that DHEC shall formulate, adopt, promulgate, and repeal regulations
relating to the control of ionizing and nonionizing radiation as well as provide by regulation for the
licensing or registration of radiation sources. No person may possess, use, or transfer a source of
ionizing or nonionizing radiation unless registered, licensed, or exempted by the Department. S.C.
Code Ann. § 13-7-40(A), (F), and (G) (Supp. 1996).
17. DHEC promulgated Regulation 61-63 on Radioactive Materials pursuant to the
statutory provisions. 24A S.C. Code Regs. 61-63 (Supp. 1996). The regulation applies to all persons
who receive, possess, use, transfer or acquire any radioactive material.
18. Regulation 61-63.3.13.1.1 provides that the licensee shall conduct operations so that
the total effective dose equivalent to individual members of the public from the licensed operation
does not exceed 0.1 rem in a year, exclusive of the dose contribution from the licensee's disposal of
radioactive material into sanitary sewerage allowed in accordance with Regulation 61-63.3.29.
19. Challenging Petitioners have shown that INS emits radioactive material from its
operations at its Columbia facility, which is an injury falling within the zone of interests protected
by S.C. Code Ann. § 13-7-40, et seq. (Supp. 1996) and 25 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. § 61-63 (Supp.
1996). Taken collectively, the Challenging Petitioners assert that their interests are adversely
affected due to the increased risk of harm presented by the close proximity of radioactive materials
handled and stored at INS's facility and the production of small quantities of radiation which invade
the air.
20. Since the Challenging Petitioners have established that the release of radioactive
material into the air constitutes injury in fact and that injury is causally connected to the operation
of INS and within the zone of interests protected by the statute and regulation, I conclude that they
have standing to maintain this action. Therefore, it is not necessary to determine whether the injuries
based on the possibility of an accident causing radioactive material to be emitted in unknown
quantities into the environment and the "present apprehension generated by this future uncertainty"
are sufficiently concrete to satisfy standing requirements. See Duke Power, supra, 438 U.S. at 73.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby
ORDERED, that INS's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
ALISON RENEE LEE
Administrative Law Judge
November 21, 1997
Columbia, South Carolina. |